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The central argument of the thesis is not that international law’s core is 
colonial, for that is the fundamental argument with which Anghie has established 
a new school in international law. Sornarajah has further magnified that argument 
to contend that, ontologically, private norm entrepreneurs, mostly Western 
scholars, have while using legal hermeneutics manufactured international 
economic laws, investment law in particular . As such, public international law 
principles have originated from colonialism and private and commercial 
arbitrations. The PCIJ Statute, 1920, listed writings of publicists and judicial 
decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. During the 
interwar period, a claim was made about the substantive completeness of 
international law; Lauterpacht, for instance, argued for the legalization of political 
dispute saying no non-liquet existed in international law. In support of the alleged 
normative completeness of international law, Lauterpacht argued that cases from 
domestic courts, British prize court for example, could be used to complete 
international law. Norms, procedural and substantive, are the building blocks of 
any law.  
 
The book argues that—contrary to the usual assumption—subsidiary 
sources have identified and developed primary sources of international law by the 
process of colonial norm entrepreneurialism of private actors. The thesis 
discursively brings to the fore norm entrepreneurialism’s colonial ontology and 
the various possible motivations animating the project. The two components of 
the subsidiary sources, judicial decisions and publicists of the various nations 
respectively, for the thesis, are the norms and actors that by conducting juridical 
lawgiving yielded primary sources of international law suitable to certain nations 
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[F]orcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, falsifying and whatever else is 
of the essence of interpreting [law].1  
 
If [the lawyers and arbitrators] promote directly or indirectly the spread of internationalism in 
law, it is because their specific careers, ambitions, and interests lead them to make personal 
investment at a particular time and place. The abstraction of international law is therefore 
closely tied to the activities of individuals and groups, who therefore give concrete meaning to 
the abstraction.2 
 
The key argument of my thesis is that private norms make public international law. I use 
Kelsen’s definition of a private norm as a half-power norm. To Kelsen’s private norm I add 
the distinction that Foucault made between a “juridical” and a “legal” function. While a legal 
function is about law and its application, a juridical function is about a network of power that 
mimics and competes with the legal function in a society. Foucault suggests that we study the 
techniques and tactics of domination to understand power and the network that generates it. 
The ontology of the power of writers and their techniques of colonial domination through 
legal argumentations forms the core of my arguments.  
 
I argue that since the start of the nineteenth century, a network of power and capital 
relations has created international law. Aiming at the protection of private property—mostly 
colonially acquired—in the interwar period jurists aided the coupling of the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, III, 24, quoted in, JH Miller, Introduction to Charles 
Dickens, Bleak House (Penguin Books, 1971) 11. 
2 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the construction 




bourgeois class and the interpretation of international law. This resulted in a contractual 
approach to international law.  
 
Indeed, private capital is central to accounts of colonialism and international law. 
Foucault has commented upon the longstanding relationship of private capital with legal 
institutions in Europe.3 As such international law is a European capital-juridical relationship 
internationalised that could be unpacked using, in good measure, Kelsen’s definition of 
private norm.  
 
In 1920 the birth of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (the PCIJ) was a watershed moment. The PCIJ Statute article 38(1)(d) wrote into the 
text of the law both private individuals as scholars and judicial decisions—both domestic and 
international law—as sources for the determination of the rules of law.  The text reads thus: 
 
[S]ubject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.4 
 
This early nineteenth century text, one that originated in 1920, cast in stone writings and 
judicial decisions as subsidiary sources of international law. Subsequently, in the interwar 
period, writers wrote for private capital and pacta sunt servanda, first, against the new post-
Tsar Russian state. As discussed in various chapters, hybrid arbitral awards would use 
domestic law as well as a moralist vocabulary to decide against the State. That states, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 M Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the discourse on Language (Pantheon Books, New York, 
1972) 45. 
4 The ICJ Statute < http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2> 
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particularly the postcolonial ones, do not make international law became palpably visible 
after decolonization. To ensure the continuity of colonial international law, a network of 
scholars termed the new resolutions by developing nations in the UN as political and non-
normative. In such ways they continued to produce international law suitable to a global 
bourgeois class by identifying international law’s primary sources. In other words, 
international law is a product of private juristic writings and judicial decisions–both national 
and international.  
II. On Methodology 
A. On Norm Typology and Norm Production 
 
Any law is made up of a number of norms. The nature of norms defines the character of 
the law that it makes. During the interwar period, in 1934, Hans Kelsen identified four kinds 
of norms: basic, general, individual or private. For Kelsen, the very distinction between 
public law and private law reflected “an opposition between law and power”. He called a 
private norm at best a “non-legal or only half-legal power” norm.5 In Kelsen’s analytical 
jurisprudence, any law is a combination of norms; norms that are homogeneously basic and 
general and those that are a hybrid—a mixture of any two or more types of norms. Borrowing 
the definition of a private norm from Kelsen, I argue that private norm, a power norm, is the 
core norm of international law. 
 
Furthermore, during the Cold War, Foucault implored thinkers to abandon the view that 
power is solely contained in “juridical sovereignty and State institution”. He suggested that 
we look into the networks of individuals that employ “the techniques and tactics of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




domination” and thereby generate knowledge as power.6 Foucault’s reference to “juridical” 
refers to the conception of power relations.7 At the same time, Foucault further called for an 
examination of the relation “between the bourgeois family and the functioning of judicial 
authorities and categories in the nineteenth century”.8 Overall, law in Foucault’s analysis is 
about a network of power and European capital; the bourgeoisie and the judicial authorities 
were in a relationship of procreating capital. It is hardly surprising then that international law 
too was about a network of powerful individuals—the writers of the so-called law of nations 
that became textually recognized sources of international law in the twentieth century. 
 
Habermas adds further nuance to the issue of power in legal theory. “Sociologists, 
lawyers, and philosophers, Habermas observes, “disagree over the appropriate 
characterization of the relation between facticity and validity”.9 The question that he raises is 
about the convertible currency of the fact and the law. Foucault might offer an illuminating 
potential for Habermas’ fact-law dichotomy; that a network of power relations, a set of 
individuals, can covert a fact into a valid norm and vice versa. Indeed, the positivist lawyers 
of the long nineteenth century constructed the validity of international law by ignoring the 
fact of an equal existence of the non-European peoples.  
 
A good example is the validity of unequal treaty regimes, which dictated that consent is 
not essential to international law’s sources. Coercion would not vitiate a treaty if validly 
applied. Additionally, the positivist lawyers rejected as non-law what the anthropologists and 
the sociologist thought were valid law of the natives. Anghie’s characterization of the fact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 M Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Book, New 
York, 1980) 102.  
7 Victor Tadro, Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault, 18 Oxford J Legal Studies 
(1998) 75, 76. 
8 Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge, supra note 3, 45. 
9 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) 8. 
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colonialism as central to the validity of international law, a seminal contribution to our 
understanding of sovereignty, proves the point. 10 I read Anghie’s work as illuminating the 
role of jurists in the making of international law.11 
 
Indeed, the classic positivists overlooked the fact of colonialism when assessing, even 
extending the validity, of international law. In a class-based examination of the global order 
and law, Chimni has argued that international law is a law made suitably by and for the 
capitalist class within nations.12 Anghie has helped us understand better the extent to which 
the doctrines of international law have been created through colonial encounters. I examine 
the writers of international law as lawmakers. It is ironical that while giving states the 
lawmaking powers, behind the scene, individual writers determined the sources of law. 
Writers, positivists or otherwise, thus produce a juridical intrigue; while a sovereign alone 
could make law, effectively the writers explained the law. Behind the veil of the nineteenth 
century sovereignty stood individual writers, connected by a network of power, supplying, as 
and when needed, private norms as public international law.  
 
If common law did not come from God, where did it come from? It was one thing to speak of 
“natural law” when nature was conceived to be the expression of divine lover or order, and 
quite another to find universal legal norms in Darwinian nature, red in tooth and claw. The 
natural law project has never recovered what Nietzsche called the death of God (at the hands of 
Darwin). If not God or nature, where could the common law have come but from judges 
themselves? That would make them legislators – unelected ones, to boot.13 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, NY, 2004). 
11 Ibid, chaps 2 and 4. 
12 BS Chimni, Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law, 21 EJIL (2010) 57. 




Judge Posner’s eloquent expression of the problems with precedents is worth pondering: “But 
the challenge remained of explaining just how the creation of legal principles as by-products 
of judicial decision making could confer on them a political legitimacy equivalent to that of 
legislative rules.”14 Posner talks of the need for an explanation that would offer judicial 
decisions “political legitimacy equivalent to that of legislative rules” in a domestic set up. 
The problem is deepened when we try to evaluate the role of precedents in international law. 
Although, to a large extent, imparting political legitimacy to domestic judicial decisions 
equivalent to that of domestic legislative rules is solved by the common law theory of 
precedents; in international law the thorny issue of legitimacy persists, despite the text of the 
law – the PCIJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) – that regards judicial decisions and writings 
“subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law”. Besides, writers are often 
imbedded in judicial decisions, as seen in the British and North American cases (see chap 1 
and 5) in the process legitimising the presence of each other to lay a claim to the sources of 
international law. 
 
Nevertheless, the examination of the role of writers as sources of international law by reading 
two domestic cases is instructive. Decisions from an American and a British court, 
respectively, stamp the stellar role of judicial writings as sources of international law during 
the colonial times. In the United States in the Paquete Habana case, what Grey J. wrote 
emphasizes the evidentiary function of jurists.15 In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, the Privy 
Council based solely on juristic writings decided that robbery was not an essential element in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Posner, Ibid15. A van Mulligen, Framing deformalisation in public international law, 6 Transnational Legal 
Theory (2005) 635, 655 “precedents and authoritative interpretations often impose reference points which actors 
cannot easily escape”. 
15 [T]he works of jurists and commentators who by years of labour, research, and experience have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by 
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 (1900), 700. 
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piracy jure gentium.16 More recently, authors have spoken about the role jurists should—and 
indeed play—in the making of international law.17 International law’s leading text writers 
have recorded that juristic opinion indeed ‘lead to the formation of international law’.18  Most 
recently, in The Philippines v PR China dispute, the Philippines ‘suggested that the Tribunal 
… review the academic literature.’19   
 
B. Statement, Description and Coherence as a Methodology 
 
When supplying a description or a set of descriptions, international law, like history, 
often draws upon a totalizing world-view. To the extent international law embodies the 
totalising and methodologically Universalist view, the critique of history is also applicable to 
international law. It is a truism today that globalisation, and its predecessor colonialism, were 
a product of the totalising view of the industrial societies. For acknowledging the world’s 
normative diversity we need to apply, at least in spirit, the space of dispersion to recognize 
the norms, rules and laws that to the industrial societies appeared non-law of only customs. 
Foucault challenges the pre-determined industrial and universalist teleology of historians:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] AC 586 at 588-9.  
17 Heller for example writes, ‘the US government has released the notorious memorandum … I’m a bit 
disappointed not to get a mention in the memo; people in the know have suggested that a post I wrote in April 
2010 led the OLC to substantially rewrite it.’ See, KJ Heller, ‘Let’s Call Killing al-Awlaki What It Still Is—
Murder’, Opinio Juris (23 Jun 2014). One of the earliest articles on sources is Gordon E. Sherman, The Nature 
and Sources of International Law, 15 American J Intl L (1921) 349-360; M Virally, The Sources of International 
Law, in M Sørensen (ed), Manual of Public International Law (London: Macmillan, 1968) 144–5; PK Menon, 
Primary, Subsidiary and other Possible Sources of International Law, 1 Sri Lanka J Intl L (1989) 113-150; K 
Nicolaïdis & J Tong, Diversity or Cacophony? The Continuing Debate over Sources of International Law, 24 
Michigan J Intl L (2004) 1349-1375. T Skouteris, The Force of a Doctrine Art. 38 of the PCIJ Statute and the 
Sources of International Law, in, F Johns, R Joyce & S Pahuja, (eds) Events The Force of International Law 
(NY: Routledge, 2011) 70. G Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Perspectives 
(Edward Elgar, 2012). See, AH Qureshi, Editorial Control and the Development of International Law, 61 
Political Q (1990) 328–339. 
18 IA Shearer (ed) Starke’s International Law, 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 1994) (original edition 1947) 44. 
19 The Philippines v PR China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case no 2013-09 (29 October 




A total description draws all phenomena around a single center—a principle, a meaning, a 
spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would deploy the 
space of dispersion.20  
 
I deploy in some measure Foucault’s critique of history. As a result, the thesis takes a 
discursive approach to norms, law formation and application. A discursive approach to law is 
not majorly concerned with the unity of global law; on the contrary, as a methodology, it 
deconstructs international law to lay threadbare the nature and conduct of norms constituting 
international law. Hence the discursive legal project is not one of lasting foundations of 
international law, but one of rebuilding foundations by acknowledging disruptions and 
diversity in the history of legal ideas. Postcolonial nations, I argue, are agents of that 
disruption as they represent diversity. 
 
Admittedly, however, the notion of such a discursive discontinuity is paradoxical: it is both 
an instrument and an object of research. For my thesis, the discursive legal formations are an 
instrument of research. Although a methodology of study purports to offer objectivity to that 
study, Descartes has in the past emphasized ideological motivations that typically undercut 
methodological choices: “[T]here are few people who are willing to express everything they 
themselves believe; [f]or the act of thinking by which we believe something is different from 
the act by which we know what we believe, and one often occurs without the other”.21 
 
I borrow Foucault’s general methodology as consolidated by him in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge.22 The history of ideas, Foucault says, usually credits discourse with the duty to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Foucault, supra note 3, 10. 
21 R Descartes, Discourse on Method and Related Writings (Penguin Book, London, 1999) 19. 
22 Foucault, supra note 3, 149. 
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establish coherence.23 If the narrative of the history of ideas, or more particularly, that of the 
history of international legal ideas, notices an irregularity or “incompatible propositions” it 
becomes imperative to then find “a principle of cohesion that organizes the discourse and 
restores to it its hidden unity”.24  
 
Foucault says that a “law of coherence is a heuristic rule” asking writers “to admit that if they 
speak, and if they speak among themselves, it is rather to overcome these contradictions, and 
to find the point from which they will be able to be mastered.”25 Not just that, a writer has to 
then prove that the artificial coherence just achieved is the result of a research and a 
methodology applied therein. Thus while challenging the building of an artificial cohesion in 
an even more contrived history of the alleged unity of legal ideas, Foucault, almost 
unintentionally, introduces “contradiction” as a methodology to research law.  
 
A reading of Foucault not only problematizes research methodology, but it also offers non-
coherence, dispersion and discontinuity as a method of enquiry of the law. Contradiction as a 
lens, if deployed, thus allows readers to see the sources of international law—particularly the 
subsidiary sources—critically. I seek to bring the private norms of public international law to 
the fore. To achieve this, I deploy contradictions and non-coherence in the grand nineteenth 
century arguments about law as methods.  
 
As a methodology, I do not try to overcome the contradictions for that is a contrived reality. I 
argue instead that it is not the coherence but the contradiction implicit in the universalism of 
international law that best explains the sources of international law. The private life of public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 




international law, it is argued, has been lived through a kind of norm entrepreneurialism. And 
to describe the private life of public international law, more than coherence, contradiction as 
a methodology has critical purchase.  
 
As noted earlier, the statement of the ICJ article 38(1)(d) is the object of the analysis here. A 
typical deconstruction of a “statement”, as Foucault says, exposes its element that can 
“reappear, dissociate, recompose, gain in extension or determination, be taken up into new 
logical structures, acquire, on the other hand, new semantic contents, and constitute partial 
organisations among themselves.”26 Foucault further remarks that “[t]hese schemata make it 
possible to describe—not the laws of the internal construction of concepts, not their 
progressive and individual genesis in the mind of man—but their anonymous dispersion 
through texts, books, and œuvre.”27 A space of dispersion, as against the unity of a world-
view implicit in the very existence of international law borrows Foucault’s deployment of 
“incompatibility, intersection, substitution, exclusion, mutual alteration, [and] 
displacement”.28  
 
The lens of incompatibility, I argue, allows us to magnify the inconsistency in the teleology 
of the classic international law; that while this law is called the law of the nations, yet its 
doctrine imparts law-making powers to certain individuals of the nations so identified as “the 
highly qualified publicists”. Thus the sources of international law equate nations and its 
publicists by offering lawmaking powers to them both at the high noon of colonialism; a 
European corporate enterprise by which many Asian and African nations were robbed of their 
sovereignty. Colonialism ensured that western scholars, aided by the doctrine of the law, 
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enjoyed power equal to states in determining the applicable law. It is argued that discourse 
and system, here a system of norms that constitute international law, produce each other.29 
For the purposes of methodological rigour, it is important to address the possibility of 
incoherence implicit in a discursive analysis of norms formed during the colonial enterprise 
of European companies. 
 
And the classical scholars, so elevated as to become equivalent to states, deploy 
cosmopolitanism as a tool to explain and analyse international law. Foucault attacks the 
notion of progress and a European view of civilization as soiled with the teleology of a 
world-view. He challenges the implicit assumptions that historians make in describing 
sporadic events as total history. His methodological approach frees, as it were, the small 
spaces of law’s alternative analysis from the tyranny of a cosmopolitan view.30 In other 
words, sometimes, as Barber puts it, a departure from a “common understanding” of a 
principle is essential to produce successful interpretations.31 The common understanding of 
the sources of international law, the thesis contends, is an apt candidate for the departure.  
 
III. PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The frontiers of a book [or a thesis] are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first line, and the 
last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, supra note 3, 76. 
30 Ibid, 10. Inspired by later writings of Foucault, Orford has recently called for description as a method for 
writing about law. Anne Orford, In Praise of Description, 25 Leiden J Intl L (2012) 609–625. 
31 NW Barber, The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory, 35 Oxford Journal of Legal 




system of reference to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network … 
The problems raised by the œuvre are even more difficult. 32    
 
That said, this book is divided into three time-blocks; the years before the League of Nations 
(nineteenth century), the interwar period (1920-1945) and the decades after decolonization 
(1946 onwards). The five chapters of the book are connected by the coverage of that time 
period. Chapter 1 examines the scope of writers in domestic decisions and its impact on the 
PCIJ Stature negotiating history. Chapter 2 discusses the interwar period and the role of 
writers in shaping international law. Chapters 3 and 4 discusses the after the post-UN world 
and decolonization. Chapter 5 looks at the phenomena of the contractual approach to 
international law and, post-decolonisation, internationalisation of contracts and the role of 
scholarly innovation before the thesis is concluded in chapter 6. 
 
While, aspiring to the conditions of a colonial legal theory, my book is a node within the 
network of the TWAIL’s œuvre. The legitimacy of law depends upon its sources. Domestic 
law, for example, gathers its legitimacy from legislative lawmaking. An ontological survey of 
international lawmaking however reveals that even private individuals can make public 
international law although arbitral tribunals have, during the decades after decolonisation,  
shot down General Assembly resolutions by states as lacking enough normative force.33 That 
makes clear today the power of writers as individual actors whose texts can generate 
international law. Since the early days of colonisation, public international law has lived an 
out and out private normative life. The empire of the private law continues to exist today too. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, supra note 3, 23. 
33 Anghie, supra note 10, 231. 
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A. Before the League (1800-1920) 
 
Whichever camp one lives in, positivism or naturalism, none can deny the purported 
quality of law’s omnipresence. Yet, historically, the nineteenth century text writers saw laws 
of certain lands as customs bereft of normative quality, and lands peopled by lawless others. 
Such a patronising view of law can only be a political project. In other words, whatever the 
nature of law in the European societies, when faced with the diversity of legal systems due to 
colonial encounters, European writers saw the laws of Asia and Africa as primitive, customs 
that could ripen into law. They were faced with two choices: either respect the diversity and 
speed with which such societies want their customs to ripen into law, or simply impose 
European law, one that had strong bias of industrial society, on the natives under the shadow 
of threat and use of force. Since the European polities adopted a variegated approach to their 
imposition in the East, unequal treaties as well as full colonialism, their writers drafted 
international law to mean a law that would exclude some of the privileges, even the sense of 
individual will and autonomy, given to Europeans. Having hunted down the native legal 
system, to use Judge Posner’s eloquent words, naturalists were red in tooth and claw. 
 
For example, in the eyes of the nineteenth century writers, an unequal treaty, made by 
the use of force and therefore lacked consent, was still legal. This position of international 
law would hold true even when in Europe private law would put supreme premium on 
consent in contract and protection of private property within the law of corporations. The 
Law of Nations was essentially the law of the European Nations. In fact as O’Connell wrote, 
while approaching the question of the existence or otherwise of a “doctrine in English law”, 




structures, a unity founded on the moral concord of Western peoples.” “This”, he thought, “is 
one of the primary uses of comparative law”.34  
 
However, if colonialism is generously read as an exercise in comparative law, given 
the purported lack of law in native societies, there wont be any comparative business to do. In 
fact the PCIJ Statutes article 38(1)(c) makes is rather clear: general principles of law 
recognized by civilised nations. In the minds of western lawyers, only a land moving fast 
towards urbanisation and industrialisation with an appetite for raw materials and finished 
products could be “civilised”. At this point western scholars divided societies into civilized, 
semi-civilized and native (therefore ought to be subjected to the full force of colonialism).  
Lex mercatoria in such ways parented natural international law. After the Treaty of 
Westphalia, lex mercatoria would be handed down as the positive law of the state. Positivism 
and naturalism within international law, it is argued, are then a chimera of form and content. 
 
That said, the dissection of international law’s doctrine on sources reveals its common 
law and civil law parentage. Given the Statute of the PCIJ was drafted at the high noon of 
colonialism, is it any surprise that the teleology of international law was colonial. Yet it took 
about a century since for Third World scholars to initiate an archaeology of international 
legal norms. The reasons are fairly obvious; after the mayhem of World War II, international 
law of human rights finally seemed to fulfil the cosmopolitan promise of international law. 
The structure of international legal arguments, oscillating between naturalism and positivism, 
stood clear of the colonial question. As Anghie argues, for the western writers, colonies and 
colonialism “constituted a separate and distinctive set of issues which were principally of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 O’Connell, supra note 42, 4. 
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political character”.35 They were not the issues that “generally impinge in any significant way 
on the core theoretical concerns of the discipline.” 36  
 
A typical catalogue of international legal texts tell those books which develop rules 
for the protection of capital from those defending states’ sovereignty. The problem however 
is that both kinds of texts lend claim to the benevolent production of a language of law for 
universal consumption. Such claims often overlooks an otherwise simple fact that an 
advocacy for the transnational bourgeoisie, often from capital exporting countries, is 
presented as public international law for even the subaltern classes.37 A text is thus presented 
as an innocent and enabling register of norms although the disabling potential of this very 
text is palpably implicit. 
 
In the sixteenth century England, the Parliamentary called for an oversight over corporate 
activities on British companies. The growing volume of colonial enterprise, of the East India 
Company for example, called for the judicial review of legislative ordinances. Interestingly, 
British law required that legislative ordinances not be repugnant to the laws of the nation as 
understood in England.38 And actors—writers of the law of nations—determined the norms of 
this law in England, followed almost verbatim in North America. In such way, the law of 
nations internationalized corporate law. Since corporate law is a progeny of civil law and 
common law intercourse in Europe, it is hardly surprising that a small incision in the body of 
the law of nations exposes its corporate bones. So provincialized, international law and its 
sources thus become a story of private capital and bourgeois legal norms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid. 35. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Chimni, supra note 12, 70 ff. 





B. The Interwar Period (1914-1945) 
 
After the first World War, much of what passed off as public international law were 
opinions furnished by “the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” drawing 
upon judicial decisions. The end of the World War I, mutatis mutandis, entrenched in the first 
definitive text on the sources of international law, the PCIJ, an European-North American 
practice of using writers of international law as sources in domestic courts. Article 38(1)(d) 
of the Statute listed “judicial decisions” and private writings as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of international law. By so doing it acknowledged the long-
established role of private power-privileging norms in the making of lawmaking. Besides, the 
appearance of both judicial decisions and writers as subsidiary sources cast in stone a 
compromise between common law and civil law jurisdictions.  
 
How do the public and the private appear in the colonial registers of law? A study of 
nineteenth century cases between native investors and kings and the East India Company is 
instructive. Forever divided between the private and the public actions of the Company, the 
British courts too became agents of colonialism. For example, in Ex-Rajah of Coorg v East 
India Company, while condoning the confiscation of the promissory notes belonging to the 
native king, a British court refused a remedy because the Company’s taking possession of the 
notes was not of “mercantile character …but … in the exercise of their sovereign and 
political power.”39 The nineteenth century British courts ratified those acts of the British 
Companies that brought land territory to the Crown, but did not accept, on the logic of the 
public and private division of the acts of such companies, the encumbrances attached to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ex-Rajah of Coorg v East India Company  (1860) 54 E.R. 642, 646-47. 
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land captured.40 
The dawn of the League of Nations buried under its civilizational vocabulary non-
European norms and values; all for an instrumental formulation of the law of diplomatic 
protection of aliens and subsequently, as some argue, international investment law.41 Much 
earlier, arbitral tribunals had catalogued the doctrine of unjust enrichment; its American 
equivalent being restitution, within international law after the common law jurists had 
invented it by a reference to ethical-juridical principles.42 Irony practically wrote itself into 
the common law then, as ethical dimension of this contractual law were used later to defend 
unethically acquired colonial properties. Yet jurists argued for the use of private law against 
State to keep investors in good humour. The empirical work, by Garth and Dezalay, on 
international commercial arbitration that takes a sociological approach points to both the 
invention of lex mercatoria and the internationalisation of private law as the characteristic of 
the 1960s and 1970s: 
 
The legal importance of the great petroleum conflicts depended on the fact that they coincided 
with a dramatic increase in international commerce and the emergence of of new states 
insisting on their legal sovereignty. As long as the economic exchange between North and 
South proceeded essentially under a more or less colonial regime, the issue of the applicable 
law was hardly posed.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Tulloch v Hartley (1841) 62 ER 814. In this case the court gave judgment, without mentioning any doubt as to 
the jurisdiction like in Doss v Secretary of State for India in Council Equity (1874–75) LR 19 Eq. 509, 516. 
41 D Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to the Standards of Civilised Justice? 5 
Transnational Legal Theory (2015) 62. 
42 DP O’Connell, Unjust Enrichment, 5 American J Comparative Law (1956) 2. 
43  Bryant G Garth & Yves Dezalay, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press, 1996) 85–86. Cf. “Over the next 
decade and a half, opposition to arbitration developed, predominantly from leftist academics, anti-globalization 
groups, and States that found themselves as respondents in investment treaty arbitrations.” Charles Brower & 
Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” 






Both extravagant naturalism and parsimonious positivism, the two dominant schools of 
international law, have failed to capture the normative intrigue that colonialism and its spin 
offs after decolonization have created. Moreover, the natural law approach of the British 
judges ran parallel to the naturalism, jus gentium, of Vitoria who, although recognized the 
cultural autonomy of the native Indians, argued that a natural law, against the Papal law, 
“naturalizes and legitimates a system of commerce and Spanish penetration”.44 Vitoria’s 
technique of using natural law, more in the nature of the lex mercatoria, allowed “the 
particular cultural practices of the Spanish” to become universal.45  
 
Similarly, believing restitutionary remedies had their genesis in natural law, scholars 
propounded a natural law doctrine of unjust enrichment: “[E]ssentially a restitutionary 
remedy founded on the broadest of moral principles was brought by the fiction of implied 
undertaking within the province of contract”.46 The common law method of implications 
allowed British jurisprudence to impregnate the private law of contracts with a moral 
vocabulary. The British private law and international law scholars have worked overtime to 
develop such arguments for European investors, a story discussed in various chapters of the 
thesis. 
 
Building on older arbitral decisions, Lauterpahct, in 1927, drew a robust private law 
analogy of public international law. Three years later, in the Lena Goldfield arbitration the 
tribunal decided to wrap a simple contractual breach in the vocabulary of moralism. It also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Anghie, supra note 10, 20-21 
45 Ibid. “The quest for a third legal order stems from many jurists’ conviction that neither municipal law nor 
international law is appropriate or suitable for dealing with international commercial disputes when parties from 
different countries are involved.” AFM Manriruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A 
challenge for International Commercial Arbitration? 14(3) American Univ Intl L Rev (1999) 657-734. 
46 O’Connell, supra  note 42, 4. 
 
 
	   19 
	  
represented the elevation of a private law principle to international law. The interwar Lena 
Goldfields arbitration against the Soviet Russia simply picked the overeager claimant’s 
argument to inject into the Award a general vocabulary of justice and morality in an 
otherwise pure and simple contractual breach.47 Around 1930s, as a parallel, mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals repeatedly applied restitutionary techniques based on considerations of unjustified 
enrichment in deciding cases involving uncompleted business dealings, which had lost their 
contractual basis through the provisions of the Peace Treaties. Such attitudes had begun to 
nourish a prototype of a transnational law, corporate law internationalized. 
 
In England private scholars collated judicial techniques developed over the centuries and 
internationalized it to develop rights for the Western bourgeoisie. To a corporate lawyer, 
international law was a seamless extension of the contractual project that went around the 
world finding cheap labour and raw materials. Colonialism was thus corporate law 
transnationalised. The contract, through moralist pacta sunt servanda, went on to represent 
the basic unit of a cosmopolitan order. The grand norm of international law, I argue, is a 
contract and its vehicle a corporation.  
 
C. After the World War II (1945- to this day) 
 
After mass decolonization, pro-investment lawyers continued to argue that the New 
International Economic Order (the NIEO) does not amount to a successful lawmaking, 
although extravagant writings and arbitral awards, for them, do act as sources. That a handful 
of academicians and arbitrators can make international law, but not a population of countries 
causes a juridical intrigue. My thesis examines and explains that intrigue.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Professor O’Connell was of the opinion that the civil law or the common law 
traditions are a product of the “essential unity of all European legal structures, a unity 
founded on the moral concord of Western peoples”.48 It is no less true that international law 
too is a projection of the colonial concord of Western peoples. This originary revelation 
aside, the extent of the role played by private norm entrepreneurialism in the colonial 
ontology of international lawmaking remains an under-researched area of legal sciences. The 
sources of international law are both a story of private entrepreneurs and an elevation of the 
private norm into the category of public international law. Curiously enough, in sharp 
contrast with domestic laws, publishing books, commentaries and articles determine 
international law, almost akin to a legislative exercise by private individuals and judges.  
 
Such a privileged lawmaking is exclusionary as an invisible college of the Western 
lawyers, all the same constituting a class, made laws for investors first against the Soviets 
during the interwar period. Subsequently, in investor-state disputes, such awards, amalgam of 
factual data as well as constitutive of European values, were used as precedent against newly 
decolonized countries. The panoply of actors, norms and processes of international 
lawmaking has presented an enigma to the majority of decolonized nations that, during 
1960s, believed that “will” of the nations, as said in the Lotus case, alone makes international 
law. 
 
A naïve view of the newly decolonized states was sustained by the received statist 
view of international law and its processes. For a very long time now, the aforementioned 
statist myopia ignored the role of private norm-makers in the making of international legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 O’Connell, supra note 42, 4. 
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arguments. Both in spirit and ontology, the scheme of colonial governance, for example the 
redistribution of colonial territories at the time of the establishment of the League of Nations 
and its appended Covenants, was transnational in character. Subsequently, the interwar 
bourgeoisie funded the ghostwriting of apathetic legal methods and capitalist norms in 
transnational tongues for the protection of aliens, mostly Western, investors.49 The cause of 
private actors, here investors, was taken up in the vocabulary of public law that sought to 
international law-ize the continuity of colonial law for an protection, ironically, of colonial 
properties. The artificial divide between public and private law would now acquire a colonial 
hue.  
 
The Second World War only made the corporate-colonial project of international law 
obvious. Both permanent courts and the ever-present ad hoc tribunals failed to acknowledge 
colonialism as international law’s Achilles heel. Post-1945, the colonial continuity of the 
structure of legal arguments stood in the way of interrogating its essentialist ontology and 
capitalist teleology. As such, initially, the ICJ stood indifferent to the colonial question. In 
disputes arising due to the breach of colonial concession contracts, investment tribunals, as if 
taxing newly independent countries for its political liberation, billed the costs of producing 
legal norms to them in the process defeating political liberation by extending uncritical 
colonial legality. Western scholars came up with innovative re-conceptualizations of 
international law, for example, Jessup’s Transnational law. Scholars argued that Western law 
should be the applicable law in disputes between Western investors and Asian and African 
states arising from colonially concluded contracts.50 This amounted to a contractual approach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 SN Guha Roy, Is The Law of Responsibility Of States For Injuries To Aliens A part of universal international 
law? 55 American J Intl L (1961) 863-879. 




to international law obscuring international law’s imperial and colonial timber. As Anghie 
elegantly puts it: 
 
The old international law conquest creates the inequities that the new international law of 
contracts perpetuates, legalises and substantiates when it ‘neutrally’ enforces the agreement, 
however one-sided, entered into by sovereign Third World states. It is in this way that the ‘old’ 
international law of imperialism, based on conquest, is connects with the new international law 
of imperialism, based on contract.51 
 
Analytical jurisprudence attempts to overcome the enigma of the deployment of moralist 
vocabulary for investors. As an example, it does so by exposing the pervasive existence of 
unjust enrichment in both Civil and Common law systems. Its first ever use against a state, 
Russia after revolution, was done by in the Lena Goldfield arbitration. Only a few years 
before, in 1920, the PCIJ statue on the sources had occasioned the division of all sources into 
two systems; common and civil. After decolonisation, jurists followed the trail to deposit 
contracts into the orbit of treaties, the technique that Sornarajah terms as the theory of 
internationalization of contracts.52 At the same time, attempts were made to suffocate the 
New International Economic Order, a project by developing counties in the UN general 
assembly, to ensure a colonial continuity of international law. 
 
That is not all. Today, those who do not find any merit in the value of the NIEO as 
useful and accurate legal principles, go on to import the bulk of human rights, a law for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Anghie, supra note 10, 241. The “turn to contracts” occurs, as Zumbansen says, “in the context of a richly 
structured filed of public, and private modes of governance”.  In Peer Zumbansen, Law, Economics and More: 
The Genius of Contract Governance, in, Stefan Grundmann et al (ed) Contract Governance: Dimensions in Law 
& Interdisciplinary Research (OUP, NY, 2015) 72,  86. 
52 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd edn. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 227. 
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human persons, to attempt an analogy for developing compensation for investors, corporate 
persons. The deployment of human rights analogies as a methodology for the development of 
investment protection amounts to accepting normative equality of human persons and 
corporate persons. In other words, scholars as lawmakers argue for human rights of corporate 
persons even as they question the lawmaking by countries, the NIEO, in the General 
Assembly.53  
 
Although pregnant with intuition on colonial nature of international legal norms for 
decades, third World jurists miscarried due to start-up nationalism in Asia and Africa as well 
as the Cold War geopolitics. The grammar of international law, colonial as it was, sustained 
colonial vocabulary and private hermeneutics. Another factor that delayed the archaeology of 
colonial norms was mimicking of international law by semi-peripheral states like Japan, 
Turkey and Siam and some others in Africa. To the decolonized countries, international law 
offered the promise of sovereignty; a kind of reversal, as it were, to a precolonial position and 
non-interference. However, decolonization presented an enigma to Western states and its 
bourgeois class. With the growing influence of Communist ideology in such countries, legal 
doctrines had to be deployed in the defence of private property acquired during centuries of 
colonialism. International law does embody pacta sunt servanda; however, an enquiry into 
the means and methods of securing such pacta reveal civilizational bias in the grammar and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







The point is writers have argued for a particular private law norm as a general and 
public law norm, and subsequently, a public international law norm. More particularly, a 
contract that embodies the ethical principle of pacta sunt servanda in relation to other private 
parties in the same jurisdiction has been in international law deployed against sovereigns. A 
relationship between two private parties is constitutive of the norms, which is different from 
norms that constitute the principle of sovereignty. To then uncritically extend a law between 
two private individuals onto the state that embodies and represents a collectivity of 
population needs more jurisprudential analysis than ever provided by the nineteenth century 
jurists.  
 
Unfortunately, such contractual norms when applied, ironically, to fetter sovereigns 
that had freed themselves from colonial rule, created a travesty of law and legal procedure. 
What is even more arresting is the fact that once decided that way, the decision itself 
becomes the new law under the theory of precedents. Thus an uncritical and doctrinally 
problematic application of law legitimizes a previous wrong by a structural process of 
international law making.  
 
The book first argues that the juridical nature of judicial decisions and writings of 
publicists created a blueprint of a bourgeoisie international law. Unsurprisingly, political 
decolonisation did not accompany legal decolonization. Rather it witnessed an oxymoronic 
making of primary international law, not by political process, but by an invisible college of 
the most qualified Western publicists instead. This led to the creation of an uncritical 
international law by a clique at a time the number of the developing and the least developed 
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countries in the UN General Assembly swelled. Such a misapplication of law was facilitated 
by international law’s inherent structural bias in favour of erstwhile colonial powers.  
 
This has forever damaged international law’s credibility in the eyes of many 
developing countries. Countries are regularly withdrawing from international legal regimes 
since 2000s. There is a new trend among countries, developing and developed, to include a 
Calvo clause in their investment treaty regimes. 
 
Although subsidiary sources hardly replace the will of states – primary sources – the 
process of identification of primary sources has been comparative and transnational; 
methodologies that entailed a circulation, if somewhat insulated from non-European values, 
of intra-Western norms, actors and processes. Highly privileged actors, mostly Western 
jurists, juggled norms from common law and civil law jurisdictions in hybrid arbitrations 
conducted before the League of Nations. Small surprise, then, that the Statute of the PCIJ was 
methodologically comparative and ontologically transnational. 
 
So long as international law has grown on the fertile grounds of precedents, a British 
legal method, it already inherits an essential unity of all European legal structures. Add to this 
the civil law and common law invention of treating writings as sources of law. What is more, 
in relation to international legal arguments scholars have permitted themselves the luxury of 
law making, arguing at the same time against that legitimate right to developing states. 
International law then appears an out and out European law.  
 
That is not all; international legal process even tried preventing non-Western nations 




decolonization international lawmaking would exclude developing states and include 
individual Western writers speaks of international law’s colonial ontologies. Standing 
between doctrinaire formalism and instrumental realism, my thesis attempts to unpack the 
ontology and the politics of the subsidiary sources of international law. Seen along with 
Foucault’s view on the role of power and tactics of domination, Kelsen’s norm typology is an 
important analytical tool for my project. The book dissects the body of public international 
laws to find private norms and processes that make international law. It discursively 
challenges the private making of public international law.54 
 
What often goes unappreciated is the fact that the Third World, on account of 
colonialism, only had training in Western conceptions of law; the defence of their 
sovereignty occasioned re-learning of the law. Such an approach was indeed supported by 
Western “turncoats” law firms and lawyers in an effort to build a new clientele. And in that 
sense too international law remained a heuristic construction of the sociology of lex 
mercatoria and a network of lawyers and jurists with high social capital.  
 
*** 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. Gilles Cuniberti, The merchant who would not be king: Unreasoned Fears about Private Lawmaking, in, 
HM Watt & DP Arroyo (ed), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP, NY, 1014) 141. 




Introduction argues that power norms are the core norms of international law. Taking that 
argument further, Chapter 1 argues that after the PCIJ Statute wrote the publicists and judicial 
decisions into international law, private actors and norms became even more entrenched in 
the making of public international law. Notably, however, since the beginning of the 19th 
century – effectively a century before the birth of the League of Nations – North American 
and British domestic courts had been invoking writers as sources of the law of nations 
extensively. Since the 1920 Drafting Committee, comprising members of civil and common 
law countries, introduced the principles of law recognised by civilized nations as sources of 
law, the writers of such civilized nations ensured that international law remained, in essence, 
a European law with a bourgeois core marshalled in the service of the imperial project. 
Chapter 1 explains international law’s structural borrowings of its sources. The chapter looks 
into the reasons behind the normative discomfort that have accompanied the acceptance of 





‘[T]he Arbitrator’s decision should be [seen] only as a subsidiary means, to the general 
principles of the law of nations and of maritime law’1 The [PCIJ] … has not confined 
itself to a consideration of the arguments put forward, but has included in its researches 
all precedents, teachings and facts to which it had access and which might possibly 
have revealed the existence of one of the principles of international law contemplated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dispute Between the United States of America and Great Britain about the Interpretation of the First 
Article of the Treaty of Ghent of 24 December 1814—Award of the Emperor of Russia of 22 April 
1822, reprinted in, 29 RIAA (2011) 1, 5. In 1910, the PCA noted the role of arbitrations in keeping the 
peace among nations. ‘Whereas it is assuredly in the interest of peace and the development of the 
institution of International Arbitration, so essential to the well-being of nations, that on principle, such 
a decision be accepted, respected and carried out by the Parties without any reservation’. Award of the 
Tribunal of Arbitration, Constituted Under An Agreement Signed At Caracas February 13th 1909 (US 
v Venezuela) 25 October 1910, 11 RIAA (1911) 237, 238. 
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in the special agreement.2 
 
Nineteenth century cases—American, British and Canadian—decided before the 
drafting of the PCIJ Statue in 1920 abundantly use writers of international law as 
authentic sources of the law of nations.3 For the 1920 drafting committee, this chapter 
argues, the North American and the British domestic cases presented the primary 
materials to arrive at the wording of the auxiliary sources of international law. The 
chapter first argues that writers of the law of nations embedded in these case, though 
subsidiary, determined the existing law of nations when Western states extended their 
rule to new colonies with concepts such as terra nullius, 4  capitulations and 
discriminatory treaties 5  or by simply extending sovereign loans to colonial 
companies.6 Vattel, for example, proposed that the amount of land a small group 
might claim be limited, lest a single person claimed an entire continent.7  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) at p. 31. MM Whiteman & GH 
Hackworth, (eds) 1 Digest of International Law (U.S. Department of State, 1963) 97. 
3 JG Starke, The Contribution of the League of Nations to International Law, 13(2) Indian Yrbk Intl L 
(1964) 207-209.  
4 The Case St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Company and the Queen, on the Information of the 
Attorney General for the Province of Ontario, 13 SCR 577, 580, 596 (1887) citing Sir Travers Twiss 
and Vattel. S Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia, 23 L & 
History Rev (2005) 95, 99-100. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 373 (1901). In the Matter of 
Jurisdiction over Provincial Fisheries, 26 SCR 444, 549 (1897) discussing Puffendorf and Grotius. The 
Schooner “John J. Fallon” and His Majesty the King, 55 SCR 348, 349 (1918) discussing Ferguson, 
Twiss, Wheaton and Halleck. However terra nullius has generated a polarized debate. Cf. E Cavanagh, 
Possession and Dispossession in Corporate New France, 1600-1663: Debunking A “Juridical History” 
and Revisiting Terra Nullius, 32 L & History Rev (2014) 97, 99. 
5 CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies: 16th, 
17th and 18th Centuries (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1967) 97. 
6 For instance, soon after the takeover of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, a terrible famine fell upon Greater 
Bengal—now Bangladesh and Indian provinces of West Bengal, Bihar, Odisha, and Jharkhand—in the 
year 1770. The East India Company’s revenue plunged sharply and in 1772 the Company applied for 
the King government’s loan to save them from insolvency. The lone was granted with a condition 
appended in the Covenant, which made a promise to pay a sum of £400,000 annually to the British 
exchequer. An appointed select committee would look into Indian matters with a parliamentary 
oversight. In such ways ‘the ship of the state was launched in India.’ Henry G. Keene, History of India, 
vol. I, 2nd edn., (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1906, first edn. 1889) 182. 






Secondly, the chapter argues that later such colonial acquisitions had to be defended 
within the legal epithet of the protection of private property using writers of the law of 
nations.8 About the Mandate System of the League of Nations, Anghie has powerfully 
argued that these ‘nineteenth-century jurists built racial discriminations into their 
conceptualization of sovereignty.’ 9  Indeed, at the PCIJ many judges would 
unwittingly expose their European bias to construe a limited meaning of “civilized 
nations” that would correspond to the redistribution of colonial territory and justify 
three tier mandates under the League of Nations.10 The kind of Normative discomfort 
associated with sources of law is perhaps understandable then.  
 
Much later, initiated by the Indian judge to the ICJ, Nagendra Singh, the Indian 
Society of International law organized the Indo-Soviet Seminars in 1977-78 on 
sources.11 Both Indian and Soviet publicists exhibited normative discomfort with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 John J MacDonald and The Georgian Bay Lumber Company, 2 SCR 364, 370 (1879). As early as 
1856, Pratt noted the “difference of opinion” that existed ‘amongst the most distinguished jurists and 
writers on international law on this subject’. FT Pratt, Law of Contraband of War (London: William G. 
Benning & Co., 1856), xix. For a reference to Lord Chief Justice Russell on ‘the subject of 
international law and arbitration’ see Report of the Committee on International Law, in 22 Annual 
Report of the American Bar Association (Philadelphia: Dando Printing & Publishing Co. 1899) 418. 
Most importantly, see, Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources And Analogies of International Law 
(Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970, originally published 1927); I Porras, Appropriating Nature: 
Commerce, Property, and the Commodification of Nature in the Law of Nations, 27 Leiden J Intl L 
(2014), 641–660, 643. For a very comprehensive study of international law’s early scholars see D 
Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 Harvard Intl L J (1986) 1–98. A Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); M 
Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 Univ Toronto L J 
(2011) 1-36, § 1 ‘The Empire of Private Law’. 
9 Antony Anghie, Colonialism And The Birth Of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, 
And The Mandate System of The League of Nations, 34 NYU J Intl L & Politics (2002) 513, 632. 
10 See, G Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilisation in International Law, 8 Current Legal 
Problems (1955) 212-234; S Mathias, Structural Challenges Facing International Organizations Re-
assessing the League of Nations, 17 Intl Community L Rev (2015) 127–137. 
11 N Singh, Indo-Soviet Seminars of 1977 and 1978, 19 Indian J Intl L (1979) 471. In the seminar, both 
Soviet and Indian publicists challenged the general theory of sources, see, GI Tunkin, General Theory 
of Sources of International Law, 19 Indian J Intl L (1979) 474; RS Pathak, The General Theory of the 
Sources of Contemporary International Law, 19 Indian J Intl L (1979) 483. 
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main sources, let alone the auxiliary sources.12 In 2006 Upendra Baxi asked, ‘how 
may anyone ever fully offer an impact analysis of the role of the ‘publicists’ in the 
shaping of the normativity’ of international law?13 Though such a quantitative impact 
analysis is tough to conduct, it is important to critically unpack the structural process 
and method that helped the drafting of subsidiary sources of international law in 1920. 
 
Historically, colonial companies invoked the law of nations propounded by European 
writers to defend their private capital and investments. Furthermore, before 1920, 
when Latin American states expropriated private properties, writings of publicists 
would determine the public international law of investors-state arbitrations.14 It is 
therefore not wrong to say that public international law, historically speaking, is a 
product of writings and arbitral rulings often penned in the defence of private 
investment. After the Tsar era, the Soviet scholars thus developed a pathological 
apprehension with sources of international law in general. 
 
Professor Sornarajah has for long argued that on many occasions private power is 
used to create public international law, more so when new capital importing 
developing countries did not have means to become persistent objectors, a legally 
recognized method, to the development of some rules.15 Sornarajah’s proposition now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 MK Nawaz, Other Sources of International Law: Are Judicial Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice A Source of International Law, 19 Indian J Intl L (1979) 526, T Starzina, Auxiliary Sources of 
International Law, 19 Indian J Intl L (1979) 522. 
13 U Baxi, New Approaches to the History of International Law, 19 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2006) 555-566, 559 (deitalicized). 
14 JB Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been 
a Party (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898). Central and South American Telegraph Co. 
v. Chile, U.S.-Chilean Claims Commission under Convention of August 7, 1892, Ibid 1477 (1898). 
15 It also subjects many respected academics to a charge of an absence of neutrality, admittedly a 
“strong claim”. M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd edn. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 279. Professor Jennings has argued for the promotion of contracts 
into the realm of international Law. RY Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 British Yrbk 





seems to have taken deeper roots as Tushnet recently opined that academics are 
indeed lawmakers. 16  To cut through this reality’s obscurity, Tushnet turns to 
customary law, a primary rather subsidiary source of international law.17 Tushnet says 
many take state practice to have been engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation 
rather than national self-interest. This is what makes customary international law. 
Note what publicists can do:  
 
International lawyers know that nations that would be disadvantaged by finding some 
rule to be established as customary international law can find lawyers who will 
examine the practices said to establish the rule as customary international law, and 
present arguments saying that this practice should not count because it arose in these 
(different) circumstances, that this other practice does not count because it arose in yet 
other circumstances, and on and on until the lawyers have shown that the practice said 
to constitute the customary rule is not widespread enough to qualify.18 
 
Usually, the publicists claim to offer characterizations of state practice that are neutral 
with respect to specific disputes. In such ways ‘publicists make international law by 
providing it with the characterization needed to transform state practices into 
customary international law.’19 Thus very ironically subsidiary sources help in the 
making of primary sources. Since the PCIJ Statute of 1920 was a result of a 
compromise between two dominant legal systems of the time, civil law and common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
internationalization of contracts’. What is notable is that the internationalization of contacts theory is 
rooted in arbitral awards and writings of the publicist, the “subsidiary means” within ICJ Article 
38(1)(d). Sornarajah, Ibid., at 289. Here is a case of the “subsidiary means” becoming a primary source 
of international law. The PCIJ discussed contracts and international law in Serbian Loans Case (Fr. v. 
Yugo.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 20 (July 12), at 41. 
16 M Tushnet, Academics as Law Makers, 29 Univ of Queensland L J (2010) 19. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
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law, it put down in the foremost text on international law both judicial decisions and 
publicists as sources. 
 
The fact that common law courts had always used writers in their decisions made 
reaching of this compromise easier. The chapter concludes with a new archival 
finding about the Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory20 between 
an erstwhile colonial power and a newly decolonized state and the normative 
discomfort with the auxiliary sources of international law.21 
 
II. From Domestic Courts to the World Courts: The Imperial Voyage of 
Writers 
 
A. Writers As Sources Before 1920 
 
By the nineteenth century, James Jaffe writes, life and work in England had been 
penetrated by arbitration as form of dispute resolution.22 Arbitration in America also 
started early.23 Arbitrations in the nineteenth century thus ran almost parallel to 
regular court systems in Britain and America. In 1906, Moore’s Digest of 
International Law compiled both domestic decisions and writings of jurists in eight 
volumes, fourteen years before the committee of Jurist sat to draft the Statute for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territories (Portugal v. India) (Merits), [1960] 
I.C.J. Rep 6. 
21 Letter of Sir C. Stirling, on April 30, 1960), No. 51 (1012/5/60, Portuguese Right of Passage Over 
Indian Territory: Judgement of the International Court of The Hague FO 371/152541, in Foreign Office 
Files for India, Pakistan and Afghanistan 1947-64 Documents (1960) para. 6. 
22 JA Jaffe, Industrial Arbitration, Equity, and Authority in England, 1800-1850, 18 L  & History Rev 
(2000) 525-558. 






PCIJ.24 It was preceded by Moore’ 1898 work in six volumes titled History and 
Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a 
Party.25 Notably, in 1886, Francis Wharton produced in three volumes A Digest of the 
International law of the United States that among things listed decisions of the United 
States Federal Court and opinions of the Attorneys-General.26 In 1956, Clifford J. 
Hynning wrote: 
 
In earlier times in the United States, when case precedents were largely lacking and 
treaty law was in its primitive stage, great weight was given by American judges to the 
opinions of Grotius, Vattel and others. In particular, Justice Story and Chancellor Kent 
made great use of the writings of these foreign jurists in their commentaries and also in 
their opinions.27 
 
Thus in the nineteenth century, North American and British Court regarded writers of 
international law as a means to resolve disputes about the law of the nations.28 In fact 
some of the text writers of international law became famous and gathered reputation 
when these domestic courts referred to them. In Regina v. Serva a British bench noted 
a principle of international law ‘laid down by the best writers on the law of nations’ as 
“Grotius says” so.29 In re Tivnan, a British bench in 1864 discussed whether ‘the 
government of a civilised country’ recognized “writers on the law of nations” as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. I—vol. VIII, infra note 50. 
25 Moore, supra note 14. 
26 F Wharton (ed) A Digest of the International law of the United States: Vol. I—III (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1886); D Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to 
the Standards of Civilised Justice? 5 Transnational Legal Theory (2015) 60-80. 
27 CJ Hynning, Sources of International Law, 34 Chicago–Kent L Rev (1956), 116, 129; T Skouteris, 
The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (TMC Asser Press: The Hague, 2009). 
28 For a historical account see, Oldham & Kim, Ibid., 241-266. Also see, JT Morse, Jr. The Law of 
Arbitration and Award (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1872). Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at § 1 ‘The 
Empire of Private Law’. 
29 Regina v. Serva and Nine Others, 175 Eng. Rep. 22 Nisi Prius (1845) 28. 
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sources of law.30 In Bay Lumber Co. case decided in 1879, the Canadian Supreme 
Court discussed Wheaton to maintain, ‘that by comity real estate in a foreign country 
can be reached.’31 As such, there are many cases where writers have been referred to 
discuss the “law of the nations”.32 Again, a British court in a 1858 ruling, Regina v. 
Lopez, said: ‘The same principle governs the law of America and France, and is to be 
found in all the great text writers on international law.’33 Structurally, it would have 
been difficult for the North American and British courts applying international law to 
avoid the aid of scholarship, which in effect blurred the line dividing actual law in the 
text and law from scholarly analysis. 
 
In Attorney General v. Kent of 1862, a British Exchequer court thought the ‘argument 
is founded upon language used for a different purpose by writers on international 
law.’34 Magdalena v. Martin went a step further to discuss Vattel ‘express[ing] the 
law of nations’ as ‘stated by Vattel and all the great text writers on that law.’35 
Similarly in Ship North case, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the “doctrine of 
pursuit” with the force of opinion of ‘Hall and other writers on international law’.36 In 
re “The William Hamilton” the British ecclesiastical court thought that the ‘true 
principles of international law have been laid down by some of our best text 
writers’.37 In Attorney General v. Sillim, a British Court said: ‘For it is held by all 
writers on the law of nature and of nations, that the right of making war, which by 
nature subsisted in every individual, is given up by all private persons that enter into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Re Tivian, 122 Eng. Rep. 971, King’s Bench (1864) 975, 977. 
31 John J. MacDonald and The Georgian Bay Lumber Company, 2 S.C.R. 364 (1879), at 370; Andrew 
Mercer and The Attorney General for the Province of Ontario, 5 S.C.R. 538 (1882), 559, 623. 
32 Birtwhistle v. Vardill, Eng. Rep. 1308—House of Lords (1839). 
33 Regina v. Lopez, 169 Eng. Rep. 1105, Crown Cases (1858) 1110. 
34 158 Eng. Rep. 782 - Exchequer (1862) 784. 
35 Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin, 121 Eng. Rep. 36, King’s Bench (1859) at 40. 
36 The Ship North and His Majesty the King, ex. rel. the Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada, 
37 S.C.R. 385 (1906) 387. 





society, and is vested in the sovereign power.’38 An ecclesiastical court in Simonin v. 
Mallac dared one of the parties to repudiate the works of learned writers: ‘for they 
would hardly have repudiated the doctrine of several learned writers, whose works are 
always received as worthy of great attention’. 39  Fikfak maintains, ‘Blackstone 
claimed that international law forms part of domestic law to the full extent, with the 
domestic system accepting international law as part of the same legal order.’40  
 
[Blackstone’s] view appears to have been adopted by Justice Gray in The Paquete 
Habana, “[i]nternational law is part of our law”. It was also explicitly referred to by 
Lord Denning in Trendtex: ‘‘it follows to my mind inexorably that the rules of 
international law, as existing from time to time, do form part of our English law’’; and 
Justice Shaw: “[w]hat is immutable is the principle of English law that the law of 
nations must be applied in the courts of England”.41  
 
‘Yet a closer look reveals’ as Fikfak says, ‘whilst Blackstone might not have imposed 
any limitations on international law forming “part” of domestic law, others did not 
agree.’42 Lord Denning thought that when Blackstone talked of incorporation, he was 
referring to rules that had been ‘universally accepted and known’, and that ‘the rules 
of international law only become part of our law in so far as they are accepted and 
adopted by us’.43 Similarly in the case of Walley v. Schooner Liberty, Supreme Court 
of Louisiana in 1838 while talking about a ‘settled principle of international law’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Attorney General v. Sillim, 176 Eng. Rep. 295 (1863), English Reports Full Reprint Vol. 176—Nisi 
Prius (1688-1867) 297. 
39 Simonin v. Mallac, 164 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ecclesiastical) (1860) 921. 
40 V Fikfak, International Law Before English and Asian Courts: Finding the Judicial Role in the 
Separation of Powers, 3 Asian J Intl L (2013) 277 (Footnotes Omitted). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. (Footnotes Omitted). 
43 Ibid. (deitalicized). 
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consulted the teachings ‘by elementary writers’. 44  There is indeed a long list 
American cases from late 19th century to early 20th century that discuss writers of the 
law of nations while deciding cases.45  
 
Much later, In Toronto Corp. case of 1918, the Canadian Supreme Court had to 
discuss mortgage on land within international law. While taking the view that in 
international law ‘a mortgage debt secured by land is to be regarded, not as a movable 
but as an immovable’ the Canadian Court noted the “authority of text-writers” being 
“strongly in favour of this view.”46 One of the most full-blown discussions on the law 
of the nations by an American Court was in the Ambrose Light case where Elihu Root 
appeared for the State.47 In fact, the North American domestic courts till the Second 
World War continued to bank upon and borrow from the writers of international law. 
This trend continued after the formation of the League of Nations and indeed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Walley v. Schooner Liberty, 12 Louisiana 98, at 115. The Court noted the federal ruling in Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 16. 
45 They are: Reynolds v. Cook, 5 Am. St. Rep. 317, 555 (Va., 1887), Johnson v. Merithew, 6 Am. St. 
Rep. 162, 180 (Me., 1888), Young v. Keller, 4 Am. St. Rep. 405, 413 (Mo., 1888), Hersey v. Walsh, 8 
Am. St. Rep. 689, 745 (Minn., 1888), Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 15 Am. St. Rep. 672, 
674 (Pa., 1889), State v. Reeves, 10 Am. St. Rep. 349, 359 (Mo., 1889), Currie v. Waverly & N. Y. B. 
R. Co., 19 Am. St. Rep. 452, 464 (N.J., 1890), St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Am. St. Rep. 
195, 200 (Ark., 1890), Morse v. Moore, 23 Am. St. Rep. 783, 826, 836, 840 (Me., 1891), King v. Rhew, 
23 Am. St. Rep. 76, 110 (N.C., 1891), Hardy v. Galloway, 32 Am. St. Rep. 828, 839 (N.C., 1892), Gist 
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Am. St. Rep. 763, 774 (S.C., 1895), Mccreery v. Davis, 51 Am. St. Rep. 
794, 805 (S.C., 1895), State v. Shattuck, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936, 942 (Vt., 1897), St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
Co. v. Paul, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154, 305-6 (Ark., 1897), Kearney v. State, 65 Am. St. Rep. 344, 421 (Ga., 
1897), Albright v. Cortright, 81 Am. St. Rep. 504, 629 (N.J., 1900), Holler v. P. Sanford Ross, 96 Am. 
St. Rep. 546, 632 (N.J., 1902), Thomas v. Thomas, 90 Am. St. Rep. 342, 368 (Me., 1902), Graham v. 
Walker, 112 Am. St. Rep. 93, 107 (Conn., 1905), Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass\n v. Corley, 110 Am. St. 
Rep. 615, 617 (S.C., 1905), Emerson v. Pacific Coast & Norway Packing Co., 113 Am. St. Rep. 603, 
614 (Minn., 1905), Cox v. Smith, 137 Am. St. Rep. 89, 145 (Ark., 1910). 
46 The Toronto General Trusts Corporation and his Majesty the King, 56 S.C.R. 26 (1918), at 26, 39. 
47 United States v. The Ambrose Light, (September 30, 1885), 25 F. 408 (1885-1886). Talking in 1943 
about levying penalty for electricity consumption on the premises of the High Commissioners, a matter 
of extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity, the Canadian Supreme Court in Levy Rates on Foreign 
Legations case discussed, among others, such text-writers of international law as Hall, Vattel and 
Wheaton. The Powers of the Corporation of the City of Ottawa et. al. to Levy Rates on Foreign 





United Nations.48 Be that as it may, it becomes clear that there has been a long history 
in Europe and North America of treating writers of international law as a source. 
Naturally the debate within the drafting committee in 1920 on the sources of law was 
done with this wealth of experience before the drafting committee of 1920.  
 
It is all the more notable that much of the international law invoked by domestic 
courts was in relation to commercial disputes along with certain disputes of 
diplomatic nature. Indeed the Law of the Nations was in part a law that facilitated the 
commercial interest and monopoly of trading ports for European powers. Even the 
formation of the PCIJ was preceded by arbitrations of commercial nature between 
great powers. Thus the internationalization of justice, or international justice, comes 
rather counterintuitively from, as Baron Descamps’ speech of June 16th 1920 reveals, 
settling commercial disputes and from the desire to bring peace and security in the 
“European” world.49 Perhaps because the 1920 Committee of Jurists settled for a 
wording that did not qualify “judicial decisions” with the prefix national or 
international, it offers scholars the space to argue for the role of even domestic rulings 
as source of international law. 
 
B. Attempts at Making World Courts Before and After the PCIJ  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 During the World War II in a case dealing with criminal immunity of the Naval officers of the 
United States, the Canadian Supreme Court maintained that the matter ‘raises many questions of public 
international law, on which many distinguished text-writers in the leading countries of the world have 
expressed opinions, which have not always been unanimous.’ In the Matter of a Reference as to 
Whether Members of the Military or Naval Forces of the United States of America are Exempt from 
Criminal Proceedings in Canadian Criminal Courts, 1943 S. C. R. 483 (1943) 511. 
49 Descamps said: ‘The honour of having created for the first time an international Court of Justice 
based on arbitration belongs to the Peace Conference of 1899.’ Descamps, infra 139, 12. 
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Indeed, before the first Hague Peace Conference in 1889, investment gave the first set 
of opportunities to arbitral tribunals, often for disputes between Latin American or 
East European States and European investors, to discuss and indeed elevate domestic 
rules to the status of international legal arguments.50 It is therefore only natural to 
assert, as Gray and Kingsbury pointed out, public international law is in part a product 
of private arbitral decisions.51 Many tender the opinion that arbitral awards should not 
be seen a subsidiary sources even if hierarchically below the decisions of the PCIJ 
and the ICJ. While the PCIJ began functioning in 1920, the ICJ was established in 
1945.52  
 
However, before these “World Courts” were established, primarily due to experiences 
of two World Wars and in the quest for a peaceful settlement of disputes among 
nations, there existed at least two legal institutions of international standing: the 1908 
Central American Court of Justice53 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration based in 
the Hague established by treaty in 1899.54 None of these institutions were permanent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See generally, JB Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. I—vol. VIII (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1906); Aboilard (France) v. Haiti, Award of July 26, 1905, 12 Rev Gen de Droit Int 
Public, Documents (1905), 12-17. Landreau v. Peru, Award of Oct. 26, 1922, 17 American J Intl L 
(1923) 157. 
51 C Gray & B Kingsbury, Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-State Arbitration Since 1945, 63 
British Yrbk Intl L (1992), 97, 120. O Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent 
Court of International Justice: The Rise of the International Judiciary (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 3. Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
30 Fordham Intl L J (2006), 1014, 1017–1021; Christine Gray, International law 1908–1983, 3(3) 
Legal Studies (1983), 267–282; K Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, 
Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 17-55. 
52 A de La Pradelle, La Place de L’homme dans la Construction du Droit International, 1 Current Legal 
Problems (1948) 140-151. 
53 Convention For The Establishment of A Central American Court of Justice, Concluded At Central 
American Peace Conference, December 20, 1907, 2 Malloy (1910) 2399. See, X Fuentes, Latin 
American States and International Court of Justice, in, Natlie Klein (ed) Litigating International Law 
Disputes: Weighing the Options (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 79, S Katzenstein, In 
the Shadow of Crisis: The Creation of International Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 Harv Intl L J 
(2014), 151. JG Starke, The Contribution of the League of Nations to the Evolution of International 
Law, 13(2) Indian Yrbk Intl Aff (1964) 207. 
54  115 states have acceded to one or both of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s founding 





though. While the Central American Court of Justice lasted only for 10 years, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a strategically chosen circumstantial nomenclature, is 
not a permanent court but a club of arbitrators from which nations could choose in 
case of international disputes.  
 
 Clearly, international law, as far as its practice before 1920 is concerned, emerged 
from arbitrations where works of publicists were used to build arguments. The ICJ 
Statute 38(1)(d) reads as: ‘subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’55 
 
The article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statue has noted travaux préparatoires.56 First the 
PCIJ and then the Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute firmly established the doctrinal 
outpourings of qualified publicists as “subsidiary means”. The writings of the 
publicist as “subsidiary means” have two components, (a) “judicial decisions” and (b) 
‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’.57 But by 
discussing writers of the law of nations the rulings of the Euro-American domestic 
courts embedded doctrinal writings in domestic law. Notably, some of the most 
celebrated texts of international law were written in the defense of national interests 
of European Kingdoms against the claim of other European states. For instance, as 
Tuck reminds, Grotius wrote a major apology for the whole Dutch commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027>. See, Kenneth Keith, 100 Years of International Arbitration And 
Adjudication, 15 Melbourne J Intl L (2014) 1. 
55 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 3 Bevans 1179, Article 38(1)(d). 
56 M Wood, Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists (Art. 38 (1) ICJ Statute), 9 Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 783. 
57 M Peil, Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International 
Court of Justice, 1 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2012) 136, 158. 
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expansion into the Indies.58  Besides, Thirlway has recently called the ICJ Statute 
article 38(1)(d) ‘material sources having a special degree of authority’.59 But in 1956 
Schwarzenberger thought, while ‘attempting to establish the place of doctrine in 
relation to the World Court’ its is ‘advisable to dispense altogether with the term 
source.’ For him it was ‘merely a metaphor’, and that this image by then had 
‘acquired so many meanings and made necessary such artificial distinctions, as 
between formal and material sources, that it had better be discarded.’60 
 
III. Subsidiary Sources at the Two World Courts 
 
A. Subsidiary Source At the PCIJ 
 
As pointed out before, the PCIJ Statute did not specify whether “subsidiary means” 
were limited to international judicial decisions alone, although that, as judge ad hoc 
Guggenheim noted, national law is a question of fact and not of law is an established 
principle of international law.61 Moreover, in the 15th Meeting on July 3rd, 1920, of 
the League of Nations’ Committee of Jurists, the Italian representative Ricci-Busatti 
‘denied most emphatically that the opinions of authors could be considered as a 
source of law to be applied by the Court.’62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 R Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 79. 
59 H Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 117; I 
Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 69. 
60 G Schwarzenberger, The Province of the Doctrine of International Law, 9 Current Legal Problems 
(1956) 235, 236. 
61 ‘Dissenting Opinion of Guggenheim’, Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), (1955) I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 50, 
52; ‘Bangalore Principles adopted by the Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms, India, 24–26 February 1988,’ 1 African J Intl & Comp L (1989), 
345; K Wolfke, International Law-Making Factors—An Attempt at Systematization, 15 Polish Yrbk 
Intl L (1983) 246. 
62 In the 15th Meeting (Private), held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, on July 3rd, 1920, in, Procès -






Since domestic courts in North America and the Great Britain—both common law 
jurisdictions—and civil law countries in continental Europe were already using 
previous judicial decisions and writers respectively as sources of international law, 
the 1920 draft of the PCIJ, in a way, occasioned the demotion of publicists and 
previous decisions to a “subsidiary source”. Quite notably, Ricci-Busatti expressed 
his astonishment at Elihu Root, the American member, agreeing to ‘a formula 
containing this idea’. The President of the Committee, Baron Descamps, repeatedly 
clarified saying ‘the judge must use the authority of judicial decisions, and the 
coinciding doctrines of jurists, as auxiliary and supplementary means only.63‘ The 
agreed text of the PCIJ was carried over to the ICJ Statute as article 38(1).64 Both at 
the PCIJ and at the ICJ, judges felt ineluctably compelled to pen opinions, separate 
and dissenting, while taking note of the ‘writers on international law’.65 Besides, 
judge Hudson in 1944 wrote:  
 
The formulation in Article 38 of the Court’s Statute has had a wide influence. In 
substance it was adopted by the American-German Mixed Claims Commission in 
1923, and by a German-Portuguese tribunal in 1928. It was also incorporated in the 
1928 Geneva General Act, and with some variations in numerous bipartite [sic] 
treaies.66 
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The Force of International Law (NY: Routledge, 2011) 70. 
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Even so, there are those who further subordinate the views of scholars to the other 
subsidiary means of determining the law, judicial decisions. This is so because the 
form of a decisions and the use of previous decisions by parties to international 
litigation make them of greater weight than the writings.67 Even then the publicists 
have been documenting and developing international law through the force of their 
opinion even before the League of Nations began the intergovernmental “codification 
of international law.”68 In 1944, in a ‘Statement of a Community of Views by North 
Americans’ postulating about the international law of the future talked of the 
subsidiary means as ‘[l]aw cannot exist in a vacuum’.69 
 
B. Subsidiary Sources from the Time of the ICJ, 1945 
 
Bruno Simma—former judge of the ICJ—makes a very practical observation saying 
scholars of international law ‘typically have an unjustified modesty about their own 
influence.’70 Indeed, ‘[f]oreign offices are under time pressure and rely on scholars as 
shortcuts: They turn to the American Law Institute’s Restatement or the publications 
of the American Society of International Law or the Max Planck Institute for valuable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 45 Journal of African Law (2001) 
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p 3. 
68 Shabtai Rosenne, Codification Revisited after 50 Years, 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law (1998), 2. See, Second Meeting, 15 (11) League of Nations Official Journal (1934), 1441; 
Counterfeiting Currency, 10(2) League of Nations Official Journal (1929) 275, 294 saying ‘publicists 
have unanimously demanded that judges should be allowed to take such previous convictions into 
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and authoritative guidance.’71 Furthermore, noting the arguments about a typically 
Latin American international law, Judge Alvarez in his dissenting opinion to Asylum 
case, noted “[c]ertain jurists” who called the ‘complex of principles, conventions, 
customs, practices, institutions and doctrines which are peculiar to the Republics of 
the New World’ the ‘peculiarities of international law in America’.72  
 
Again, while arguing for the Portuguese right of passage with “arms and 
ammunitions” as a local customary law Judge Koo, a Chinese member of the Court, 
invoked Professor Max Rheinstein and van Bynkershoek. 73  An attempt to 
problematize the phenomenon of such customary citation of Western text writers by, 
for instance judge Koo, leads us to a nuanced assertion that judges, Western or 
otherwise, often invoked classical scholars to legitimize their own opinions. Professor 
R.P. Anand, doyen of the third world approaches to international law, in his swan 
song, opined ‘Although international law is presumed to be applicable among all 
states, east or west, north or south, big or small, it is only a recent phenomenon, not 
older than the United Nations itself.’74 
 
Before the Second World War, international law was supposed to be not only a product 
of the European states and based on their customs and treaties, but applicable only 
among them—that is, European states or states of European origin. It was only in 1856 
that an extra-European country, Turkey, was admitted into the family of civilized states 
and later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that Japan forcefully entered the so-
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72 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez, Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] ICJ Rep. 266, 293. 
73 Separate Opinion of Judge V. K. Wellington Koo, Case Concerning the Right of Passage over 
Indian Territories (Portugal v. India) (Merits), [1960] I.C.J. Rep 6, 66-67. 
74 RP Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A Historical Study, 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2010), 5–21, 5. See, A Becker Lorca, Sovereignty beyond the West: The 
End of Classical International Law, 13 J History Intl L (2011) 7-73. 
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called exclusive European club after defeating China and Russia.75 
 
This finding is also supported by the new scholarship on the history of international 
law which, while classifying nations into Western, semi-peripheral—Turkey and 
Japan for instance—and non Western, assert that much of international law was taken 
to Japan and Turkey by scholars from these countries educated in the West.76 Of 
course then, Western scholars had a more tangible role to play in the making as well 
as universalization of international law. Lorca thus argues ‘that international law 
universalized when jurists from semi-peripheral polities, such as Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire, and Latin American states, appropriated European international legal 
thought.’77 As such ‘[c]lassical international law only recognized equality between 
states belonging to the ‘family of civilized nations,’ while sovereign autonomy and 
equality was denied beyond the West.’78  
 
Özsu supports Lorca’s thesis saying, ‘[c]lose enough to dominant centers of economic 
and intellectual production to come under their influence, but with national traditions 
and state institutions resilient enough to resist formal colonization, the semi-periphery 
was a natural home for informed engagement with the international legal rules that 
facilitated colonialism and imperialism.’79 Koh thinks, ‘It is the very nature of state 
practice that it is influenced by the practices and criticism of other nations and legal 
publicists.’80 After all, in Paquete Habana case, the United States Supreme Court not 	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79 U Özsu, Agency, Universality, and the Politics of International Legal History, 52 Harv Intl L J 
Online (2010) 58, 59 <http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/10/online_52_ozsu/>. 
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only expressly recognized Japan as ‘the last state admitted into the rank of civilized 
nations’, it also mentioned a Japanese writer of international law. 
 
Since the English orders in council of 1806 and 1810, before quoted, in favor of 
fishing vessels employed in catching and bringing to market fresh fish, no instance 
has been found in which the exemption from capture of private coast fishing vessels 
honestly pursuing their peaceful industry has been denied by England or by any other 
nation. And the Empire of Japan (the last state admitted into the rank of civilized 
nations), … Takahashi, International Law 11, 178.81 
 
Be that as it may, in a more modern context, Goldsmith thinks legal scholars are 
biased and their writings should not be taken as source of law, subsidiary or 
otherwise: International law scholars ‘lack a democratic pedigree, and they usually 
lack scholarly detachment on these issues.’ They are, he says, ‘among the most biased 
when it comes to the content of the customary international law of human rights, and 
thus deserve little, if any, deference on these issues.’82  
 
Besides, Lorca’s assertion again reinforces the power of publicists in not only making 
international law but in bringing States in the fold of international law.83 Should 
scholarly writings and judicial decisions be treated as main sources of international 
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International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 9 J History Intl L (2007) 179, 
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82 J Goldsmith, ASIL Proceedings, supra note 70, 318. Cf. G Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by 
International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2011) 5–23;  M Shahabuddeen, 
 Precedent in the World Court (New York: CUP, 1996) 180; K Wolfke, Materials Used in the UN 
Practice of International Law-Making , 7 Polish Yrbk Intl L (1975) 255, 256, 266–273. 
83 Lorca, supra note 76, at 477; Özsu, supra note 79, 58. 
 	   46 
 
law?84 In fact recently German scholars have argued in favor of treating judicial 
precedents not as “subsidiary means” but main “source of law”.85 But for obvious 
reasons, developing country scholars have expressed their reservation to such an 
approach.86 
 
The political principle of self-determination is another example of how writers made 
international law since the formation of the League of Nations. Thus, while the Paris 
Peace conference, in Woodrow Wilson, witnessed the rhetoric of self-determination 
as a political carrot dangled to protectorates and colonized peoples, after the second 
World War, it became the main argument for western intellectuals and lawyers to 
advance their opinion to small princely states seeking independence not from colonial 
masters but from nation building based on nationalism and anti-colonialism.87 For 
example, in 1948, the princely state of Hyderabad sought a representation at the 
Security Council.88 As Adviser to the Representative of Hyderabad, Eagleton wrote, 
Hyderabad’s formal complaint forwarded an argument ‘which apparently derives 
from the writings of Professor Lauterpacht.’89 
 
IV. The PCIJ, 1920 Drafting History: A Compromise Between Common 
Law ‘Jurisprudence’ and Civil Law ‘Doctrine’ 
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The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists’ President Baron Descamps proposed the 
wording ‘international jurisprudence as a means for the application and development 
of law’ which later became ICJ Article 38(1)(d).90 Needless to say, Descamps’ 
proposed text was extremely vague and imprecise. British member of the Committee, 
Lord Phillimore, did not attach much importance to the successive order in which the 
sources were to be used.91 The formulae adopted had simply been taken from 
Descamp’s draft and ‘in his opinion the order simply represented the logical order in 
which these sources would occur to the mind of the judge.’ Ricci-Busatti expressed 
the desire to have “the principles of equity” included in no 3 (now ICJ Article 
38(1)(c)).92  
 
Lord Phillimore first recalled the meaning of “equity” in English jurisprudence. The 
adoption of “equity” as a source of law, the Committee thought, would result in 
giving too much liberty to the judge, unless the technical meaning just mentioned 
were adopted. 93  Throughout the meetings however Descamps emphasised the 
‘auxiliary character of the elements in No. 4 as elements of interpretation.94‘ De 
Lapradelle, however, thought it to be appropriate to mention that the results of the 
agreements reached by the Committee should be above criticism; ‘the actual wording 
did not give him complete satisfaction from a practical and logical point of view.’95 
The amendments of M. Ricci-Busatti were to a great extent justified, ‘but they also 
contained points which, if introduced in the plan, would not improve it, but would do 
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quite the contrary.’96 
 
To the use of the phrase “civilised nations” there was an interesting debate and when 
questioned by Lapradelle, Lord Phillimore stated that Ricci-Busatti’s scheme used the 
same phrase.97 For Lapradelle, it was superfluous because he thought, “law implies 
civilisation.”98 Above all, Lapradelle was of the view that jurisprudence was of higher 
importance than doctrines. Lapradelle’s use of the limited terms “general principles of 
law” actually came up as the formulae ‘without indicating exactly the sources from 
which these principles should be derived.’99 Descamps satisfied Ricci-Busatti’s query 
on ‘general principles of law’ by arguing that it was necessary to avoid non-liquet.100 
The doctrine of non liquet i.e. the situation where the court declares an absence of law 
to be applied in the matter before it, is rather important in legitimizing the presence of 
“subsidiary sources” in the text of the PCIJ and the ICJ Statute. Thus if a court could 
find some discussion or arguments in a text of international law, they can always 
allude to it to avoid non-liquet.  
 
This results into depositing writers of texts on international law in the orbit of sources. 
Of course the choice of “civilized” in the epithet “civilized nations” was a standard 
adjective in the very definition of international textbooks well into the twentieth 
century.101 However, as historian Duara reminds ‘[a]rising in the context of European 	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domination of the non-Western world,’ the newly reinforced standard of civilization 
‘could be specifically found in the legal language of various “unequal treaties” and its 
interpretation by the international lawyers of the time.’102 
 
While debating in 1920s a discussion followed between de Lapradelle, President 
Descamps and Lord Phillimore as a result of which point 4 was worded as follows: 
‘The authority of judicial decisions and the doctrines of the best qualified writers of 
the various nations’.103 Root wanted the text to be drafted as ‘the authority of judicial 
decisions and the opinions of writers as a means for the application and development 
of law.104‘ In the subsequent proposal presented by President Baron Descamps and 
Lord Phillimore, and as amended by Ricci-Busatti, the auxiliary means appeared as: 
‘The Court shall take into consideration the judicial decisions rendered by it in 
analogous cases, and the opinions of the best qualified writers of the various 
countries, as means for the application and development of law.’105 
 
This text clearly points to the compromise between common law and civil law 
members for while the former treated judicial decisions and the latter doctrinal 
writings as sources in domestic law.106 The text, as a compromise, had both ‘judicial 
decisions rendered by it in analogous cases’ embodying jurisprudence while ‘best 
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qualified writers of the various countries’ identified the applicable doctrine of law. 
Scholars observed that the ‘final text of this sub-paragraph, therefore, not only 
removed all mention of judicial decisions as a means for the development of the law; 
there was also an explicit agreement amongst the drafters that judicial decisions were 
not, in any sense, envisaged as primary sources of law.’107  
 
Eventually, while President Descamps’ initial text referred to “international” 
jurisprudence, the final sub-paragraph did not qualify the type of judicial decisions 
intended and, in particular, did not distinguish between “international” and “national” 
decisions.108 In the 15th Meeting of July 3rd, 1920, President Descamps lauded the 
draft submitted by the American representative Elihu Root where Root ‘explained the 
delicate task of an international judge: ‘First of all the judges had to decide whether 
an act was included under one of the classifications of international law; then proceed 
to appreciate the fact in conformity with the said law.’109 
 
A. Lawmaking By Writing: The PCIJ, the ICJ and Lauterpacht 
 
In his opinion in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case Judge Moore—the 
compiler of arbitral decisions in 1896 and 1906—was cautious and calculated while 
discussing the jurisdiction of tribunals accepting non liquet rejecting Lauterpacht 
consequently: ‘The international judicial Tribunals so far created have been tribunals 
of limited powers. Therefore, no presumption in favour of their jurisdiction may be 
indulged. Their jurisdiction must always affirmatively appear on the face of the 	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record.’110 Later, while seeing the PCIJ to be the court of only the most important 
disputes between states, Judge Ehrlich in Factory at Chorzów case sagaciously 
dissented in the following words quoting Judge Moore’s dissent: 
 
For the Parties might purposely have conferred on a court—and most of all on this 
Court—the competence to settle the most important disputes, without wishing to 
burden the Court with disputes of less importance, particularly since, by deciding on 
the interpretation of a treaty stipulation or on the correctness of its application, the 
Court could probably point the way for the solution, or prevention, of a number of 
disputes, while the question of reparation might have to be considered in each 
individual case.111 
 
Subsequently, in international law’s signature Lotus case of 1927, the PCIJ had to 
deliberate on the “judicial competence” and admissibility of the case as Turkey 
argued in favour of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts.112 In fact Judge Moore 
referring to Article 38(4) of the Statute of the PCIJ noted that ‘while giving to such 
judgments the weight due to judicial expressions of the view taken in the particular 
country,’ the PCIJ should ‘follow them as authority only so far as they may be found 
to be in harmony with international law, the law common to all countries.’ 113 On the 
other hand, Judge Altamira on the same occasion offered an opinion ‘that the 	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municipal legislation of different countries, as it does not by its nature belong to the 
domain of international law, is not capable of creating an international custom, still 
less a law’.114 How are we to reconcile these two observations emanating from a 
classic case of international law? 
 
For Lauterpacht, a young publicist in 1927, expanding the jurisdiction for the PCIJ—
World Court of the time—and advocating for municipal decisions as sources of 
international law were the two sole most important duties to undertake as a law 
professor.115 Arguably, Lauterpacht was a major exponent of this doctrine that said 
there are no gaps in what can be decided by an international court because of the 
breadth of “sources” which included text writers and judicial decisions.116 Living in 
the time of the great dissenter Judge Anzilotti117 and in wake of the regular dissents 
produced by the PCIJ against jurisdiction of the Court, Hersch Lauterpacht in 1928 
ploughed the filed of international law to raise a crop of arguments in favour of 
legalizing political disputes—indeed a very sound example of the attempt to make 
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laws by teaching and publishing. 118  Subsequently, only a year later in 1929, 
Lauterpacht made a powerful case for the inclusion of municipal decisions as source 
of international law.119 He astutely pointed out the stigma, of four factors behind 
treating domestic judicial decisions as sources of international law. The domestic 
decisions he thought are stigmatized: 
 
[1] [B]y the current preoccupation with decisions of prize courts and their 
identification with decisions of municipal courts in general; [2] by the rigid 
predominance of the positivist doctrine; [3] by the so-called dualistic conception of 
the relation between international law and municipal law; and [4] by the confusion 
enveloping the conception of sources of international law on the one hand, and the 
nature of the function of municipal judges on the other.120 
 
Lauterpacht was of the view that the prize court decision, even though they dispense 
international law on behalf of the territorial sovereign and that such laws come from 
national legislature, should not constitute a bar on the value of such rulings creating 
“general international law.”121 Lauterpacht’s opinion that such decisions are made 
based on laws that represent national priority, if not bias, should go on to become 
“general international law” is perplexing.122 What is notable is that Lauterpacht does 
not even consider prize court decisions “subsidiary means” but as constituting general 
international law. Positivism and dualism of international law were two impediments 	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that Lauterpacht thought constrained the implication of consent and as such he 
disliked ‘the rigid separation of the judicial from the legislative functions in the 
direction of totally divorcing the work of judges from law-making proper.’123 Thus 
even where domestic courts have the opportunity to inquire into the existence and 
content of, for example, international jurisdictional rules, the rules at issue are often 
axiomatic so that any judicial statement on point is a commonplace and as such of 
little international legal interest.124 
 
The role of domestic courts as agents of development of the international law of 
jurisdiction is by no means negligible. But it is more unwitting and more mediated 
than might be imagined. In the end, it is largely in how other states react to domestic 
judicial proceedings and decisions, whether by way of protest or litigation in 
international courts, and in how other domestic courts deploy such decisions that their 
influence lies.125 
 
Lauterpacht was indeed a very prescriptive writer. In the early days of the ICJ, many 
believed Lauterpacht to be reasonable in expressing ‘the wish that the decisions of the 	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Court should be long’ as it should also be ‘fully and closely argued in order to carry 
conviction and in order to develop international law.’126 As a judge at the ICJ he 
astutely argued for the value in international law of the municipal decisions merely 
five years after the 1920 Commission of Jurists hotly deliberated on the meaning, 
scope and limits of judicial decisions and writings of the publicists.127  
 
Furthermore, at the 1920 deliberations to form the League of Nations no more than 
forty-four nations were present .128 Out of which only a handful of European nations, 
the British, the Spanish, the Dutch and so on, occasioned the dispensing of prize court 
decisions; the rulings that Lauterpacht sought to elevate into the realm of general 
international law. For him municipal judicial decisions evidenced opinio juris as such 
rulings are delivered ‘in a spirit of detachment and impartiality free from 
considerations of immediate and important interests of states’.129  In fact, more 
recently, in the 2002 Arrest Warrant case the ICJ addressed Belgium’s argument 
where Belgium referred in its Counter-Memorial to, inter alia, ‘examples from 
national legislation, and to the jurisprudence of national and international courts.’130 
The ICJ noted: 
 
Belgium also places emphasis on certain decisions of national courts, and in particular 
on the judgments rendered on 24 March 1999 by the House of Lords in the United 
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Kingdom and on 13 March 2001 by the Court of Cassation in France in the Pinochet 
and Qadaffi cases respectively, in which it contends that an exception to the immunity 
rule was accepted in the case of serious crimes under international law.131 
 
On its part, Congo disputed the law creating function of cases from international 
criminal tribunals for domestic courts, here Belgian, on a matter of international 
law.132 However it would have pleased Lauterpacht that the ICJ ‘carefully examined 
State practice, including national legislation and those few decisions of national 
higher courts, such as the House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation.’133 
Furthermore, in the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case the ICJ devoted a 
paragraph to note, ‘practice is particularly evident in the judgments of national 
courts.’134 What is more, the ICJ took note of the cases from sister international 
court—the ECtHR—a practice that took time to develop.135 However, much before in 
the Lotus case at the PCIJ, the parties did cite as the Court took note of many 
domestic decisions on collision of vessels.136 It is notable that in the year 1886, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Ship Frederic Gerring Jr., had extensively 
borrowed the wisdom of Regina v Keyn upon which the Agent for the French 
Government in the Lotus case heavily relied upon. The Canadian Court quoted Regina 
v Keyn as using ‘foreign writers on international law’.137 However, today scholars 
maintain that as a manifestation of the practice and opinio juris of the forum state, 
domestic judicial decisions take a back seat to legislation and, like legislation, 	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represent the position of a single state alone.138 
 
B. The PCIJ Lotus Case and Turkey: Civilization and the Source of Law 
 
The Council of the League of Nations established a Committee of Jurists to formulate 
and submit to it for adoption a plan for the establishment of the PCIJ, provided for in 
Article 14 of the Treaty of Versailles dated June 28th, 1919. In the words of Baron 
Descamps, the President of the Committee, the Committee’s first task was ‘clearly to 
ascertain the present state of international law.’139 However, the first set of cases at 
the PCIJ, for example the Lotus case between France and Turkey, to critical 
international law scholars represented the classic meeting of the East (Turkey) with 
the West (France). Deconstructing the Lotus case, Özsu unearths, explicates, and 
contextualizes the techniques on which Esat, Turkey’s agent before the PCIJ in the 
Lotus case, drew in order to narrate a fresh understanding of Turkish ‘nationhood’ 
during a period of intense vulnerability for the newly established Republic.140 
 
[A] close reading of Turkey’s pleadings reveals that it was inclined to oscillate between 
a variety of universalistic and particularistic approaches, Esat litigating the Lotus with 
an eye to exploiting the schism that lies at the heart of the concept of ‘civilization’ so as 
to submit Turkey to the normative authority of the international legal system while 
bolstering its positive power as an independent sovereign state. More specifically, it 
was by merging two modes of reasoning—the one prizing systematicity, the other 
prioritizing sovereignty—that Esat sought to construct a new, robustly reconciliatory 
identity for the ‘Turkish nation’, one that would enable it to embrace its commitment to 	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international order by securing its place in ‘la civilisation contemporaine’ while 
amplifying the ambit of its autonomy as ‘un état civilisé’.141 
 
Nevertheless, it is actually hard to miss the eagerness of the members of the PCIJ in 
legalizing the relationship between the East and the West in the Lotus case. Little 
wonder then, the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 between Turkey 
and the Allied Powers for Judge Weiss in the Lotus case reorganized the ‘the legal 
and judicial relations between the Ottoman Empire and Christendom.’ 142 
Consequently, for judge Weiss, the ‘new Turkey therefore finds herself freed from the 
hampering servitudes which for so long had placed her in a situation apart, in an 
inferior position amongst the nations; she now becomes their equal, having like them 
no other sovereign than international law.’143  
 
Thus what Weiss said of Turkey’s graduation to civilized ways in the Lotus case gave 
civilization a “legal” meaning turning it into tool of interpretation. As Prasenjit Duara 
notes, ‘By the late nineteenth century, international law and its standard of civilization 
became increasingly positivist, and reflected the social Darwinist conception that 
certain races were more civilized than others.’144 ‘While a hierarchy of races with 
different capacities to achieve civilization seemed natural,’ as Duara continues, ‘the 
notion of Civilization did not theoretically preclude the ability of a “race” to become 
civilized.’145 However, Ethiopia did not have such luck as Turkey in becoming 
civilized. Though brought into the fold of the League of Nations, Ethiopia was denied 
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true recognition as a part of the family of civilized nations.146 The European concerns 
had trumped the Covenant as Italy was allowed to once more take on the “savages” 
who previously—at the Battle of Adwa in 1896—had defeated it. Precisely because of 
such historical meaning attached to being civilized the Japanese, after 1905, claimed 
to have inherited the leadership of Asian civilization given its success in mastering 
Western Civilization.  
 
Justice Radhabinod Pal used Japan’s this parallel with the West in competing for 
civilization to dissent at the Tokyo Military Tribunal constituted after the World War 
II. 147 Justice Pal noted the prosecution’s emphasis on change in Japanese education 
policy to create a sense of “racial superiority”, ‘a failing common to all the 
nations’.148 What is more, in his dissent Justice Pal made an effort to address most of 
the views of the leading publicists of time, indeed a source of law. Developing 
countries often make an assumption that international law is a law made up of the will 
of the states. At least this is the classic perception of international law that the PCIJ 
established in the Lotus case.149 
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
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communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.150 
 
The Lotus case is an important judicial decision for declaring that will of the states 
alone makes international law. This case moreover stands testimony to the 
civilizational discourses of international law; after all ICJ Article 38(1)(c) talks about 
the civilized states. The ICJ statue of 1945 is a continuation of the PCIJ Statute. The 
PCIJ Statute was settled in 1920; at a time when just about forty odd nations made up 
the world. Barring a few kingdoms, all of Asia, Africa and the Middle East were 
colonized by European powers. Therefore even if one were to believe that the PCIJ’s 
Lotus position situates states at the centre of international law formation, these states 
needed to be “civilized” and thus essentially European.151  
 
V. The 1920 Committee of Jurists and ‘Civilized Nations’ 
 
A. ‘Civilized Nations’ and Subsidiary Sources at the PCIJ 
 
The PCIJ Statute was drafted in 1920. As discussed before there was much debate 
during the drafting sessions. It is worth noting that 38(1)(d) uses the term “various 
nations” at the high noon of colonial capture. With Britain in the lead, Spain, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands distributed all of Africa and 
Asia between them. Since the PCIJ Statute refers to the “highly qualified publicists” 
from “various nations”, the true meaning a scope of “nations” merits debate. It was 
clear before the 1920 Committee of Jurists that the nations considered civilized for the 	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purposes of recognition were only Christian.  
 
Member of the Council of the League of Nations, a French Statesman, Léon 
Bourgeios addressed the first public meeting of 1920 Committee of Jurists on June 
16th, 1920: ‘It took three centuries for Christianity to establish its empire in the world, 
and no one could have imagined that an international convention, however solemn, 
could suffice to what must be nothing less than a universal revolution.’152 This 
accurately captures the atmosphere of the occasion and the mandate of the Committee 
regarding the meaning and scope of “civilized nations” of the time.153 Mr Bourgeios 
was clear in his vision about the establishment of the Christian conquest and empire 
formation as the legitimate way to form an organic international order. Clearly to him 
international law and order meant peace through arbitrations between Great powers as 
he said: ‘It is not here, in the Peace Palace of The Hague, that we should forget the 
arbitrations and the inquiries which, notably in the affairs of the Dogger ‘Bank of 
Casablanca, of the ‘Carthage’ and of the ‘Manouba’ on several occasions warded of 
serious conflicts and perhaps even of serious wars between several great powers.’154 
 
As late as the First World War, as Professor Anand reminds, the position of Persia 
(now Iran), Siam (renamed Thailand in 1935), China, Turkey, Abyssinia (now 
Ethiopia), and the like was to some extent anomalous.155 There was considerable 
commercial intercourse between these states and states of Western civilization—
treaties had been concluded, full diplomatic relations had been established; China, 
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Japan, Persia, and Siam had even taken part in the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 
and 1907.156 However, since they belonged to ancient but different civilizations there 
was a question how far relations with their governments could usefully be based upon 
the rules of international society.157 In his public address M. Bourgeios talked of the 
“soldiers of civilization” and “freeing of nations from servitude”. With only forty-four 
nations present and rest of the world colonized by European powers, Bourgeios 
maintained nevertheless: 
 
The victory of the soldiers of civilization and of liberty enabled reparation to be made 
for some of the serious injustices of history and abolition of some of the must cruel 
servitudes of the past. The conquered peoples have been freed and the rights of 
nations to constitute themselves have been recognised. It is now possible contemplate 
the hour when the world de facto will not be contrary to the world de jure.158 
 
For a third worlder, it is almost impossible to understand how in 1920 the French 
statesman could speak about the ‘abolition of some of the must cruel servitudes of the 
past’ that ‘conquered peoples have been freed’ and ‘the rights of nations to constitute 
themselves have been recognized’ when France and other European powers had 
distributed much of the world between them.159 If Judge Weiss saw Turkey being a 
sovereign equal to France in the Lotus dispute, it was because, among other things, 
Turkey argued her case ‘with the aid of numerous quotations from authors and 	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judicial decisions, taken from the theory and practice of many countries’—the 
subsidiary sources of international law as seen by other European “civilized” states.160  
 
Judge Nyholm while voluntarily explaining the method of custom formation—one of 
the main sources of international law—affirms the kinds of States whose custom will 
make international law; those ‘which have adopted the European system of 
civilization’.161 Ironically in 1927 when Nyholm penned such an opinion the only way 
countries could ‘adopt[] the European system of civilization’ was through colonial 
capture as seen in the case of India. For countries such as Siam or Turkey that were 
never colonized, only a ticket of “civilization” from European nations could elevate 
them.  
 
In their opinions, the World Court judges inadvertently produced an apology for 
colonialism. After all, from the Ottoman Empire and German possessions, the League 
of Nations created tiered mandates as class A, Class B and class C in terms of their 
perceived relative development.162 Therefore international law and its sources, as 
Anghie has argued many times, could never be seen without the history of 
colonialism.163 Even so, given the position of German minority in Poland and that the 
language of instruction for the minority children was at question in German Minority 
Schools case, any unique and secular meaning of the “European system of 
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161 Dissenting Opinion by M. Nyholm, Lotus case, supra note 136, 60. 
162 Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), Judgment 
of 21 December 1962, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 319 at 387. For a discussion on the powers of Mandates see, 
Lauterpacht, supra note 8, 194, § 85. 
163  A Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century 
International Law, 40 Harvard Intl L J (1999) 1-80. 
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civilization” for legal purposes remained in dispute.164 Similarly in Oscar Chinn case 
Sir Cecil ‘assumed that, when it is alleged that the Belgian measures rendered it 
impossible or commercially impossible for Chinn to carry on business, reference is 
made to Chinn merely because he was the only British subject involved’.165 Thus 
even in purely commercial matters we see the isolation of the nationality of 
Europeans. It is thus impossible to understand a common ‘European system of 
civilization’ for custom formation that Judge Nyholm talked about.  
 
One of the ways to unpack the Lotus saga is to see it as an opportunity by Members of 
the PCIJ as offering Turkey a ticket to the “European system of civilization”. The 
point is, while teachings of the publicists were seen as a “subsidiary means” within 
the sources of international law, the number of “various nations” before 1920 were 
quite small, in fact forty four. Besides, all these nations were fighting among 
themselves for capturing territories and their resources. In other words, while the 
“subsidiary means” were exclusionary, the “civilized nations” were only a handful. 
Japan, as the American Supreme Court declared at the turn of the 19th century in 
Paquete Habana case, was the last member admitted to the club of “civilized 
nations”. 
 
B. Scholarly Innovation at the ICJ 
 
Much later the ICJ talked of the role of equity even for “juristic persons” in Barcelona 
Traction on the basis that investments add to the host states welfare: ‘a theory has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 40 (May 15). 
165 Dissenting Opinion of Sir Cecil Hurst, Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 





been developed to the effect that the State of the shareholders has a right of 
diplomatic protection when the State whose responsibility is invoked is the national 
State of the company.’166 The ICJ in this case acknowledged theory building to 
protect investments of companies as “juristic persons” when much of the rights on 
property in erstwhile colonies, oil contracts for example, came from wars, conquests 
and colonization.  
 
Seeing the ICJ accepting a theory about the “injury” to juristic persons such as 
corporations even through “equity”, what is one to make of the ICJ’s lack of theory 
building in South West Africa case (second phase)?167 In this case the ICJ noted the 
suggestions made that humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to 
generate legal rights and obligations to which it disagreed in the clearest terms 
possible.168 The Court however subsequently reminded the petitioners that it was “a 
court of law” and that could take account of ‘moral principles only in so far as these 
are given a sufficient expression in legal form.’169  Quite surprisingly, the ICJ 
conspicuously recalled the ‘limits of its own discipline’ ignoring “humanitarian 
considerations” only to recognize the role of equity for corporate persons four years 
later in Barcelona Traction case.170  
 
In 2013 however ‘bridging the temporal gap between the cessation of the Claims 
Commissions model of dispute settlement at the end of the 1930s and the rise of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, 48, para. 92. For Chen 
however the PCIJ used the terms law, justice and equity almost synonymously, see, Bin Cheng, Justice 
and Equity in International law, 8 Current Legal Problems (1955) 185-211. 
167 For an excellent scholarly comparison of the two cases see, Bin Cheng, The 1966 South-West 
Africa Judgment of the World Court, 20 Current Legal Problems (1967) 181-212. 
168 South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), (Second Phase), [1966] ICJ Rep. p. 6 at p. 34, 
para. 49. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Cf. Barcelona Traction, supra note 166, para. 92 with South West Africa, Ibid. at para. 34. 
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investor-State arbitration at the end of 1990s’ for some publicist ‘would be to rely 
mutatis mutandis on State practice and judicial decisions regarding the most similar 
regime of international law during the time: international human rights.’171 Not that 
comparing investor-State claims with human rights regime of protection is 
unthinkable. The problem lies in clubbing two classes of people, capitalist investors 
and victims of human rights abuses, on the same side. It amounts to the obliteration of 
material reality and the use of law to obfuscate an otherwise “class” reality of 
international law.172  
 
Thus from Chimni’s class perspective, Barcelona Traction—a case that envisages 
investor protection as human rights using equity—is even ironic given this case 
speaks of the concept of obligation erga omnes and the human rights of investors in 
the same breath. Nonetheless, Barcelona Traction disfavored investment protection 
within the facts of the case.173 In fact the invocation of equity for cases involving 
corporate issues led even Judge Lauterpacht in Norwegian Loan case to opine that 
‘[t]he judicial character of the Court may become endangered if it were to assume the 
task of interpreting and applying texts which, being devoid of the element of effective 
legal obligation, are essentially no more than a declaration of political purpose.’174  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 M Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (Oxford 
OUP 2013) 7. 
172 Although some ‘criticisms of the use of the category of ‘class’ have a degree of validity’, Chimni 
argues, they ‘can be adequately addressed from within a Marxist approach.’ BS Chimni, Prolegomena 
To A Class Approach To International Law, 21 European J Intl L (2010) 57, 60. 
173 M Paparinskis, Barcelona Traction: A Friend of Investment Protection Law, 8, Baltic Yrbk Intl L 
(2008) 105, 112. 
174 Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in Norwegian Loan, supra note 112 at 66. Case 
Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 2 December [1963] ICJ Rep., p. 15. However, the Court in Tehran Hostage Case also 
opined that both the existence of wider political dispute constitute no bar to legal proceedings and that 
Security Council proceedings no restriction on functioning of the Court. United States Diplomatic and 






The lack of democratic legitimacy and the absence of non-Western nations in 
international law formation was certainly an issue to recon with. Even then, 
developing country members to the International Law Commission have not only 
noted but also asserted the role of publicists. For instance, Abdul Hakim Tabibi, ILC 
member from Afghanistan, while discussing the Preliminary Report on the Content, 
Form and Degrees of International Responsibility noted: ‘the report did not cite the 
teachings of publicists …, future reports should include appropriate references, since 
Article 38, paragraph 1 (d), of the Statute of the ICJ recognized the importance of 
those teachings, as did the General Assembly.’175 This inspired the acceptance of 
subsidiary sources in other regions as well. For instance, Article 20 of the ‘Protocol of 




The new turn to archives by Third World writers of international law to retrieve 
information around a particular international case has yielded information that 
confirm the anxieties of developing countries in accepting judicial decisions and 
writings of publicists as the source of international law.177 There are quite a few 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 1600th Meeting, 30 May 1980, State Responsibility (Continued) A/CN.4/330, Preliminary Report on 
the Content, Form and Degrees of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Article), 1 ILC Yrbk 
Int (1980) 85-90, 88. 
176 Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, 13 African J Intl & Comp L (2005) 115, 120. 
177 For the role Judge Sir Percy Spenser in suppressing the voice of a developing county judge in a pro-
imperial stance see, V Kattan, Decolonizing the International Court of Justice: The Experience of 
Judge Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan in the South West Africa Cases, 5 Asian J Intl L (2015) 310-355. 
The ICJ’s internal struggle paralleled a larger political struggle outside the Court. Kattan revisits the 
controversy of Judge Zafrulla Khan’s recusal from the South West Africa cases using new information 
from the National Archives in Australia, India, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, including an 
unpublished manuscript written by the Australian judge Sir Percy. P Singh, India Before and After the 
Right of Passage Case, 5 Asian J Intl L (2015) fn 148. However, d’Aspremont discredits the proneness 
of international lawyers to stretch the limit of their study by ‘seizing materials outside the realm of 
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examples where, for instance, the British Foreign office has relied on the work of 
jurists, mostly western, for establishing the British opinio juris. In relation to India’s 
invasion of Goa, on 6 May 1968, Vincent Evans’s letter, written on behalf of F. A. 
Vallat of the British Foreign Office, proffers a tangible example of law determination 
by publicists. He wrote: 
 
During the present century the rules of international law, as generally accepted, have 
almost certainly changed. At the beginning of the century it was accepted that a  State 
could acquire title to the territory of another State by conquest. But since the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Charter of the United Nation I think that 
the position now is that a State cannot acquire a good title to territory by such means. 
Amongst the works of the text book writers a useful summary of the position is to be 
found in Oppenheim’s International Law Vol. 1 8th Edition at page 574, and a fuller 
exposition is to be found in Chapter IV of Professor Jennings’ book ‘The Acquisition 
of Territory in International Law’ which is published in the Melland Schill series. … In 
speaking on this point we could draw on pages 61 to 64 of Jennings’ book.178 
 
Interestingly Sir Francis was a powerful supporter of writers as sources of 
international law. Delivering a talk on the Northern Cameroons case,179 he approved 
of the ICJ’s ‘considerable reliance … on the work by the distinguished American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
international law’. Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New 
Legal Materials, 19 European J Intl L (2008) 1075–1093. Cf. R Bierzanek, Some Remarks on Soft 
International Law, 17 Polish Yrbk Intl L (1998) 40. Even so, against this admittedly Anglo-Saxon 
versus French legal debate the archival turn both critiques and adds to this discourse on softness 
(political) of international law and non liquet (legal). 
178 However the letter also said ‘[w]hile these works give us useful general guidance on this subject I 
think we should be reluctant to quote them in public as having the full approbation of HMQ’ See Goa, 
CP.4/1, 6 May 1968, Internal Political Affairs of Goa, Daman and Diu, FCO 37/266, in Foreign Office 
Files for India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1965-1971 (1967-1968) para 2. Interestingly 
Schwarzenberger thinks international lawyer are ‘highly susceptible to current fashions in the realm of 
political ideology’ in comparison to lawyers in ‘legal departments of Foreign Offices’. G 
Schwarzenberger, Trends in the Practice of the World Court, 4 Current Legal Problems (1951) 1-34. 
179 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 





scholar, E. M. Borchard’.180 Notably, Vallat’s communiqué quoted above is a follow 
up from India’s capture of Goa after the ICJ ruled in the Right of Passage case. Just as 
the East met the West at the PCIJ in the Lotus case, India’s meeting with Portugal in 
the Right to Passage case at the ICJ precipitated a similar situation. What is more, a 
look at the diplomatic communiqué between London and Lisbon after the 1960 ICJ 
ruling in the Right of Passage case serves as smoking gun on the realty and integrity 
of international adjudication and the rulings that it produces.181 Sir Charles Stirling, 
the then ambassador of Britain to Lisbon recorded the Portuguese Foreign Minister’s 
conversation that Portugal did not get a completely favorable ruling from the ICJ ‘due 
only to the illness of the British Judge and the death of one of the Latin American 
Judges committed to the Portuguese cause’.182  
 
This particular archive has been declassified in 1991. It then becomes important to 
look into the change in constitution of the bench between 1958, the year of 
preliminary judgment and 1960 when the merits’ judgment came out. While the 
British member of the Court who sat in the preliminary rulings but to have fallen ill 
subsequently was Judge Lauterpacht. The Latin American judge implicated in the 
conversation of the Portuguese Minister was José Gustavo Guerrero, a diplomat from 
El Salvador, who served as the last president of the PCIJ from 1937 to 1945 as well as 
the first president of the ICJ from 1946 to 1949. He remained member of the Court till 
his death in 1958.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 F Vallat, Declaratory Judgments, 17 Current Legal Problems (1964) 1, 2. 
181 Scholars think nationality or geography inevitably constitute overriding influences on international 
judges. See, GI Hernández, Impartiality and Bias at the International Court of Justice, 1 Cambridge J 
Intl & Comp L (2012), 183–207. Cf M Markovic, International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification 
of Judges on the Basis of Nationality, 13 Washington Univ Global Studies L Rev (2014) 1-48. 
182 Letter of Sir C. Stirling, on April 30, 1960), supra note 21, para. 6. 
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Be that as it may, the expectation that these two judges would rule in favor of 
Portugal might only be an expectation of the Portuguese minister without the two 
judges having actually colluded. Besides, such expectations shape litigation strategies 
of parties. In fact India’s third preliminary objection throws light upon Portugal’s 
litigation strategy based perhaps on expectations of the Portuguese Foreign minister 
as recorded by the British Ambassador to Lisbon. Judge ad hoc Chagla’s dissenting 
opinion noted, ‘India’s third objection is that the present dispute was brought before 
this Court without preliminary diplomatic negotiations and without the negotiations 
reaching a deadlock.’183 
 
It is urged by India that the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to deciding legal 
disputes, and before there can be a dispute, it must be clear that the controversy cannot 
be settled by negotiations. It is pointed out that before a State is brought before the bar 
of the International Court, every attempt should first be made to see whether the 
controversy in question could not be amicably settled.184 
 
Perhaps Portugal had expected the ICJ to be more decisive in its favour and any time 
spent in diplomatic negotiations would have been futile. In early decolonial period, 
Western states expected international courts to decide legally what would be heretical 
diplomatically. As such a micro study of Lisbon’s litigation strategy and New Delhi’s 
response might reveal more about this case. This also plants seeds of doubts as far as 
the status of judicial decisions as sources of international law is concerned. That the 
Portuguese minister referred to Lauterpacht, the doyen of the discipline, precipitates a 
critique that Western writers have either not found—this assumption is untenable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Chagla, Case concerning right of Passage over Indian territory 
(Preliminary Objections) Judgment of November 26th, 1957, ICJ Rep. 125, 172. 
184 Ibid. Even in his merits dissent, Chagla referred to Lauterpacht, see, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 





given the Western institutions lead research, legal or otherwise—or overlooked or, 
even worse, not cared to speak about. What is more, the weight of Lauterpacht’s view 
in deciding questions of international law can simply be gauged from Judge ad hoc 
Chagla’s reference in his preliminary dissent to Lauterpacht even as Lauterpacht 
shared the preliminary bench with Chagla. This is rare, as, customarily, a bench at the 
World Court seldom cites authors sharing the bench in that case. 
 
*** 
Chap. II: The Normative Completeness of International Law: 




The 1920 drafting committee talked of subsidiary sources and avoiding the blind alley of non 
liquet in the same breath. For Lauterpacht subsidiary sources meant belief in doctrinal and 
jurisprudential completeness of law. Roughly at the time that the ICJ ruled on the merits of 
the Right of Passage case, Western publicists, aided by the non-liquet rule, began to 
internationalize colonial contracts. This view was supported perhaps also by Portugal’s 
unsuccessful arguments that the 1779 revenue tenure agreement with the Marathas, local 
Indian rulers, be seen as a treaty since it related to the question of “cession of sovereignty”. 
This became a very profitable line of arguments in disputes arising due to commercial 
contracts: international law—with laissez faire as its grand norm—could be invoked to treat 
colonial contract as a treaties. The power of individual scholars can be judged from the fact 
that in 1948, Hyderabad, a princely state, had before the Security Council used Lauterpacht’s 
book, a subsidiary source, as the sole source while claiming statehood. Subsequently, when 
Malta applied for intervention in the Continental Shelf case the politics of subsidiary sources 
became explicit. The ICJ noted that the Maltese request to intervene contained an implicit 
desire to argue points of general law so that the resulting judgment might form an important 
precedent to be used subsequently. This chapter argues that a theory of the artificial 






The cult of the precedent is … as dangerous as the rejection of precedent. Judge Gilbert 
Guillaume 1 [T]he case-law is generally recognized as the third formal source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J Intl Dispute 
Settlement (2011) 5–23 at 23. M Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 
British Yrbk Intl L (1975) 273-285. L Gross, Sources of Universal International Law, in RP Anand (ed) 
Asian States and the Development of Universal International Law (Delhi/London: Vikas Publications, 
1972) 189. 
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international law. Maktouf & Anr v Bosnia & Herzegovina.2 
 
Due to the cleavage of opinion between the publicists of powerful and powerless 
countries on their role and place, the subsidiary sources of law are a perfect 
candidates for politico-legal analysis.3 After much debate between civil law and 
common law members of the 1920 drafting committee, the committee settled for the 
wording ‘judicial decisions and the writings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations.’4 The negotiating history of the Statute reveals that it was a 
compromise—a kind of workable formulae—between common law’s idea of 
“jurisprudence” and the civil law tradition’s liking for “doctrinal” writings.5 However, 
already at the time of the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration the 
precedential value of prior judgments had come up in the discourse.6 Nevertheless, 
“judicial decisions” and ‘teaching of the highly qualified publicists of the various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Maktouf & Anr. v Bosnia & Herzegovina, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), [2013] ECtHR 2312/08, para. 
74. Recently in Kiobel case a U.S. lower Court found ‘indisputable that the works of the publicists on 
which we have relied accurately describe the primary sources of the relevant customary international 
law—the relevant customs and practices of States.’ Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2d Cir., 49 
ILM. 1510, at n 47. Similarly, in Zdanoka v. Latvia, ECtHR, Judge Zupancic in his dissenting opinion 
discussed publicists and philosophers in great details. Zdanoka v Latvia, 16 March 2005, [2006] ECHR 
58278/00. 
3 The situation is even more acute today as publicists from America talk of withdrawal from customary 
law, thereby, making or unmaking international law. CA Bradley & M Gulati, Withdrawing from 
International Custom, 120 Yale L J (2010) 202, 275. 
4 In the 15th Meeting (Private), held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, on July 3rd, 1920, Procès -
Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee 16th–July 24th 1920 with Annexes, vol. I (The Hague: 
Van Langerhuysen Bros., 1920), 332. 
5 Peil has established that the Court has cited publicists in only 22 of its 139 Judgments and Advisory 
Opinions. M Peil, Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the 
International Court of Justice, (1)3 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2012) 136, 143. It is notable that Peil 
has taken an exacting criterion in ‘for including or excluding a source’. Though scientific, it is also too 
positivistic in measuring the impact doctrinal writings had on pronouncing judgments. Writers are 
careful in crediting others in doctrinal writings, let alone Judges who have to cloak them in the blanket 
of legality. As such they would not cite doctrinal authors lightly. If the ICJ judges have cited doctrinal 
works, as Peil painstakingly demonstrates, they surely meant to cite it knowing too well the 
jurisprudential value of such judgments.  
6  Guillaume, supra note 1, at 7. J d’Aspremont, The International Court of Justice and tacit 
conventionality, 18 Questions of Intl L (2015) 3-17. Judges often speak of rules using the vocabulary of 
case pointing to how embedded judicial decisions as law are. See, Joint Declaration of Judges 
Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, Eiriksson and Jesus, in The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. 






nations’ became “subsidiary means” eventually in 1920. Sir Judge Humphrey has 
observed:  
 
The way in which individual judges quite often make use of’ doctrinal writings of the 
publicists ‘in their separate opinions indicates that they have played a part in the 
internal deliberations of the Court and in shaping opinion.7  
 
In the early days of the PCIJ, judge Moore noted ‘that Anglo-saxon jurists have long 
been in the habit of carrying this practice into the domain of international justice.’8 In 
the merits phase of the Nicaragua case, Judge Lachs, while rebutting American 
accusations of bias leveled against him, cited Judge Jessup in support of his defense.9 
Most recently, in the arbitration proceedings against India under the Indus Waters 
Treaty of 1960 instituted by Pakistan, the interim order of 6 June 2011 10 
institutionalized the ruling of the ICJ in Passage Through the Great Belt order.11 Even 
when Judge Nagendra Singh in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case said that ‘[t]he 
adjudicatory function of the Court must necessarily be confined to the case before it’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 H Waldock, (1962/II) 106 Hague Recueil 1, at 96 quoted in Peil, Ibid., 137.  
8 Dissenting Opinion by M Moore, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 
P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30) 57. 
9 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Merits, 
Judgment, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 159. See, GI Hernández, Impartiality and Bias at the International Court 
of Justice, (1)3 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2012) 183–207; F Zarbiyev, Judicial Activism in 
International Law—A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, 3 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2012) 247-
278. Today as international arbitration expands, many raise legitimate questions: how do arbitrators 
decide? Do they tend to favour certain classes of parties? S Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the 
Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J Intl Dispute 
Settlement (2013) 553-585; WW Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, 1 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2010) 25-
53. 
10 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Interim Protection Order, PCA (June 6, 
2011) para. 6, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1726>. This has been pointed out by S 
Bhattacharya, Proceeding at Your Own Risk: Evaluating a New Principle of International Law for 
Provisional Measures, 38 Yale J Intl L (2013) 512. 
11 Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures Order, 1991 I.C.J. 12, para. 17 
(July 29). Further, Wohlwend notes the role of the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as 
subsidiary source of international water resource law. BJ Wohlwend, The Teaching of the Most Highly 
Qualified Publicists as a Subsidiary Source of International Water Resources Law, Proceedings of 
Regional Conference on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Water Resources Management, Teslic, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (14-18 May 2001) 73-92 <http://www.bjwconsult.com/05.pdf>. 
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he did not rule out the possibility of looking into previous cases to adjudicate the 
cases at hand.12 In 2014, President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Sir David 
Baragwanath wrote more explicitly: 
 
[I]f no settled custom or other source of existing law is ascertainable, to decide the case 
the judges must somehow secure a law to apply. And if no law is to be found—in legal 
vernacular, if non liquet is not an option—law simply must be created. So in my view, 
it must be recognised that a measure of law creation is simply inherent in the judicial 
function: those who create judicial decision-makers perforce create law-makers, and 
must be aware of this.13 
 
The role and force of ICJ article 38(1)(d) is thus evident from the early days of 
permanent courts. Moreover, while writing separate and dissenting opinions at 
international courts and tribunals (ICTs), judges engage with publicists’ opinions. 
Indeed, the separate opinions of judges constitute a particularly strong subsidiary 
source under ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) ‘because they are written by the most highly 
qualified jurists sitting as judges in cases that have been carefully argued and 
presented by expert counsel.’14 As such, Judge Shahabuddin while in agreement with 
the ICJ ruling in Transborder Armed Actions took efforts to explain his approach in 
relation to ‘the views of the publicists.’15 In the LaGrand Case, the United States, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Declaration by Judge Nagendra Singh, in Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, 
[1974] ICJ Rep 3, 43. 
13 Sir David Baragwanath, The Interpretative Challenges Of International Adjudication Across The 
Common Law/Civil Law Divide, (3)1 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2014) 450, 453. 
14 CH Brower II, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 
Virginia J Intl L (2000) 1, 55, fn. 280. 
15 Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, in Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v 
Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility [1998] ICJ Rep 69, 144. At the ICJ, in his Dissenting 
Opinion Judge ad hoc Kateka also discussed publicists’ view. Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Congo v Uganda), [2005] ICJ Rep168 at 360-361. M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World 





support of a view, inter alia, ‘develop[ed] arguments concerning the “weight of 
publicists” commentary.’16  
 
In effect, article 38(1)(d) launches the publicists of the various nations into the orbit, 
depositing them alongside the members of various ICTs right away. This is a 
remarkable situation.17 Kennedy however is of the view that the ‘consent’ central to 
the sources and, the sources in ICJ article 38(1)(d) are least convincing because they 
are least consensual.18 On the contrary, Brunnee and Toope argue that: 
 
[T]he rhetoric of “sources” in international law has been a limiting factor on its 
progressive development. However, the theory of epistemic communities confirms the 
role of international lawyers in the formulation of principles that, when promoted 
through various regimes, may ultimately harden into binding norms of international 
law.19 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 LaGrand (Germany v USA), [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 500. In its rejoinder, the Republic of Nicaragua in 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights cited a Chilean publicist. Rejoinder of Nicaragua 
of 15 July 2008, 50 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15090.pdf>. The Counter-Memorial of the 
United States of America in Avena And Other Mexican Nationals, (Mexico v US) mentions ICJ Statute 
Article 38(1)(d) 61<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/10837.pdf>. 
17 Published in 2012, a study based upon a survey of more than 600 Judgments, Advisory Opinions and 
Orders, where the ICJ uses these sources and analyzes the individual scholars and writings that have 
been most useful to the Court. Peil, supra note 5, 136–161. 
18 D Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 American Univ J Intl L & Policy (1987) 1, 29. 
19 J Brunnée & SJ Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime 
Building, 91 American J Intl L (1997) 26, 42, fn 96. For the impact of scholars on international law see, 
DG Mejía-Lemos, Some considerations regarding “‘Instant’ International Customary Law”, fifty years 
later, 55 Indian J Intl L (2015) DOI <10.1007/s40901-015-0003-2>. Conclusions of ‘international 
scientific legal conferences’ can be accepted as being ‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’ 
and therefore closer to higher consensus. JE McWhinney, The New Countries and the New 
International Law: The United Nations’ Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
among States, 60 American J Intl L (1996)1 , 31; D Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal 
System: Sources of Law, 92 American J Intl L (1998) 398, 400-401. 
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Given its text’s openness and generality, article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties is often invoked to support the force of 38(1)(d).20 Because it 
came in 1969, years later, its presence arguably validates the role of ‘generality’ in the 
sources doctrine. Since judges are often assumed to be immune to politics, Anand in 
1965 was of the view that ‘the degree of caution or boldness used’ by the ICJ ‘in the 
development of international law depends on the individual judge’s philosophy on the 
nature of the judicial function in the international field.’21 Recently, in his dissenting 
opinion in the Pedra Branca case, Judge ad hoc Dugard said the ICJ ‘is not bound, in 
reaching its decision, by the submissions of counsel representing parties before the 
Court.’22 It may ‘invoke reasons of its own, proprio motu, when it considers that there 
is a sounder basis for decision than that advanced by parties.’23 Judge Lauterpacht is 
known to have actually never relied exclusively on the material laid before the Court 
by the parties, but he undertook his own researches.24 Former ICJ President Judge 
Guillaume notes:  
 
Interstate arbitration is most frequently entrusted to members of international tribunals 
(particularly from the [ICJ]) or to academics who are familiar with these institutions. 
The decisions are always published. Thus, they are more frequently imprinted with 
jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice and arbitration tribunals on 
which they rely. They can at times distance themselves from this jurisprudence in an 
attempt to complete it or add nuances to it. Yet they are essentially faithful to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  T Voon, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 103 American J Intl L (2009) 710, 714, fn 15.  
21 RP Anand, The International Court of Justice and the Development of International Law, 7 Intl 
Studies (1965) 228, 244. T Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 
Virginia J Intl L (2011) 1; JK Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 
Virginia J Intl L (2008) 411. Cf. Zarbiyev, supra note 9. 
22 Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), [2008] I.C.J. Rep 12, 152. 
23 Ibid. 
24 S Rosenne, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the Task of the International Judge, 55 American J 





precedent that they cite abundantly.25 
 
An invisible college of arbitrators of the Court of Arbitration for Sport systematically 
refers to ‘decisions previously taken by their colleagues.’ 26  Similarly, Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers awards refer to precedents.27 Arguably 
then, judges, in the name of finding one, end up making international law though 
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute attempts at constraining this practice.28 Anand suggests, 
‘the limiting terms of Article 59 refer to the actual “decisions” of the Court, i.e., the 
operative part, as distinguished from the reasoning underlying the decision and 
containing the legal principles on which it is based.’29 Anand wrote in 1965, nearly 50 
years ago. Today European scholars have become even more vocal about the power 
of ICJ Article 38(1)(d).30 The actual potential of the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d)31—
aided by Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT32—to unsettle the doctrinal ordering of sources 
based on consent is immense.33 While there is nothing to show conclusively that the 
enumeration of sources in ICJ 38(1)(d) constitutes “a rigid hierarchical order”,34 
Professor Sornarajah however sees them as “low-order sources.”35  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Guillaume, supra note 1, 15 (footnotes Omitted). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See in details the writings of former international judges: Guillaume, Ibid., 5-23; M Shahabuddeen, 
Precedent in the World Court (CUP, New York, 2007); T Treves, Judicial Lawmaking in an Era of 
“Proliferation” of International Courts and Tribunals: Development or Fragmentation of 
International Law? in, R Wolfrum & V Röben (eds) Developments of International Law in Treaty 
Making (Springer, 2005) 587-620. 
29 Anand, supra note 21, 245. 
30 A von Bogdandy & I Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public 
Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 European J Intl L (2012) 7, 19. 
31 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1055, 33 UNTS 993. (1945), Art. 38(1)(d). 
32 ‘[A]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.’ 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (1969) at (Art. 31(3)(c). Also see, A 
Gourgourinis, The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in International 
Adjudication, 2 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2011) 37–39. 
33 Kennedy, supra note 18, 60. 
34 Ibid. 230. Also see, D Shelton, Normative Hierarchy In International Law, 100 American J Intl L 
(2006) 291. 
35 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edn., (NY: CUP, 2010) 277. 
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Recently, Michael Byers has noted the role of the publicists of developed states in the 
formation of customs.36 Today, while European scholars take a liberal view and 
support the force of ICJ article 38(1)(d), the structural constraints and procedural 
practice in international adjudication leave little room for an approach that is more 
textual i.e. treating judicial decisions and writings as simply subsidiary sources. In the 
2826th ILC meeting, Chairperson Teodor Melescanu found it was “true that the 
Commission had no tradition of referring to the writings of publicists in the 
commentaries.”37 Member Pellet did not agree to the Chairman’s view. In his opinion, 
‘the codification and progressive development of international law required the 
Commission to apply the teachings of publicists, which were an element of the 
determination of the rules of law, as indeed provided in Article 38 (d) of the Statute’ 
of the ICJ.38 
 
While assessing such arguments, Teitel looks at the rise of international adjudication 
‘along with the increasing attention to the problem of weak and failed states.’39 ‘The 
decisions of international adjudicators in international criminal law and human rights 
law,’ she thinks, ‘often respond directly to political and legal institutional failures or 
gaps at the level of the state.’40 The argument is that the possibility of international 
courts to discover and apply laws is greater when a weak country is a party. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Michael Byers, Power, Obligation, And Customary, International Law, 11 Duke J Comp & Intl L 
(2001) 81, 82. 
37 ‘2826th Meeting, Draft report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-sixth session (continued), 
Chapter IV. Diplomatic protection (continued) (A/CN.4/L.653 and Corr.1 and Add.1)’, 1 UN Yrbk ILC 
(2004) 218. 
38 Ibid. Furthermore, publicists allege that the ICJ has relied on ‘actual practice to determine the 
content of customary rules surprisingly rarely, instead frequently basing its conclusions instead on non-
binding actions by international bodies or on its own decisions’ i.e. the help of Article 38(1)(d). M 
Weisburd, The International Court of Justice And the Concept of State Practice, 31 Univ Pennsylvania 
J Intl L (2010) 295. 
39 Ruti Teitel, LJIL Symposium: A Consideration of ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An 
Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority, Opinio Juris (Apr. 9, 2013) para. 4 





Qualitatively speaking, chances are that developing countries hire foreign firms to 
represent them at international disputes due to issues of the lack of capacity.41 Most 
times, these foreign firms or scholars write memorials for the developing country 
parties.42 Such citations in memorials to previous cases as precedents are fairly 
common. 
 
The fact is, unhampered by any specific limits laid down in the Article 59 of the ICJ 
Statute, ‘but within the bounds of judicial caution,’ the ICJ has been applying 
international law in a spirit of “progressive realism” and has become one of the chief 
agencies for the gradual development and growth of international law.’43 R.P. Anand, 
again, says that any attempt to clarify and re-formulate the principles of international 
law, whether by private juristic re-statement themselves must be welcomed.44 On the 
same line but further down, Schachter, while writing about a theory of “international 
obligations”, maintains that the ‘international lawyers need not be unduly modest as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See for the who’s who of international law on both the sides of the case for two of world’s most poor 
countries, Kasikilil/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ Rep. 1999, p. 1045; Frontier Dispute, 
Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 554; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ 
Rep. 1994, at p. 6. There is a long list of such cases with some of the poorest African countries. 
Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity Building to 
a Level Playing Field? 4 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2013) 83-109, 88. What is notable is that even the 
two junior counsel representing India in Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration Between 
Bangladesh and India were not Indians. Thus, even today, the Indian government does not have and is 
not training a younger crop of local counsel for future international disputes. In Bay of Bengal 
Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, apart from Shankardass, foreign 
counsel in the case included Alain Pellet, Sir Michael Wood, and M. Reisman. Ironically, Bangladesh 
did not even have a single local counsel. See Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between 
Bangladesh and India, 8 October 2009, PCA <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376>. 
A similar trend is seen in other cases between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Even junior counsels and 
advocates for these cases are doctoral candidates working under senior counsels, who are mostly 
Western nationals. Naturally, there is no development of the valuable expertise in developing counties. 
Developing countries continue to ignore the need to cultivate homegrown experts. See the list of 
counsels in the following cases; Dispute Concerning Delimitation of The Maritime Boundary Between 
Bangladesh And Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), 2012 ITLOS Rep. 1, 5-8; 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Final Award, 20 December 2013, PCA 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392>. 
42 This explains for example the mention of judicial decisions and publicists, the Right of Passage case 
and writer Thirlway, in the Memorial of Namibia in Kasikili/Sedudu Island proceedings. Memorial of 
the Republic of Namibia in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Vol. 1, 
28 February 1997, para. 173 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/98/8574.pdf>. 
43 Anand, supra note 21, 246. 
44 Ibid. 258. 
 	  81 
 
to his contribution.’45 In fact, as early as 1927, Hersch Lauterpacht was quite vocal 
about international law recruiting private rules of different countries to expand its 
sources.46 More recently, Sornarajah, however, has taken a more cautious position. 
From a theoretical perspective, he says: 
 
[I]t is important to show that multilateral corporations, though essentially private 
actors denied personality in international law, nevertheless had sufficient power to 
manipulate the low-order sources of international law, such as judicial decisions, the 
writings of highly qualified publicists and the general principles of law, to construct a 
system of protection they desired.47 
 
Indeed today the debate on the role of judicial decisions and the writings of highly 
qualified publicists as sources of international law is impregnated with realpolitik, an 
avowed enemy of legality.48 Noting the increase in democratic process in custom 
formation, Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the South West Africa Cases said 
the ‘method of the generation of customary international law is in the stage of 
transformation from being an individualistic process to being a collectivistic 
process.’49  
II. Jurists and Litigating Parties as Lawmakers  
As evidenced by Sir Michael Wood’s Report of March 2015, views of the publicists 
empowered by ICJ 38(1)(d) have been central even in settling the jurisprudence on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 O Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligations, 8 Virginia J Intl L (1968) 300, 317. 
46 H Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, Green & Co., 
1927). 
47 Sornarajah, supra note 35, 277. J Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 Harv International Law J 
(2015) 229 makes similar arguments. 
48 See generally for an informed exposition, J D’Aspremont, Formalism and Sources of International 
Law (OUP, Oxford, 2011) 63-77. 
49 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, in, South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), Judgment of 18 
July 1965, [1965] ICJ. Rep. 6 at 294. Paulo Borba Casella, Contemporary Trends on Opinio Juris and 
the Material Evidence of International Customary Law, the Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture (17 July 





customary law.50 The participants in customary law prescription include ‘pressure 
groups, private associations and indeed even individuals.’51 Therefore we should 
focus ‘not only on the question of who has the legal competence to participate, but 
also of whose behavior is in fact leading to the formation of customary 
prescriptions.’52 By inventing legal analogies, such as the one between a treaty, a 
contract and a constitution, and then crystalizing it further by publishing these views, 
western publicists have created another source that legitimized their action. It was 
indeed, to use Villalpando’s words, a “normative ponzi scheme” in relation to the ICJ 
and the ILC.53  
 
Now, if the [ILC] relies so heavily on the [ICJ’s] jurisprudence to determine the rules 
of law and the Court invokes so indisputably the Commission’s work for the same 
purpose, are we not the victims of a normative Ponzi scheme? In other words, what 
remains of the investigation on ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ and of 
the role of governments in the codification of customary international law? The 
interaction between expert bodies and judicial organs does indeed appear to result in 
an autocatalytic process in which the crystallization of opinio juris may occur by the 
mutual reaffirmation of the existence of a norm, without any external practice.54 
 
Here, it would be useful to note that the Rapporteurs of the more important works of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Third Report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 
UN Doc A/CN.4/682, 27 March 2015, para 67. 
51 K Venkata Raman, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the development of International 
customary law, 59 ASIL Proceedings (1965) 169, 171. 
52 Ibid. 
53 S Villalpando, On the International Court of Justice and the Determination of Rules of Law, 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 243, 248. J Seifi, Procedural and Evidentiary Innovations 
in the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Oil Platforms Case (November 2003), in J-
H. Paik,  S-W. Lee,  KYL Tan (eds) Asian Approaches to International Law and the Legacy of 
Colonialism: The Law of the Sea, Territorial Disputes And International Dispute Settlement 
(Routledge, London, 2012) 25-63. 
54 Ibid. at 247-48 (Footnote Omitted). 
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the ILC were mostly developed country lawyers. The truth is, the members of the ILC 
from the developing world are usually elected to pay off public servants or reward 
politicians. 
 
A. The Case of Clyde Eagleton vis-à-vis Hyderabad at the Security Council 
 
The function of a doctrinal analysis is tell to international legal rules really are, as 
opposed to what writers could make of them should they adopt a particular 
ideological or political point of view. Yet international law is very political and 
writers find themselves in one or the other ideological camp.  
 
During the 1960s, a right of self-determination supported decolonization from 
bluewater colonialism. In 1952 Clyde Eagleton wrote that the colonial powers 
‘thought of colonies as, for the most part, unable to stand alone in the strenuous 
conditions of modern civilization and therefore in need of a period of tutelage before 
being considered for independence.’55 But the Soviet Union’s resolution in the United 
Nations, differentiated between the non-self-governing territories within the UN 
Charter Article 73, which were to be assisted toward “national self-determination”, 
and national minorities, which should have only the right to use their native tongues 
and cultures. Naturally newly decolonized nations viewed Russia’s definition to be 
more suitable to their reality. Eagleton among other things was ‘Adviser to the 
Representative of Hyderabad’.56 On August 21, 1948, Hyderabad complained to the 
President of the Security Council though a cablegram: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 C Eagleton, Excesses of Self-Determination, 31(4) Foreign Affairs (1953) 592, 596. 





The Government of Hyderabad, in reliance on Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter of 
the United Nations, requests you to bring to the attention of the Security Council the 
grave dispute which has arisen between Hyderabad and India, and which, unless settled 
in accordance with international law and justice, is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security. Hyderabad has been exposed in recent months to 
violent intimidation, to threats of invasion, and to crippling economic blockade which 
has inflicted cruel hardship upon the people of Hyderabad and which is intended to 
coerce it into a renunciation of its independence. The frontiers have been forcibly 
violated and Hyderabad villages have been occupied by Indian troops. The action of 
India threatens the existence of Hyderabad, the peace of the Indian and entire Asiatic 
Continent, and the principles of the United Nations. The Government of Hyderabad is 
collecting and will shortly present to the Security Council abundant documentary 
evidence substantiating the present complaint. Hyderabad, a State not a Member of the 
United Nations, accepts for the purposes of the dispute the obligations of pacific 
settlement provided in the Charter of the United Nations.57 
 
On September 12, 1948, the Government of Hyderabad, in view of the India’s 
‘officially proclaimed intention’ as ‘announced by its Prime Minister to invade 
Hyderabad,’ implored the UN Secretary General to put the complaint upon the agenda 
at ‘the earliest possible date’.58 On September 13, 1948 a cablegram informed the 
Secretary General that Hyderabad had been invaded. The Secretary General was, as 
Eagleton reports, doubtless uncertain as to the status of Hyderabad within 
international law, introduced the text of Hyderabad’s complaints with the words: ‘The 
Secretary General, not being in a position to determine whether he is required by the 
rules of procedure to circulate this communication, brings it to the attention of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Security Council, Official Records, U.N. Doc. S/986 (3rd September 1948) 5. 
58 U.N. Docs. S/998 and S/1000, ibid., 6, 7. 
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Security Council, for such action as the Council may desire to take.’59 
 
There are two observations that merit a thorough discussion. Eagleton was not only an 
advisor to Hyderabad; he was on the editorial board of the American Journal of 
International Law at the time. The luxury of presenting his case in the journal, by no 
means a small privilege given not many in 1950s could do so, is indeed important to 
the process of law making by writing.60 He starts making his case for Hyderabad with 
a presumption: ‘Assuming for the moment that Hyderabad was a state, it had a right, 
though not a Member of the United Nations, to bring before the Security Council a 
dispute to which it was a party, provided it accepted in advance the obligations of 
pacific settlement in the Charter, for the purposes of that dispute.’61 He opines further: 
 
As to this point of recognition, several things may be said. Britain did authorize 
independence for these States, if they chose to take it under the Indian Independence 
Act, but she could not well extend formal recognition to them until she knew what their 
choice would be. Nothing in Sir Hartley’s words would prevent later recognition; 
indeed, recognition should logically flow from the British position, in due course, for 
such States as might wish to remain independent. No Member of the United Nations 
could with propriety recognize a state whose status was at the moment before the 
Security Council for decision. Whether recognized or not, Hyderabad was an 
independent state, fully organized, of size and resources sufficient to entitle it to 
recognition according to usual standards of stability and willingness to meet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid. Much later in 1970 the Indian Supreme Court in Scindia v India said that, ‘formerly Rulers of 
territories in India brought within the fold of the Constitution [are] [t]hough not sovereign within the 
meaning of that expression in [i]nternational [l]aw, these former Rulers had certain attributes of 
sovereignty during the days preceding the independence of India.’ Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia & 
Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., 15.12.1970, MANU/SC/0050/1970, para. 157. 
60 See for a discussion, AH Qureshi, Editorial Control And The Development of International Law, 61 
Political Q (1990) 328–339. 







However, explaining the position of the Indian States, in his letter of March 27, 1926, 
to the Nizam (King) of Hyderabad, Lord Reading had written: ‘The sovereignty of the 
British Crown is supreme in India, and therefore no Ruler of an Indian State can 
justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing.’63  
 
Nonetheless, having made this claim Eagleton makes an arresting claim meriting a 
postcolonial analysis on state practice and making of law by scholars. ‘The formal 
document embodying the Complaint of Hyderabad puts forward an argument’ 
Eagleton writes, ‘that recognition is merely declaratory of the existing fact of 
statehood, which apparently derives from the writings of Professor Lauterpacht.’64  
 
In 1950, Eagleton, having advised in 1948 the representative of Hyderabad in the 
Security Council, published an article in the American Journal of International Law in 
support of Hyderabad’s status for a sovereign state. Eagleton, quoting from 
Hyderabad’s complaint that he himself had helped in drafting, revealed the basis of 
the Hyderabad’s main source of argument: Lauterpacht’s classic treatise of 1947, 
Recognition in International Law.65 
 
In 1948, not only did Eagleton argue with the force of subsidiary sources, writings of 
Lauterpacht, two years later in the pages of the American Journal of International 
Law he argued the same point, in effect creating another source supporting the first. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid. 
63 P Diwan, Kashmir And The Indian Union: The Legal Position, 2 ICLQ (1953) 333, 335. 
64 Eagleton, supra note, at 56, fn 24. 
65 H Lauterpacht, Recognition In International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947).  
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There can’t be more direct case of the subsidiary means shaping the source of 
international law by complainant states within international law. Hyderabad’s central 
claim for independent entity within international law were based on the writings of 
publicists and not on any customary law, treaty, or general principles of law, the main 
sources of international law.66  
 
However later the government of Hyderabad after the successful conclusion of the 
Indian Army’s “punitive expedition”, as Professor Taraknath Das put it, “petitioned 
the United Nations to withdraw the case.”67 In fact Das explicitly wrote that much 
before 1948 Indian and British lawyers, as hired guns of the princely states, wrote 
articles “in support of the claim that the Princely States of India had special relations 
with the British Crown and thus could maintain their relations directly with the British 
Crown without being in any way responsible to the Government of India.’68 No 
wonder, postcolonial publicists identified certain features of international law as ‘an 
imaginative creation of some international jurists”.69 
 
B. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya) 
 
In 1981 the request by Malta before the ICJ to intervene in a case between Tunsia and 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya raises a significant question of the politics of sources 
doctrine and the tactics of law formation. On 14 April 1981 regarding the application 
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by Malta for permission to intervene in Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, the 
ICJ, inter alia, noted Tunisia’s following observations:  
 
[O]n the basis of the object of the intervention as explained by Malta, the Application 
amounted to a request to intervene in a case in order to argue points of general law, 
simply because the resulting judgment might form an important precedent as a 
subsidiary means for the ascertainment of the law; and this Tunisia considers to be 
inadmissible, the more so if Malta, as seemed to be its intention, does not propose to be 
bound in any way by the precedent.70 
 
Tunisia’s observations are indeed of high importance, and in many ways, present a 
Third World critique of the sources doctrine. Tunisia maintained that it saw Malta’s 
application ‘amount[ing] to a request to intervene in a case in order to argue points of 
general law’.71 This is all fine; the point made next is of higher interest. Tunisia 
thought Malta did this for strategic purpose of playing the politics of law sources. For 
Tunisia, Malta requested to intervene ‘to argue points of general law’ so that ‘the 
resulting judgment might form an important precedent as a subsidiary means for the 
ascertainment of the law.72‘ The politics is indeed sharp one as Tunisia considered 
Malta’s request ‘inadmissible, the more so if Malta, as seemed to be its intention, does 
not propose to be bound in any way by the precedent.’73 Indeed like individuals, 
governments advance contentions to suit a particular case that might not be its actual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Application to Intervene by Malta, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 
[1981] ICJ Rep. p. 3, 12, para. 16. In its counter-memorial to ICJ’s Avena proceedings the United 
States submitted that “[t]he Court’s decisions are only binding on the parties to the case before it, and 
the decision in one case has no necessarily determinative function in later cases involving different 
parties.” Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, in, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 
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71 Ibid. See Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Nullity and Validity: Challenges to Territorial and Boundary 
Judgments and Awards, in, Jin-Hyun Paik, Seok-Woo Lee and Kevin Y. L. Tan (eds.) Asian 
Approaches To International Law And the Legacy of Colonialism (London: Routledge, 2012) 37. 
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settled and impartial opinion; one has to fish for it while shifting through the volumes 
of official stationary of the state. 
 
The point that Tunisia was attempting to make was that, while requesting to intervene, 
Malta wanted to expand the sources of law using the points of general law which, 
Tunisia had reasons to believe, could be used against it by Malta or any other party’.74 
Conclusively, it can be argued that Malta wanted a law made by the ICJ using 
38(1)(d). However, the ICJ in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute said:  
 
[T]he Chamber should take the 1917 Judgement [sic] into account as a relevant 
precedent decision of a competent court, and as, in the words of Article 38 of the 
Court’s Statute, “a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. In short, the 
Chamber must make up its own mind on the status of the waters of the Gulf, taking 
such account of the 1917 decision as it appears to the Chamber to merit.75 
 
Deducing from facts, cases and commentaries by publicists, it appears that publicists 
from developing countries, given the lack of support for research and other structural 
handicaps, are although publicists, but as minority or dissenting voices. 
 
III. International Law and Publicists in the Opinio Juris of States 
 
A. The ICJ’s Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Opinio Juris and Developing 
Countries 
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Within the time limits fixed by the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, over thirty-
five UN Member states—from the United States to Sierra Leone—filed written 
submissions. Written statements by the UN Member states are the most direct 
examples of opinio juris. However, ‘the shared view of the Parties’ the ICJ ruled in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities, ‘as to the content of what they regard as the rule 
is not enough.’76 The Court ‘must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the 
opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.’77  More recently after the Kosovo 
opinion of the ICJ, the role of publicists in self-determination has led to a debate 
again about the publicists building up subsidiary law in furtherance of a particular 
ideology. Pointing this out Alexander Orakhelashvili writes: 
 
The Kosovo situation is a clear illustration that writers, when motivated by political or 
ideological considerations, run the risk of presenting the international legal position the 
way they would like to see it, as opposed to what that legal position is in terms of 
consent and agreement of States, and of pointing only to that part of the evidence that 
suits their position, to the exclusion of evidence that does not suit that position.78 
 
To this Hipold retorted: ‘One could, in principle, agree with this position if there were 
not the suspicion that Orakhelashvili is asserting that he knows in advance, for sure, 
what international law is and that other writers are not allowed to look for different 
solutions.’ 79 One notable aspect of the Kosovo affair in particular is that while 
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Hilpold, 8 Chinese J Intl L (2009) 285, 287. 
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Western Member states cites publicists, the African and Latin American states usually 
did not.80 In its submission of well over hundred pages, similar to that of the United 
Kingdom, the United States supported the Kosovo’s declaration for independence in 
six chapters, drafted almost like a North American law review manuscript citing 
publicists and previous international judicial decisions.81 
 
Why? One wonders if this is simply a matter of resources and staff capacity of states. 
While the submissions by the United States, the United Kingdom and other East 
European countries in the Kosovo case cited publicists, the submissions from Asian 
and Latin American countries observed restraint in citing, let alone subscribing to the 
views of the publicists. The emerging power China chose to anchor its argument in 
the ruling of a municipal court of Canada82 while India had nothing to say. As 
expected, Japan categorically stated that the advisory opinion should not be seen as 
establishing “precedent”, of course, without citing any publicist.83 
 
B. Authors in the Aid of 38(1)(d) 
 
International law scholarship today is characterized by a Clarion call to reject 
monism-dualism distinction alongside the call to rescue 38(1)(d) from the misery of 
being “subsidiary”. Armin von Bogdany and Ingo Venzke, German scholars, for 
example argue that the ‘effect of judicial precedents is concealed by the doctrinal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
support in academic writing for such a concept.’ P Hilpold, The Kosovo Case and International Law: 
Looking for Applicable Theories, 8 Chinese J Intl L (2009) 47, 56. 
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ordering of things in light of Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute which classifies 
international judicial decisions as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.’84 They lament that the decisions are ‘pictured as a source for recognizing the 
law but not a source of law.’85  
 
In the past American and Indian scholars, Freidmann and Anand for instance, have 
penned in support of the proposition that judges should make law. Freidmann wrote 
‘[t]hree of the four sources enumerated in Article 38 are reasonably well defined: 
treaties, custom and judicial decisions are in fact the three principal sources of legal 
authority in the international community.’86 But judicial decision is not a primary 
source. Besides, Anand thought, ‘there is no reason why society should be deprived of 
a conscientious, slow, but effective law-making by a few wise jurists who are 
representatives of the international community.’87 Furthermore, Anand has pointed 
out, citing the Lotus case and the dissents of Lauterpacht, the role of both previous 
decisions and individual opinions in the subsequent making of international law.88 
 
Opinions such as these have fertilized the view that publicist make laws with the 
power and force of their studied opinion when in 2013 even so called “emerging 
powers”, let alone small and powerless countries, struggle, as empirical studies reveal, 
to garner resources to participate in international proceedings.89 In international 
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criminal law, the role of precedents has been spectacular.90 The fact is, publicists of 
powerful countries outnumber the legal department of small countries in both quality 
and quantity. Thus in effect 38(1)(d), with all its noble intentions, does ensure that 
writings of a few experts create law but the actual political law-making process by 
weaker countries is jeopardized by powerful countries through persistent objection, 
though limited only to customary law. The game of sources continues to exacerbate 
the weakness of weaker countries, therefore their insecurity and the lack of 
confidence in international law generally.91  
 
It is notable that the 1920 commission of drafters included 38(1)(d) to avoid non 
liquet.92 And since then scholars have created this atmosphere of completeness of the 
international legal order that sustains the non-declaration of non liquet.93 For a long 
time constitutional limitation of the treaty making powers has been seen as a method 
to protect the sovereignty of states.94 Imposing domestic limitations on treaty making 
powers through constitution, it is argued, are mechanisms to control the non-
consensual growth of sources of law. Just as the formation of secular states in the 
West watered down the legitimacy of older treaties made by monarchs, doctrinally 
speaking, decolonization, another anti-imperial moment, one would imagine should 
impact the doctrine of sources in the same way. In line with such a view, India’s first 
Prime Minister, Nehru, representing the political mandate of the time pointed to the 
absurdity of “ancient treaties” saying, “independent India” was ‘in no way bound by 	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any old or modern treaty between other countries to which not subscribed’.95 But in 
reality India did accept colonials treaties as Nehru’s views was for political 
consumption. 
 
If not more, such sources should at least not fall within 31(3)(c) that together with ICJ 
38(1)(d) complete the sources of international law. What is notable is the fact that 
works of publicists supports a certain view of treaty, subsidiary sources clothed as 
primary sources.96 
 
Small wonder then, developing country publicists identify only treaties as the most 
important source. For instance, almost all major Chinese publicists, Chiu observes, 
‘place custom after treaties in their discussions on principal sources of international 
law.’97 Furthermore, the Soviet theory of treaties toed similar lines.98 Communist 
theory always insisted on consent as the basis of international law and accepted only 
treaties and custom as sources.99 As such, today, the developing countries take an 	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assiduously conservative approach to sources of international law in contentious 





This chapter has first tried to demonstrate that the doctrine of non liquet has been 
rather important in the sources of international law. In the early years of 
decolonization many aspiring new states tried to claim independence using writings of 
the publicists (e.g., Hyderabad’s case before Security Council). There cannot  be a 
better example of the power of writings. Second, as a strategy, western publicists in 
their writings reinforced arguments, that failed before a court. The internationalization 
of contracts is an excellent case in point in this regard. Through a structural process 
such arguments would become usable primary sources. It is noteworthy that in 2014, 
the ICJ accepted the validity of even tacit agreements.100 
 
The fact that submissions by Western UN Member states before ICTs cite publicists 
in their written submissions is testimony to the fact that such sovereigns do anchor 
their arguments in existing scholarship. Historically, and in comparison to the rest of 
the world, Western States offer more value to the views of the publicists. This 
difference points to the relationship between State and the private individuals in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
advisory opinion submitted pursuant to an international agreement other than the UNCLOS, the PRC is 
wary given any two or more states in South China Sea might sign an agreement to ask the Tribubal to 
offer opinion on law of the sea issue. The PRC has recently said that ‘there is, at present, no provision 
in UNCLOS that can serve as a basis for the advisory competence of the full bench of the ITLOS’. 
Request for An Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), 
Written Statement of the PRC, Case No. 21, ITLOS, para 94(b) 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/written_statements_round1/C21_8
_China_orig_Eng.pdf>. 





capitalist and socialist-communist countries. Liberal states, naturally capitalists, 
exchange opinions with their publicists. This occasions writings sitting in the 
footnotes of the written submission by such states. On the contrary, the socialist and 
communist States, believing in collectivity against the individualistic view, perceive 
the anchoring  of their opinion in publicists as almost heretical. 
 
But the truth is that many developing countries seek the advise of law firms based in 
Europe or the United States in the matters of international law. 101  Therefore, 
abstaining from citing a publicist does not mean that non-Western States do not value 
the opinion of the publicists. For instance, Judge ad hoc Tarazi in his dissenting 
opinion in Tehran Hostage case discussed French municipal ruling and a French 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Papa, supra note 41, at 88. 
102 The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tarazi in Tehran Hostage Case [1980] ICJ Rep 63. 
103 David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 Sydney L Rev 
(2005) 5-28. More recently in Romak arbitration Uzbekistan relied ‘on scholarly writings as well as 
decisions and awards of arbitral tribunals.’Romak v. Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280 
(2009) at para. 95. Interestingly enough Romak, the Swiss Company, rebutted saying because this 
arbitration is conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules, ‘the Salini criteria are inapplicable and 
irrelevant, having been developed within the context of ICSID case law.’ Ibid. 107. 
	   	  
Chap III: Transnational Law and Decolonisation: Jessup as an 
Actor 
*** 
The chapter 3 unpacks Jessup’s Transnational Law, a post-war innovation as an example of 
the role of jurists as sources of law. Transnational Law presents perhaps the most suitable 
example of the private life of international law. In 1956 Jessup popularized Transnational 
Law to conflate national and international law. This scholarly innovation represented an 
astute legal argument to neutralize the sovereignty of newly decolonized states in disputes 
with investors. Before 1956, in arbitrations involving Latin American, East European and 
Asian States, Western arbitrators made an effort to negative sovereignty against investors on 
the question of “governing law” and the “choice of law”; latter being a chapter in 
Transnational Law. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Nasser’s 
rejection of the internationalization of the Constantinople Convention by Dulles, Secretary to 
President Eisenhower, captures the tension that the application of transnational law on 
colonial treaties exhibited. After 1956, Western scholars disparaged international law of the 




I. Capitulations and Concessions Contracts Before Transnational Law 
 
Corporate bodies, whether political or nonpolitical, have certainly been treated in 
orthodoxy theory as fictions, but their essential reality as entities is now well accepted 
and law deals with them as such. … Transnational situations, then, may involve 
individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups.1 
 
The very idea of sovereignty hides an enigma in relation to concessions contracts, the 
primary economic tool used during centuries of colonialism to exploit natural 
resources. Historically speaking, concessions contract an accommodation of the rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 P Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 3; cf David Pierce, Post-







of Western traders by Asian rulers.2 Capitulations served to impose conditions for the 
residence of Europeans in such Kingdoms for free trade and commerce.3 The signing 
of the Treaty of Nanjing, an unequal treaty, between the British and the 
representatives of the Qing dynasty in 1842 is a good example.4 
 
Colonial powers, often after having defeated a native sovereign, used a legal tool, 
extraterritoriality, to plant foot in the local territory. Later they would strip the locals 
off sovereignty in a gradual expansion of authority. The motives usually were 
overwhelmingly commercial and it also covered exemptions from criminal 
prosecution of the foreigners from local laws—e.g., extraterritoriality in the Treaty of 
Nanjing. Most of the times, the inadequacies of the native laws were proffered as the 
reason for creating mixed courts that applied foreign law. Colonial privateers as legal 
norm entrepreneurs in such ways successfully planted seed of Western law in new 
soils, albeit with the power of gunboats diplomacy.5 
 
Japan followed the British East India Company’s model, but cared much less about 
law than territorial domination and commercial exploitation. After defeating Russia in 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, Japan established the South Manchuria Railway 
Company in China to promote the business and commercial interest of Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies: 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1967) 97.  See for a discussion on Ottoman-French 
commercial treaty, A Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under 
the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 Harv Intl L J (2000) 419, 431-33. 
3 M Sornarajah, Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 31 ICLQ (1982) 
661- 685, 673. 
4 Phil CW Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law since the Opium War, 27 Leiden J Intl L 
(2014) 859–892, 866. 
5 However there was a treaty of 7 February 1631 between the King of Persia and the Netherlands, 
which gave favourable treatment to Persian traders. CH Alexandrowicz-Alexander, A Persian Treaty in 





citizens.6 In China, the world witnessed two varieties of colonialism from two worlds, 
the West and the East—while the former forced an unequal treaty and 
extraterritorially, the latter inflicted Asian form of colonization. 
 
By maintaining that China had no history of corporate law a European tradition of 
philosophical prejudices about Chinese law developed into a distinctively American 
ideology of empire.7 The first Sino–US treaty in 1844 authorized the extraterritorial 
application of American law. A kind of legal imperialism found its fullest expression 
in an American district court’s jurisdiction over China.8  Similarly France, like 
Portugal, too had extraterritorial enclaves in India.9  
 
Later with Japan’s desire to include a racial equality clause turned down at the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919, Western racism indeed gained a legal meaning. Trade and 
commerce did not deliver upon its laissez faire promise; it did not lift the Asians to 
the level of the Western imperial powers. Yet, for American and Europeans lawyers 
to see transnational law, an innovation to deflate sovereignty in commercial dispute, 
as an innocuous innovation is to disregard history of colonialism all together. In the 
world of mercantilism facilitated by colonialism, while the cost of the production of 
international law through innovative arguments was passed on to the non-West, its 
makers, the West, kept the profits that accrued.  
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7 T Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 Michigan Law Review (2002) 179-234. 
8 T Ruskola, Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law (Harvard University Press 
2013). 
9 See BR Whyte, Waiting For The Esquimo: An Historical and Documentary Study of the Cooch Behar 
Enclaves of India and Bangladesh, Research Paper 8, School of Anthropology, Geography and 







Legal orientalism was thus born. And transnational law, one that emerged soon after 
the end of the World War II, was an innovation to defend capitulations. This 
transnational law, much like colonialism, was born with congenital dislike for 
sovereignty of the non-Western peoples and States. As Huang put it in 1957, 
concessions contracts have vital effect upon world economy, and in other spheres, 
warranting a consideration of its nature and legal status.10 Historically, oil in the 
Middle East, Latin America and Africa, and basic minerals and other extractive 
products in all parts of the world were exploited under concessions contracts.  
 
Subsequently, Judge Guha Roy questioned whether the responsibility of states for 
injuries, economic or otherwise, to aliens is a part of universal international law.11 
Both Lillich and Judge Jessup challenged Guha Roy.12 A later, Abi-Saab wrote about 
state responsibility and colonial contracts succinctly: 
 
The colonial administration granted concessions to nationals of the colonizing powers. 
The liquidation of such situations is necessary for any rational social reconstruction. It 
can, however, be hampered by a rigorous application of the traditional rules of state 
responsibility. This is the reason for the necessity for the newly independent states to 
find ways and means to hold these rules in check.13 
 
When decolonization challenged colonial treaties Western lawyers chose not to factor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 T Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 American J Intl L 
(1957) 277, 289. 
11 SN Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States For Injuries to Aliens A Part of Universal 
International Law? 55 American J Intl L (1961) 863, 891. 
12  RB Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of 
International Law Under Attack, 69 American J Intl L (1975) 359. Lillich garners the support of Phillip 
Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 Columbia J Transnl L (1973) 415. 
13 G Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States And The Rules Of International Law: An Outline, 8 
Howard L J (1962) 95, 114. Sinha gave an excellent account of how developing counties felt about 
various aspects of international law. SP Sinha, Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the 





in the sympathetic nature of colonial contracts while interpreting treaties that favored 
Western traders.14 After the World War II, in his Transnational Law Jessup addressed 
the problem that seeing national law and international law as two separate 
constituencies created without addressing colonialism. For him colonialism was just a 
granted fact of world history with no doctrinal implication on international law.  
 
When newly born States began using sovereignty as the central tenet of international 
law, for Jessup, States had lost the monopoly over the production of international law. 
In fact, Jessup saw developing African and Asian countries colluding with the Latin 
American countries to ‘fasten the blame on the wealthy countries of the West’ that 
operated ‘under slogans like self-determination’.15  As such actions and will of 
developing states did not produce international law. Therefore after being admitted to 
the UN system as full participants,  
 
[M]any of the new States of Africa and Asia tended to devote much of their efforts on 
forcing a re-examination of certain sociological and normative foundations of positive 
international law and some of its basic assumptions as they relate to the new political 
and socio-economic realities engendered by decolonisation and sovereignty.16 
 
In 1970, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a background paper 
maintaining the position that ‘foreigners are on occasions entitled under international 
to higher standards of compensation that those available to local nationals.’17 Guha 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (NY: CUP, 2004), 85. 
15 Jessup, supra note 1, 19-20. 
16 SL Sempasa, Obstacles to International Commercial Arbitration in African Countries, 41 ICLQ 
(1992) 387– 413, 390. 
17 Expropriation of UK Property in Developing Countries, Background Paper No. 5, Expropriation and 
Nationalisation of British Companies in South Asian Countries, FCO 37/547, in Foreign Office Files 







Roy had in 1961 questioned such a treatment of alien being part of universal 
international law.18 Besides, adequate compensation was an unsettled question in as 
much as the adequate value or price was to be decided by free market or the price set 
by the expropriating government. 19  This was actually a moot question in the 
nationalization of “Sterling Tea Estates” in Sri Lanka. A speaking note prepared by 
O’Neill of the South Asia Department of the British Foreign Office, made an 
erroneous proposition that ‘[i]t is up to the companies themselves to decide what 
compensation will be acceptable.’20 He thought the price offered by the Sri Lankan 
government while nationalizing tea estates was ‘well below a free market price’.21  
 
The Suez Canal presents another example. Following two concessions granted by the 
Turkish Viceroy of Egypt La Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez was 
created via a statute dated 5 January 1856.22 After the stipulated life of 99 years the 
Egyptian government was entitled to take over the canal, paying the Company its 
value as fixed either by agreement or, failing that, like the Sri Lankan colonial estates, 
by “experts”.23 
 
In international law in such ways a legal right could be birthed by a mere assertion to 
that effect. Little wonder ‘the support for the norm of full compensation’, as 
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21 Ibid. BS Chimni, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Toward a Radical 
Interpretation, 38 Indian J Intl L (1998) 213–14. 
22 French text reproduced in The Suez Canal: A Selection of Documents Relating to the International 
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Sornarajah writes, ‘can only be found in the weakest sources of law—the decisions of 
some tribunals and the writings of some publicists.’24 Much of the British investments 
vicariously attached to its citizens, natural or corporate, took for granted the existence 
of a right of diplomatic protection of its nationals abroad as part of universal 
international law.25 Subsequently it was extended to cover economic injuries as well. 
It is not that nationalization per se is illegal in international law. But as Britain 
maintained, it be non-discriminatory and compensation adequate, prompt, and 
effective.26 
 
This chapter looks at motivations, material conditions and history behind the 
innovation called Transnational Law and its subsequent use. The timing of 
decolonization and the simultaneous rise of transnational law need an investigation to 
light up the alley of commercial agenda that precipitated international law.27 Notably, 
while during the colonial period Western States sought to neutralize the sovereignty 
of Latin American and East European States in investor state arbitrations, the creation 
of Jessup’s Transnational Law and its explicit and expedient use by Western scholars 
in commercial matters characterized the period after decolonization. 
 
II. Birth of Jessup’s Transnational Law 
 
Jessup’s invention presents a “distinctly liberal strain of imperial apologetics that 
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rushed first to the defence of the British Empire before First World War and then to 
the aid of American imperialism after the Cold War.”28  In 1956, professor Phillip 
Jessup, as he was then, popularized the idea of transnational law.29 Seeds of his 
transnational law however lay in his Julius Rosenthal Foundation lecture at 
Northwestern University School of Law on April 18, 1947.30 Indeed a very lucidly 
penned piece, it banked on the existing American cases and settlements of awards by 
tribunals to articulately present a case of sources of international law.31 Agreeing to 
the power of publications as sources of law, he noted: ‘the opinions of our courts 
more and more cite law review articles.32‘ “The writers”, according to him, ‘have 
played a notable role in the development of international law and their contribution 
cannot be discredited just by calling them “professors”.’33  
 
Jessup was rather explicit about the role of ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d)’s second part. 
‘It is the publicists’ he was of the opinion, ‘who now have important claim to 
consideration in connection with the progressive development of international law 
and its codification which is being undertaken by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in accordance with the obligation imposed upon it by Article 13, par. 1(a) of 
the Charter.’34 Jessup’s this imaginative piece also drove the role of publicists of the 
various civilized nations as sources of international law to the fore. He invoked, quite 
understandably, the works of other publicists in support of arguments made therein. 
Jessup was certainly one of the most respected publicists of the post-World War II 
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world, thus, as ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) puts it, a source to determine the law.  
 
A. Arbitrations and the Making of Commercial International Law 
 
In 1927 Lauterpacht lamented the attempt of publicists to distinguish between 
contract and treaties foretelling that such attempts are “doomed to failure”.35 The 
main legal questions to arise from disputes involving the breach of concession 
contracts were whether such contracts are treaties and the issue of the “choice of law”. 
Notably, even though the idea of sovereignty came to the fore in Europe, the Latin 
American states in investor state arbitrations before and after the First World War 
were its most frequent users.  
 
Naturally, in the opening pages of his Transnational Law Jessup quotes Georges 
Scelle saying that international law should not be ‘taken exclusively in its Latin 
etymology’.36 What he meant was that in commercial matters one must not take 
sovereignty very seriously. Before the formation of the United Nations, the world was 
part of the Empire, British or otherwise; the League of Nations had only forty-four 
participants.37 Some of such cases like Cheek v Siam, involved Asian Kingdoms and 
East European states too as defendants.38 The Cedroni v Guatemala arbitration found 
the one-sided termination of the contract by Guatemalan government illegal. 39 	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Similarly, in Company General of the Orinoco case before the 1902 French-
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, the termination of the contract by Venezuela 
was held to give rise to an international liability to Great Britain.40 In May v 
Guatemala, Robert May was awarded damages against the Government of 
Guatemala.41  
 
Again in Shufeldt case, a tribunal ruled that a Guatemalan legislation regarding 
cancellation of concession contract was subject to review by an international court 
even thought in the tribunal’s view the issues involved were only contractual.42 What 
is more, in Shufeldt arbitration the investor was awarded compensation based, among 
other things, on “anxiety of mind”.43 It is of particular interest to note that the 
preliminary draft prepared in 1957 by F. V. Garcia Amador explicitly provides that 
international obligations whose breach entails State responsibility are those ‘resulting 
from any of the sources of international law’.44 Will this also cover subsidiary sources 
remains an interesting question. 
 
The line of Latin American cases is rather large.45 Quite intriguingly, while investors 
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Order (Frances Pinter Publishers 1980), 229–30. 
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came to such poor countries rich in resources on the logic of development of such 
countries, in Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of America, the arbitrator opined 
that the fact that the State has not realized its expectations of profit couldn’t be 
considered a reason sufficient enough from releasing the state from its obligation 
pursuant to the concession contracts.46 Sornarajah writes: 
 
Takings in pursuance of economic programme came to be debated in after Russian 
revolution. The Eastern bloc states maintained that such taking was non-compensable 
… there were two regions, Eastern Europe and Latin America, where European 
attitudes to state taking were questioned. With the independence of Africa and Asia, 
two more regions were added, and there were four regions that stood outside the 
European sphere … [thus] it is futile to suggest that any customary international law 
would have developed on this point, despite the suggestions of some writers to the 
contrary.47 
 
So much for the democratic legitimacy of international legal doctrines! Much earlier, 
Radio Corp v. China arbitration had suggested that ‘[t]he Chinese Government can 
certainly sign away a part of its liberty of action’.48 Counterintuitively, thus, if the 
PCIJ49  and ICJ cases50  are anything to go by, the public international law of 
concession contracts uses arbitration between private investors and non-Western 	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sovereign states as sources. In Serbian Loan case the PCIJ tried to settle this 
question.51 The public international law of concession contracts thus emerged from, as 
Carlston puts it, “living law” of investor-state contracts.52 Naturally laissez-faire 
lawyers were quick to pick up such arguments; a bid was made to internationalize 
contracts on the basis of the general principles of law and on the question of choice of 
applicable law.53  
 
While during colonization, concession contracts were read as treaties, the imposition 
of restrictions on sovereign power became all the more obvious after decolonization 
as arbitrators sought to curtail the international law of “permanent sovereignty” over 
natural resources.54 Even so, Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States provided that ‘[e]very State has and shall freely exercise full and permanent 
sovereignty, including full possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural 
resources and economic activities.’55 The rejection of the explicit international law of 
permanent sovereignty by arbitrators in Aminoil saying this “contention” of 
permanent sovereignty “lacks all foundation” is therefore simply astounding. 56 
Nonetheless, in AGIP v Congo, the arbitration panel tethered Congo to the provisions 
of contract against the sovereign will.57  
 
B. International Law After Transnational Law: Ideologies As Legal 	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During the interwar period, and in decades after the World War II, the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various Western nations—Borchard, Cheng, Delson, 
Verdross and Wortle, among others—all wrote on expropriation, concession contracts 
and international law.58 Some of the successors of these publicists are Amerasinghe, 
Domke, Dolzer and Schwebel.59 One wonders how, if ever, the sovereign will, if not 
the arbitrators, made international law of concessions. However such pro-capital view 
of international law did not go unchallenged as Soviet writers opposed restrictions on 
sovereign powers.60 International law thus became the normative battlefield between 
apologists of capitalism and protagonists of socialist view of international law. The 
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doctrine of rebus sic stantibus stands for the fundamental change in circumstances 
that can lead to limiting a state’s obligations arising from treaties.61 Article 62 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties finally gave expression to this doctrine. 
During the interwar period, while the Western scholars, in relation to contracts, 
canvassed pacta sunt servanda,62 they at the same time sought to limit rebus sic 
stantibus, in relation to colonial treaties.63  More particularly, McNair (1925) and 
Lauterpacht (1927) were at the forefront of rejecting rebus sic stantibus.64 
 
Given Anghie’s thesis that colonialism has been central to the doctrine of 
international law much doctrinal clarity is desired vis-à-vis VCLT Article 62. While 
diluting the importance of rebus sic stantibus Brierly compares treaties with 
contracts.65 For the development of international law Lauterpahct, wanted to ‘reduce 
the emanations of the so-called rebus sic stantibus doctrine to the manageable 
confines of a general principle of law applied by an international tribunal at the 
instance of the state which claims to be released from the treaty on account of a 
change in vital circumstances’ bolstering pacta sunt servanda at the same time.66 His 
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this view however came much later as in his 1927 text titled Private Law Sources he 
saw rebus sic stantibus as a cause of ‘embarrassment to international publicists’.67  
 
More recently, the issue of pacta sunt servanda versus rebus sic stantibus resurfaced 
at the ICJ in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case.68 Hungry in this case presented 
arguments in support of the lawfulness of the termination of a treaty using the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Hungary argued that it was entitled to invoke a 
number of events which, cumulatively, would have constituted a “fundamental 
change of circumstances” understood within the meaning of VCLT Article 62.69 ‘The 
negative and conditional wording of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties is a clear indication’ the ICJ however said ‘that the stability of treaty 
relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of circumstances be applied 
only in exceptional cases.’70 However drawing the limits of pacta sunt servanda 
Judge Rezek declared in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case: 
 
[T]he rule pacta sunt servanda means that the treaty creates reciprocal rights between 
the parties on the basis of a convergence of interests, a pooling of sovereign wills 
which in all probability will continue to coincide over time. When on both sides of the 
treaty process, there is a lack of rigour in doing what has been agreed, the commitment 
weakens and becomes vulnerable to formal repudiation by one of the parties, 
irrespective of the question of which party was the first to neglect its duties, and it 
hardly matters that the parties lacked rigour in different ways. Treaties derive their 	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force from the will of the States which conclude them. They do not have an objective 
value which makes them sacred regardless of those common intentions.71 
 
Judge Rezek’s observation points to an eager and uncritical promotion of one doctrine 
over other by international law’s stalwart scholars that ironically passes on the cost of 
the development of international to former colonies while former colonizers remain 
beneficiaries; a doctrinal continuation of colonial status quo.  
 
 Why should one legal principle be elevated and other depressed is not governed by 
any doctrine or rule of law, it is an ideological position clothed as a legal argument. 
And where breaches were seen legal, Dolzer held the view that since expectation of 
parties govern a contract, and that during the colonial times multinational companies 
had higher expectations, such expectations should yield higher compensation in the 
event of a breach!72 However, the right of every State freely to choose its economic 
system as an aspect of the (economic) sovereign equality of States was introduced in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States.73 A writer’s doctrinal, view time, and supporting 
political and geopolitical environment, metamorphoses into a law when an “invisible 
college of lawyers” sitting on the same side of the ideological fence invoke it.74 Such 
a college of lawyers can even paper over UN declarations.75 
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The international law of concession contracts is one such candidate for a historical 
analysis of this law. No wonder in 1961 Guha Roy, thought ‘what at first sight appear 
to be generous sacrifices of acquired rights and interests of considerable value but are 
really in most cases no more than either belated justice or overdue rectifications of 
past wrongs’.76 Therefore, the developing countries’ bid at outlawing economic 
coercion using VCLT Article 52 is then understandable. Article 52 says: ‘A treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of 
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.’77  
 
III. Publicists’ Reception of Transnational Law 
 
During 1950s, international arbitrations and decisions involving expropriations or 
nationalizations of concessions, owned wholly or predominantly by foreign nationals, 
pressed the newly minted transnational law in the service of private property. Legally 
speaking, these concession agreements were half contract and half legislation, and 
half treaty and half ordinary municipal contract. 78  As such this “schizophrenic 
nature”—the result of an agreement between a state and a foreign corporation or 
individual—led to controversy about these agreements’ international status.79 The 
Western judicial scheme, the American system for example, as Dickstein explains, ‘is 
predicated upon the notion that particular cases will be tried upon the merits of their 
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particular facts.’80 Thus, previous misapplications of the law would have no effect 
upon its proper application to a present set of facts.81 Effectively then innocence of 
history is used as a tool of interpretation of international law. 
 
Furthermore, Friedmann saw Jessup addressing the ‘increasing fluidity of the 
traditional distinction between public and private international law’ through 
transnational law, which would, instead of sovereignty or power, work on ‘the 
premise that jurisdiction is essentially a matter of procedure which could be amicably 
arranged among the nations of the world.’82 Dillard, the President of the American 
Society of International Law at the time, noted that the Society was ‘acting as a 
catalyst for the exchange of ideas and documents among practicing lawyers, 
government officials, teachers of law, political scientists, and corporate officials’ 
helping to foster new concepts in transnational law.83  
 
Again, University of Virginia Professor Ramazani noted that ‘[w]ith the proliferation 
of international oil contracts, the problem of the choice of law … deserves 
investigations by the students of “transnational law.”84 For Amerasinghe, the fact that 
a tribunal is disconnected from any municipal legal system makes the tribunal “a 
transnational one”. 85  Discussing state contracts in international law, Jennings 
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invoking Jessup noted ‘that there is a great wealth of legal material from which 
answers to these problems may be fashioned whether by judicial elaboration or 
otherwise.’86  
 
Authors are not alone in accepting transnational law. Among the practitioners Domke 
was perhaps the most ardent student of transnational law.87 He noted that Jessup’s 
transnationalism ‘far from being an outgrowth of only Western concepts, is indeed an 
expression of fundamental principles embodied in long established legal systems 
throughout the world.’88 All of this has been said of course without first clearing the 
dichotomy that colonialism wedged, among other aspects, into the sources of 
international law.89 
 
‘A truly realistic analysis of the law’, Alfred von Verdross wrote, shows ‘that every 
positive juridical order has its roots in the ethics of a certain community, that it cannot 
be understood apart from its moral basis.’90 One wonders if Verdross’ idea of 
“forbidden treaties” could be extended to cover colonial treaties as bad sources on 
“moral basis” given colonial servitude, slavery and violence accompanied colonial 
capture by Great Powers; something antithetical to jus cogens.91  
 
If that were so, it would have crippled commerce based on concessions system and 
would straight away terminate many colonial treaties and contracts. It however took 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 RY Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 55 British Yrbk Intl L (1961) 156, 178. 
87 M Domke, The Settlement of International Investment Disputes, 12 The Business Lawyer (1957) 
264, 271. 
88  M Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects Of Contemporary International Law, 55 
American J Intl L (1961) 585. 
89 Sornarajah, supra note 24, 19. 
90 Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 American J Intl L (1937) 571, 576. 
91 For a discussion on jus cogens and the reaction of various governments, see Fifth Report on the Law 
of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special, Rapporteur, U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4 







two World Wars for the world to see the condemnation of colonialism as an issue of 
jus cogens, let alone the condemnation of colonial treaties. The 1984 ‘Second Report 
on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ noted this 
with disappointment mixed with astonishment: 
 
The condemnation of colonialism falls within the sphere of jus cogens, and it is 
surprising that no reference should have been made to this phenomenon in a draft code 
drawn up in 1954. It was necessary to wait until 1960 for the adoption of the well-
known Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, outlawing colonialism. However, the Charter of the United Nations itself 
already contained the principle of the condemnation of colonialism.92 
 
There was another question in need of an answer, would jus cogens rule apply only to 
treaties concluded after its emergence, or could it also apply to earlier treaties? In the 
846th meeting, the ILC ‘agreed that nullity of that kind could not be extended into the 
past ad infinitum.’93 While considering the ‘validity of the treaties by which colonial 
frontiers had been established’ the ILC unfortunately ‘did not wish to lay down a rule 
whose consequences would be so absolute.’94 It is understandable.  
 
The jurists of the ILC could not suggest measures that would give a knee-jerk jolt to 
international commerce and trade. Ranganathan has recently called attention to the 
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ILC’s “subtle” project of strengthening international law.95 The ILC’s project on 
treaties, she insightfully argues, ‘was informed by an appreciation of the politics of 
international law and was founded on liberal and constructivist assumptions.’96 The 
ILC in relation to treaties ‘was concerned neither to overload the idea of international 
law as always providing authoritative solutions, nor to concede its limits to situations 
of low political charge.’97 Instead, as Ranganathan concludes, the ILC’s approach to 
treaty conflicts reveals a determination to bolster the influence of international law by 
deliberately creating treaty conflicts, i.e. pitting one ‘legality’ against another, putting 
international law before politics as a result.98 
 
IV. The Suez Crisis: The East versus the West on Transnational Law 
 
But for the presence of the Suez Canal in the Egyptian territory, the West’s interest 
and investment in Egypt would have been a lesser concern.  The Khedive of Egypt 
made a concession in 1856 to Ferdinand de Lesseps to dig a canal across the Isthmus 
of Suez. This instrument established the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company for 
a duration of 99 years from the opening of the Canal, provided for free and equal 
navigation of the Canal, and for the distribution of tolls. Now, the “concession was 
confirmed by a Firman of the Sultan of Turkey in 1866. The Universal Suez Canal 
Company was financed by Egypt and by private investors, largely French. The Canal 
was opened to traffic in 1868.”99  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 S Ranganathan, Between Philosophy and Anxiety? The Early International Law Commission, Treaty 
Conflict and the Project of International Law, 83 British Yrbk Intl L (2012) 82. 
96 Ibid., 82. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 92. The VCLT’s one ‘identified lacuna is that these rules disregard many differences present in 
different kinds of treaties.’ Ahmad Ali Ghouri, Is Characterization of Treaties a Solution to Treaty 
Conflicts? 11 Chinese J Intl L (2012) 247–280. 








That the “official Egyptian attitudes” toward ‘international legal order in general’ has 
been a subject of scholarly study bespeaks of the importance of the Suez Canal for the 
international trade and commerce. 100  It occasioned independent Egypt’s first 
diplomatic showdown with the West after the Second World War just as the Lotus 
case was Turkey’s first legal dispute with France and India’s with Portugal. Egyptian 
president Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956.  
 
The principal legal issue involved in Egyptian nationalization was ‘whether or not the 
Company was Egyptian’.101 Obviously Egypt thought it was; the Western powers, 
voiced in Dulles’ words, maintained that the 1888 Constantinople Convention and the 
international nature of investors invested the Canal with international legal status.102 
Huang, for instance, after careful examination of relevant documents and most 
importantly, “international law of concessions” argued that the Declaration of the 
Ottoman Porte of December 1, 1873 gave the Company an international legal 
status.103 When the Government of France contended that, because of its unique 
status, the Suez Canal Company is amenable not solely to Egyptian law, but also to 
French and international law,104 one could see this line of argument came from the 
fount of Abu Dhabi arbitration.  
 
In Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company arbitration, the Tribunal 
held “that public international law should be applied to the effects of the Concession, 	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when objective reasons lead it to conclude that certain matters cannot be governed by 
any rule of municipal law of any state”.105 Such an interpretative choice is political as 
if “certain matters cannot be governed by any rule of municipal law of any state” it 
should then become an ideal case, in commercial matters, of non-liquet and not an 
excuse for judicial activism. What is more, Nasser’s action led British cabinet to think 
that “the use of armed force against Egypt” is a possibility “as a legitimate 
measure”.106 This was in complete contravention to the UN Charter principle that 
changed the old law of aggression as legitimate to illegitimate. The British Cabinet’s 
view is revealing. Nasser’s action ‘amounted to no more than a decision to buy out 
the shareholders’, British case for the use of force in commercial matter needed 
“wider international grounds” of justification.107  
 
Yet again publicists came in the aid of the British position. Professor Arthur 
Goodhart, published a letter in The Times on 11 August 1956, opining that the view 
that under ‘international law force must never be used except to repel direct territorial 
attack … cannot be accepted, as the use of force is not so limited’.108 In a clear 
example political persuasion based on publicists’ view, British Cabinet member 
Viscount Kilmuir, while quoting professor Goodhart’s article in the Cabinet meeting, 
advised Britain to attack Egypt.109 
 
Among the many other geopolitical reasons, Nasser is said to have nationalized the 
Canal after the United States reneged on a promise to provide funds for construction 	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of the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. Though such economic considerations were 
certainly important, as Doherty says, “the deeper motivation appears to be political: 
the attainment of full sovereignty and national dignity”.110 Indeed, secretary to 
President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles, while answering whether he felt that the Suez 
crisis would have developed if the United States had not withdrawn American offer of 
aid for the Aswan Dam, he replied in affirmative: 
 
I feel quite confident that it would have happened in any event. Indeed President 
Nasser did not, and does not, attempt to justify his action on the ground of the 
withdrawal of aid to the Aswan Dam. That would indeed be a very feeble ground upon 
which to justify it. He justifies it as a step in his program of developing the influence of 
Egypt, what he calls the “grandeur” of Egypt, and as a part of his program of moving 
from “triumph to triumph.” He puts it on these broad grounds and says he himself has 
been studying it for over 2 years.111 
 
Notably, the same Mr. Dulles, when at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, had 
suggested that Egyptian demands for self-determination from British colonialism 
“should not even be acknowledged”.112 Egypt, as a developing country, maintained 
that a state may nationalize foreign assets upon payment of “adequate” compensation 
and that its payment to the Company’s shareholder fulfilled that requirement although 
the compensation amounted to only one third of the Company’s estimated loss.113  
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Egypt acted on the basis of prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the total 
value of nationalized assets. But expectedly the value of a property in Egypt and West 
would be different with no calculable free market value to be imposed. 114 
Furthermore, the history of the capture of Egypt by the British is not all together 
irrelevant here; soon after the eruption of the First World War in 1914, ‘the British 
had declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire, formalizing the 1882 
invasion and temporary occupation of the country.’115 And after decolonization, when 
advocating treaty as a formal source of international law, Western commentators and 
lawyers strategically ignored the way such treaties were made. To be sure, much of 
the “concession contracts” signed under the shadow of Imperial threat are then 
elevated into the realm of international law by calling them “treaties”.116 In that sense, 
Huang’s study of international law of concession that came a year after Jessup’s 
Transnational Law, amounts to an expected transnationalisation of the law of 
concessions.117 In 1964, Fatouros made the argument that different standards be 
applied in judging claims to actions of developing countries emerging from the 
receding of colonial tides simply because such states have nascent political, legal and 
economic system.118  
 
A. The transnational law of the Suez Crisis 
 
The representative of Egypt maintained in the Security Council that the mere fact that 	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the 1888 Convention made mention of the concession agreements did not confer upon 
them the status of a treaty.119 The instant development of the law of concessions at the 
time of the Suez Crisis had origins in concession agreements that Hyde liked to call 
“international economic development contracts”.120 But, as Carlston wrote in relation 
to concession agreements, “legal rules could not be fully understood or evaluated 
without a fairly clear understanding of the social facts which they were designed to 
regulate.”121  
 
Many of the international economic development contracts concealed behind the 
verbiage of legal drafting the past of callous rulers in the developing world, privateers 
and the subsequent direct colonial capture or indirect control of the governments. 
Therefore in the post UN Charter world, self-determination was the touchstone of 
which every international legal rule was adjudged. Notably however Huang bluntly 
postulates “political pressure and indirect means … exerted to secure the grant does 
not necessarily invalidate the concession if the laws of the conceding state have been 
complied with.”122 
 
This of course is debatable. Even in the absence of a negotiation reduced in black and 
white, it has been argued, lawyer may invoke the haloed and almost legalized doctrine 
of good faith in international law.123 For instance, Tariq Hassan writes that under the 
maxim pacta sunt servanda, international law has long recognized that parties to a 
treaty are bound to perform their obligations thereunder in good faith. This obligation 
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to perform in good faith has been thought to arise only after a treaty has been ratified 
and has entered into force. More recently, however, the international community has 
come to recognize an application of the principle of good faith to the treaty formation 
process itself.124  
 
But the Middle East is an altogether different story. After the World War I, mandates 
were added to the British Empire without even the regular official pantomime known 
as “declaring a protectorate”.125 The doctrine of good faith was used many times, as 
Portugal did in the Right of Passage case, to protect colonial possessions. But how 
often has colonization been put as a question within the vocabulary of good faith? 
 
Nasser’s move of 1956 was judged in the light of his allegiance to Non Aligned 
Movement and good relations with the Soviet Union.126 The Egyptian Press quoted 
President Nasser’s astonishment on American observation that the 1888 
Constantinople Convention had given an international character to the Suez Canal.127 
Yet Egypt accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction.128 The American media asked Secretary 
Dulles explain “the meaning of “international” in that connection”.129 Secretary 
Dulles replied: 
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[T]he Suez Canal was, of course, built before Egypt was an independent state, when it 
was still a part of the Ottoman Empire, and at that period it was internationalized by the 
treaty of 1888, which provides that it shall be a waterway freely open in time of peace 
and war to the traffic of all of the nations. That treaty was signed by the nations at that 
time principally interested in the canal and constituting the then “great powers” of the 
world. It was open for adherence by all countries of the world.130 
 
For Dulles it was not necessary to think of the problem in terms of these very great 
issues, ‘these great slogans, such as the slogans of ‘nationalism versus 
internationalism,’ or ‘nationalism versus colonialism,’ or ‘Asia versus Europe,’ or any 
such things.’131 The British were angry at the canal’s nationalization and sought the 
support of France, which believed that Nasser was supporting rebels in the French 
colonial rule of Algeria. Secretary Dulles who represented the United States at the 
London Conference on Suez Crisis summed up the Soviet propaganda in the 
following words: ‘That propaganda was, in effect, saying to the Egyptian people: Any 
solution that comes out of the London conference is colonialism, is imperialism, and 
if you accept it you will have subordinated Egypt again to the colonial rule which you 
have thrown off.’132  
 
B. The Suez Crisis, Publicists and Applied Transnational Law 
 
In response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, on February 12, 1957, the French 
Government introduced a bill declaring the Compagnie Universelle de Suez to be a 
purely French Company not subject to the laws of a foreign state. The Americans too 	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contemplated “creative thought [to] devis[e] new forms of protection for American 
investments.”133 Martin Domke, the then Vice President of the American Arbitration 
Association, noted that the “Suez Canal crisis demonstrates that international law 
failed to offer new solutions adequate to meet new problems.”134 Legal protection of 
the investor, he wrote, “in judicial determination of his rights in the foreign country as 
well as on the international level, requires a new approach to time-old remedial 
aspect.”135  
 
And for such a “new approach to time-old remedial aspect” Domke was to turn to 
Jessup’s Transnational Law.136 It is hardly surprising that Domke invoked Friedmann, 
transnationalism’s most astute and devoted subscriber for digging a new approach for 
Suez crisis.137 For Domke transnational law provided such a new approach, which to 
Hugo Hahn was inspired by “pragmatic considerations” and “utilitarian concept”.138 
Domke noted: 
 
This development shows a new international “law” governing the taking of property of 
foreigners when in the national interest of a country in which such assets are located. 
Economic development, not only in underdeveloped countries, may require 
appropriation of public resources for public use. It has been labeled the sovereign right 
of countries to dispose of natural resources and wealth, without mentioning an express 	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or implied obligation to compensate foreign investors. The resolution of the General 
Assembly of December 21, 1952 recognized such a right and in spite of the criticism 
encountered […]139 
 
“We have to face the fact that competitive coexistence,” Domke noted in 1957, “in 
one form or the other, is here to stay, bringing about new challenges which the 
Western world has to meet by new approaches to international legal relations.”140 
Most importantly, “Creative thought” he pondered “will become necessary to cope 
with new challenges.”141 Domke wrote in the vocabulary of what many would call 
reverse-colonialism: “We are, of course, aware of the fact that the Suez Canal crisis is 
not solely—or even principally—concerned with the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company”.142 More is involved, namely the unilateral abrogation by a foreign 
government of contracts voluntarily entered into which it decides no longer to 
respect. 143  Domke uncritically assumes that such contracts were “voluntarily 
entered”? In fact such attitudes are part of litigation strategies. Indeed Western 
publicists’ reply to “nationalization” of colonial properties by Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, 
and Cuba in 1950s was an astute transnationalization of international law. However 
what must not escape attention is that such innovations in law sprang from the writing 
of publicists citing other publicists.144 
 
To be sure, the history of colonial investments leads from one colonizer to another. It 
is hard to miss the fact that the French joined against Egypt because they were trying 	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to protect its colonial interests in Algeria. How could a movement to overthrow a 
colonial regime be legal question within international law? And when the erstwhile 
colonizer did sit to talk in the language of law, the violence came out in the form or 
normative annihilation of laws other than those emerging from the general principles 
of law of the civilized nations. The overall argument here is that international law was 
read as accepting colonialism as a matter of property law transnationalised. 
International law, Judge Guha Roy wrote: 
 
 [W]hich the worldwide community of states today inherits is the law which owes its 
genesis and growth, first, to the attempts of these states to regulate their mutual 
intercourse in their own interests and, secondly, to the use made of it during the period 
of colonialism.145  
 
Yet the doctrine of international law sat comfortably with the colonial capture of 
lands and resources. Western publicists thus had to internationalize contracts to 
defend colonial properties without first resolving the doctrinal puzzles that 
colonialism presented. While within international law the properties built on 
conquered land had protection of the law, the same law was blind to the temporal 
attachment of property to colonial land. Ironically, the role of equity and fairness in 
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The time and occasion of the use of transnationalism as an argument presents an 
example of astute lawyering by writers. However, for the history of international law, 
the search for the conditions in which transnationalism flourished is important. 
Among other things, this search is important to highlight the role and power of 
scholarly writings not as the textual “subsidiary means” but functionally in the 
making of international law. Transnational law stands for the creativity of arguments 
within international law. It however also disrobes the idealism that international law 
purportedly covers itself with. Transnationalism as a legal argument rose to puncture 
the sovereignty of newly decolonized states and for the protection of properties 
accrued though colonialism. And as Dezalay and Garth say: 
 
The law and legal practices directed to the north-south disputes … developed to reflect 
the interest of Western businesses in avoiding national courts and laws. And merchants 
found the services useful and valuable also because the perceived autonomy and 
universality of the lex mercatoria enabled the Western merchants to ensure – at least 
statistically – their domination and their profits in their business relations with ex-
colonial governments.147 
 
At a time the arguments of equity could be used to highlight the colonial nature of 
property acquisition, transnationalism rose as a counterargument. Transnationalism, 
as Sornarajah would say, was pushed into the sphere of international legal argument 
for purely commercial needs of the erstwhile colonizers. That concession agreements 
as municipal contracts in 1950s gave host nations with colonial past absolute 
authority leaving the corporations of developed nations unprotected. The Suez crisis 
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thus explains the reasons for the growth of the doctrine of the internationalized 
contract in international law. The concept of the internationalized contract was 
derived from the comparison of concession agreements to treaties. By turning 
contracts into treaty, a legal fiction was created saying international law should now 




Chap. IV: Auxiliary sources, Indian judiciary and 
decolonisation: A Postcolonial Account 
 
*** 
This chapter presents India’s case as an example of the reception of international law’s 
subsidiary sources. It is argued that India’s political decolonisation did not engender her legal 
postcolonialism. The Indian Supreme Court continued using international law’s subsidiary 
sources uncritically even as the executive rejected primary law sources like colonial treaties. 
In 1955, while the Indian executive declared India to be not bound any old or modern treaty 
between India and other countries, to which she had not subscribed, Indian court adjudged 
‘writings of publicists’ a source of the law of nations. Part of the reason for Indian judges’ 
faith in less consensual subsidiary sources was India’s anomalous position in international 
law between the first Paris Peace Conference and its independence in 1947. A sense of 
colonial continuity of law swayed the minds of judges. However, this sense of colonial 
continuity would dissipate due to the environment created by, inter alia, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (1955), ruling in the Right of Passage case (1960), Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), and the passing of the United 
Nations declarations on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962). Between 
1947 and 1977, it forced the Indian judiciary to take a more nuanced position on International 
law’s subsidiary sources, expediting the coupling of India’s postcolonial executive and 





Indian Supreme Court justices sprinkled foreign precedents in their judgments to 
demonstrate that a cosmopolitan approach had at, least been attempted.1 
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Since the early days of the UN, publicists have applied comparative law to 
international law.2 The ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) says, cases—international and 
domestic—and scholarship are sources of international law. 3  The reception of 
international cases in domestic law is a matter of comparative law, but since they are 
imported for the resolution of domestic cases, the issue can be studied within Roberts’ 
epithet ‘comparative international law’.  
 
Commentators who characterize ICJ Article 38 on sources on sources—namely 
Article 38—through the prism of positivism rely on both the order in which the 
sources are listed, and the manner in which they are described.4 They treat the order 
as a hierarchy, from the most to the least consensual source: ‘treaties before custom 
before general principles before judicial decisions before publicists.’5 Though the 
actual text of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute places writers before judicial decisions, 
practice has elevated judicial decisions above teachings.6  
 
Creating a hierarchy among sources based on a frozen characterization of each source 
as more or less “consensual” advances the project of domesticating the tension between 
authority and normative criticism within sources doctrine as a whole ... In one vision, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 LB Wehle, Comparative Law’s Proper Task For The International Court, 99 Univ Pennsylvania L Rev 
(1950) 13-24, WE Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, in W E Butler (ed), 
International Law in Comparative Perspective (1980) 25, 33; M Koskenniemi, The Case for 
Comparative International Law, 20 Finnish Yrbk Intl L (2009) 1, 1; BN Mamlyuk & U Mattei, 
Comparative International Law, 36 Brooklyn J Intl L (2011) 385. A Roberts, Comparative International 
Law? The Role of National Courts In Creating And Enforcing International Law, 60 ICLQ (2011) 57–
92 at 74. M Benatar, International Law, Domestic Lenses, (3)2 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2014) 
357–380. 
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 UNTS 993, Art. 38(1)(d). 
4 D Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 American Univ J Intl L & Policy (1987) 1, 29. 
American authors have talked about the use of international law as a method of reading domestic law. 
RG Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 
Vanderbilt L Rev (1990) 1103. 
5 Kennedy, Ibid. 
6 A Enabulele, The Avoidance of non liquet by the International Court of Justice, the Completeness of 
the sources of International Law in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court and the role of Judicial 





treaty is the master of custom because it is more consensual [positivists], in another the 
reverse [naturalists] … [T]he overall project of establishing distinctions and hierarchies 
[of the sources of international law] protects the image of a doctrinal resolution to the 
social problem of conflicting authority centers.7  
 
Be that as it may, the comparativists have spilt sufficient ink on the Indian Supreme 
Court’s reception, or lack thereof, of foreign judgments.8 Lawyers have also penned 
on the Court’s manifest borrowings of foreign scholarship.9 Besides, there is an 
availability of scholarship on the Court’s generous use of public international law in 
cases involving human rights issues.10 The idea of a ‘comparative international law’ 
brings comparativists and international lawyers together in understanding the 
reception of international law by the domestic courts. Such an approach enables us to 
see Indian courts and their reception of international cases and scholarship—the 
subsidiary sources of international law—in a new light. 
 
International cases appear in judgments of the Indian Supreme Court through the 
mandate of Article 51 of the Indian Constitution.11 According to Article 51, “State 
shall endeavour to: (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Kennedy, supra note 4, 29-30. 
8 AK Thiruvengadam, Forswearing ‘Foreign Moods, Fads or Fashions’? Contextualising the Refusal of 
Koushal to Engage with Foreign Law, 6 NUJS L Rev (2013) 595–612. Kalb says ‘references to 
international and foreign law in a court’s decisions can perform an important communicative function 
about the court’s fidelity to rule of law principles.’ J Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies: A 
Strategic Account of Comparative Citation, 38 Yale J Intl L (2013) 423, 437-38 (footnotes omitted); 
Adam M Smith, Making Itself at Home—Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The 
Indian Case, 24 Berkeley J Intl L (2006) 218. BR Opeskin, Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic 
Effect of International Law in Commonwealth Countries, 27 Commonwealth Law Bulletin (2001) 
1242-1278. L Rajamani & A Sengupta, The Supreme Court, in, NJ Jayal & PB Mehta, The Oxford 
Companion to Politics in India (New Delhi, Oxford India Paperbacks, 2011) 80. 
9 Dhavan, supra note 1, 513. 
10 Anashri Pillay, Revisiting The Indian Experience of Economic And Social Rights Adjudication: The 
Need For A Principled Approach To Judicial Activism And Restraint, 63 ICLQ (2014) 385-408. C 
Chinkin, The Commonwealth and Women’s Rights, 25 Commonwealth Law Bulletin (1999) 96-109. 





relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty 
obligations; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.”12 
Furthermore, a colonial continuity of law allowed Indian judges to incorporate 
international law through Article 372(1) of the Indian Constitution. Article 372 says: 
“Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution … all the laws in force in the 
territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall 
continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent 
Legislature or other competent authority”. 
 
Despite Nehru’s opposition to colonial treaties for political consumption, India 
considered itself bound by approximately 627 treaties devised by the British 
administration in India.13 In the Rosline George case, the Delhi High Court said:  
‘[n]ew nations inherit the treaty obligations of the former colonies’ and India 
therefore ‘agreed to take an assignment of all treaties signed on its behalf by Great 
Britain.’14 The scholarship on the reception of public international law by Indian 
courts excludes the nuanced story of Indian courts and the auxiliary sources of 
international law, i.e. writings of the publicists of international law and cases, 
domestic and international.15 A principle reason for this might be the fact that the 
Court has been mostly constitutional lawyers’ subject of study. International lawyers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  The Constitution of India, Part IV: Directive Principles of State Policy, Art 51, 
<http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss(7).pdf>. Kesavananda 
Bharati v State of Kerala, MANU/SC/0445/1973, para. 164. See SC Kashyap, The Constitution of 
Indian and International Law, in BN Patel (ed) India and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden/London 2005) 9-32, 19. 
13 MK Nawaz, International Law In the Contemporary Practice of India: Some Perspectives, 57 ASIL 
Proceedings (1963) 279. 
14 Rosline George v. Union of India, MANU/DE/0428/1990, para 1.  
15 Both early and current scholarships do not talk about it. SK Agrawala, Law of Nations as Interpreted 
and Applied by Indian Courts and Legislature, 2 Indian J Intl L (1962) 431; SK Agrawala, India’s 
Contribution to the Development of International Law—The Role of Indian Courts, in, RP Anand, (ed) 
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working on Indian courts perhaps expected constitutional lawyers to build a consistent 
theory.  
 
In recent times, much of the scholarship on the Indian Supreme Court has been 
produced in light of the alleged judicial activism of the Indian judges.16 From an 
international lawyers’ perspective, it is somewhat apparent that the Court’s 
unexplained and uncritical borrowing of international law’s subsidiary sources in its 
early years was, although structurally comparative, a symptom that led to full fledged 
activism. A call to human rights and the later suspension of civil rights during the 
emergency of 1975 was the justification added to the legal liberalism that had long 
been in practice.17 Factually, even the Emergency that suspended all civil rights had 
external factors at play: an earlier proclamation of emergency made in 1971 during 
the war with Pakistan, an international event, had yet not been withdrawn.18 Indira 
Gandhi government superimposed the Emergency of 1975 over the earlier emergency 
of 1971. The reason given for the former was combating internal disorder whereas the 
latter had come in the first place for confronting the threat of external aggression.19 
 
Besides, the rise of nationalism and the quest for sovereignty among the newly 
decolonized people of colour notwithstanding, a sense of colonial continuity among 
Indian judges is also tied with India’s anomalous position and status in international 
law between the first Paris Peace Conference and its independence in 1947. W. E. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Thirty- Ninth Amendment of 1975 of the Indian Constitution conferred validity on Mrs. 
Gandhi’s election, despite the decision of any court to the contrary. The Supreme Court struck down 
that clause of the Thirty-Ninth Amendment as being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution 
in Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. On June 25, 1975 the Gandhi government advised 
the President to declare emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution. SP Sathe, Judicial Activism: 
The Indian Experience, 6 Washington Univ J L & Policy (2001) 29, 94. 







Beckett, legal advisor of the British Foreign Office, on 19 March 1946 wrote about 
the obligation of the future Indian Government, employing the writings of the 
publicists.20 Publicists such as Rama Rao, Oppenheim, and Poulose, amongst others, 
have also noted that India’s status within international law was an anomaly.21  
 
Thus, the position of India in matters of international law in the minds of early judges 
of the Indian Supreme Court was shaped by colonial writings such as Beckett’s. This 
explains the existence of a tradition of generous and uncritical borrowings by the 
Indian judges of international legal materials, particularly subsidiary sources in their 
decisions. In fact much of international law in the minds of Indian judges is almost 
like common law.22 
 
In 2006 Indian scholar Upendra Baxi asked, ‘how may anyone ever fully offer an 
impact analysis of the role of the ‘publicists’ in the shaping of the normativity’ of 
international law?23 How does one become a highly qualified publicist? Perhaps by 
writing along the lines of those already recognized as highly qualified publicists and 
citing them as a proof of the unity of arguments made. One has to then, as Tushnet 
says, commit to a ‘project of international law, that is, to the proposition that nation-
states ought to resolve an ever-increasing number and ever-wider range of their 
disputes through the means of existing and emergent rules of international law rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 WE Beckett, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties: Obligations of a Future Indian Government, 
Opinion By the Legal Advisor of the Foreign Office, FO 371/67725, in Future of French and 
Portuguese territories in India: Extent of Inheritance of Treaty Obligations by a Future Indian 
Government, (Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1947-1964, 1947) (closed until 
1978). 
21 TS Rama Rao, Some Problems of International Law in India, 6 Indian Yrbk Intl Aff (1957); more 
recently see, RP Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A Historical Study, 
23 Leiden J Intl L (2010) 5–21. 
22 Centre for Public Interest Litigation and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., MANU/SC/0089/2012, para. 
65. 
23 U Baxi, New Approaches to the History of International Law, 19 Leiden Journal of International 





than, economic or, worse, military force.’24 Indeed there is an invisible college of ‘the 
most qualified publicist of the various nations’, however undemocratic, who compete 
for space and persuasion.25 In a recent meticulous study conducted in 2012, Peil has 
demonstrated that at the ICJ not only are generalist writers cited more than experts, 
but it is even possible to identify the “most-favored publicists”.26 This not so invisible 
college of lawyers now—judges on international tribunals, members of the ILC and 
those fortunate to move between academia and government—clearly do make 
international law.  
 
With their number going up due to decolonization, in the 1960s developing countries 
saw General Assembly as an important vehicle through which they could press their 
claims for economic justice. 27  It was a process through which the developing 
countries sought to convert the ‘law of nations’ into ‘law of the peoples’ of the 
nations.28 
 
Having broken away from Britain a decade and a half earlier before the mass 
decolonization in Africa, India under Nehru’s leadership was busy rallying countries 
for the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) at the height of the Cold War.29 I argue that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 M Tushnet, Academics As Lawmakers, 29 Univ Queensland L J (2010) 19, 20. 
25 J d’Aspremont, Wording in International Law, 25 Leiden J Intl L (2012) 557, 577. 
26 M Peil, Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International 
Court of Justice, 1 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L (2012) 136, 158. 
27 ME Salomon, From NIEO To Now And the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62 ICLQ 
(2013) 31, 33. 
28 U Baxi, What May the “Third World” Expect from International Law? in, R Falk, B Rajagopal & J 
Stephens (eds), International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge-Cavendish 
2008) 16. 
29 Both the courts and the executive have kept in sync with the NAM spirit. Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union 
of India and Anr., MANU/DE/0216/2005. The Ministry of External Affairs in 2012 updated NAM 
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and the independence struggles of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and other regions of the 
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the environment created by the NAM movement, 30  the UN declarations on 
sovereignty and decolonization, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,31 
and Permanent Sovereignty over natural Resources32 egged on the Courts to rethink 
the sources of international law. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs notes: 
 
In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement 
of Non-Aligned Countries was given a decisive boost during the Fifteenth Ordinary 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which 17 new African and 
Asian countries were admitted. A key role was played in this process by the then Heads 
of State and Government Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, 
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of 
Yugoslavia, who later became the founding fathers of the movement and its 
emblematic leaders. Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries 
was founded on a wider geographical basis at the First Summit Conference of 
Belgrade, which was … was attended by 25 countries.33 
 
For a short period of time, Indonesia, an important member of the NAM, withdrew 
from the UN citing ‘the circumstances which have been created by colonial powers in 
the United Nations so blatantly against our anti-colonial struggle and indeed against 
the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.’34 However UN 
declaration of New International Economic Order (the NIEO) of 1974 engendered 	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31 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV), 14 December 1960, UN Doc. A/4684. 
32 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 December 1962, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. 
Doc. A/5217. 
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hope.35 Many Indian international lawyers expressed hope in the NIEO.36 A general 
neglect of the NIEO, Anghie wrote in 2015, ‘in contemporary discussions and 
analyses of international relations has obscured the scale of this initiative and the 
seriousness with which it was treated by states, international institutions, and scholars 
alike.’37  
 
Regardless of the particular area of international law it was seeking to reform, the Third 
World had to address and challenge the fundamental issue of the legal doctrine 
regarding the sources of international law that in its conservative version would negate 
any attempt at reform … Consent is the basis of international law—no sovereign state 
is bound by a rule unless it has consented either explicitly, as in the case of a treaty, or 
else more implicitly as in the case sometimes of customary law. This presented a 
crucial problem to Third World jurists: Western states, although in a minority, could 
exercise their sovereignty and refuse to accept the legal reforms proposed by the NIEO, 
and this refusal would be permissible under international law.38  
 
Indeed, law was an important dimension of the NIEO and the politics of international 
law was the single biggest politics that the developing states had to play.39 While 
auxiliary sources of international law for the Indian courts were both a common law 
and customary law from the start, Indian publicists’ normative discomfort with the 	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auxiliary sources of the law of nations was palpably visible. In order to deal with this 
issue, the Indian Society of International law organized “1977-78 Indo-Soviet 
Seminars” on sources. Indian judge to the ICJ, Nagendra Singh, played an active 
role. 40  Both Indian and Soviet publicists expressed normative discomfort with 
auxiliary sources.41 
 
In light of the foregoing historical and structural account of subsidiary sources, the 
Right of Passage case offered a definitive moment to Indian judiciary to rethink its 
continuity with colonial law in postcolonial India. A sense of territorial integrity, after 
Portugal questioned it at the ICJ, ushered in this rethinking. Though the Court did not 
become nationalist immediately, the ICJ ruling did allow the Court to sympathize 
with or at least understand the Indian executive’s dilemma. The judiciary and 
executive thus coupled for a period of time before the court became active again on 
issues of human rights.42 The coupling and decoupling of the Indian executive and the 
judiciary tells a tale of the reception of auxiliary sources of international law which 
also includes foreign law. 
 
This narrative has been missing in the literature, if any, on subsidiary sources of 
international law in India. Further, the lack of an express international case involving 
an erstwhile colonial power in the early days of their birth did not allow other newly 
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decolonized countries a similar opportunity to rethink international law.43 In that sense 
India’s case is a unique one, worthy of enquiry.  
 
While the Indian Government accepted colonial treaties, quite curiously, the Indian 
Court kept using the views of the publicist and ICJ’s decisions—lower order 
sources—for clarifying the points of law. For example, in 1996 in the Vellore Citizen 
case, the Indian Supreme Court expected “international Law jurists” to “finalise” the 
“salient features” of “[s]ustainable [d]evelopment” as a ‘part of the Customary 
International Law’. 44  This chapter argues that Portugal’s challenge to India’s 
sovereignty at the ICJ had a subtle but sure impact on the Court’s understanding of 
the subsidiary sources. This new understanding of the Court led to the coupling of 
India’s judiciary and executive as the Court became more nationalist. 
 
II. Comparative International Law in India: In need of Nuance? 
 
Indeed, there is a twist in the story of comparative international law when applied to 
countries that were a product of decolonization. Unlike a flat result that the 
application of comparative international law on American and British cases produces, 
the use of comparative international law in India displays a nuanced politico-legal 
process that expose the relationship of the judiciary and the executive in freshly 
decolonized countries. The Indian Supreme Court that was very comparative since the 
start was so, as discussed before, because of a sense of colonial continuity of the 
British law. But this would change due to a judgment of the ICJ and the environment 	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India’s special role among other developing country see, S Yildirim, Expanding Secularism’s Scope: 
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created by UN declarations during the 1960s and 1970s, and the NAM movement. 
 
A. Comparative International Law And Indian Courts 
 
Akin to a normative discomfort in importing, or the unexplained eagerness in 
borrowing cases from the Privy Council and the American Supreme Court, a reading 
of the Indian Supreme Court’s reception of subsidiary sources of international law 
exposes a normative rancor engendered by decolonization and international law’s 
recognition of self-determination.45 The General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 
14 December 196046 that ‘Welcom[ed] the emergence in recent years of a large 
number of dependent territories into freedom and independence’ gave further shot in 
the arm to the idea of decolonization, which Indian courts began to take note of. After 
the UN declaration on self–determination, Indian judges saw international law as 
fractured; it lost its colonial continuity as the new countries saw a part of international 
law’s sources repugnant.  
 
Writers of international law whose scholarship was colonial-neutral i.e. who did not 
see colonialism as a doctrinal problem of international law suddenly were not good 
subsidiary sources of international law anymore. A typical example of the loss of 
colonial continuity in decolonial countries is the sentiment expressed by Keba Mbaye, 
a Judge of the ICJ, that African, Asian, and Latin American countries saw arbitration 
as a foreign judicial institution imposed upon them and not a system of international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 UN Charter Article 1(2), ‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>. 
46 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Adopted by 








The account of comparative citation of foreign law in India is no less fascinating. In 
the Virendra Singh v Uttar Pradesh case,48 while the petitioners relied upon American 
cases, the State of Uttar Pradesh relied heavily on the Privy Council decisions. The 
Supreme Court subsequently overruled Virendra Singh in Mithibarwala case.49 Justice 
Subba Rao, while dissenting in Mithibarwala, noted the importance of the Virendra 
Singh case stating Virendra Singh case ‘pleaded for a departure from imperialistic 
traditions’ in ‘adopt[ing] the American traditions, which are in consonance with the 
realities of the situation created by our Constitution.’50  
 
Justice Rao particularly noted counsel Tricumdass’ submission that the Court discard 
the ‘theory of public international law that underlies the decisions of the Privy 
Council’, and ‘accept and give effect to what might be termed the American view’.51 
In the 1960s, the Indian Supreme Court stood askance between the continuity of 
English colonial law and the possibility of borrowing American cases. At the 
Supreme Court of India lawyers called for a postcolonial understanding and 
application of cases distinguishing British and American jurisprudence based on the 
similarity of history. Fresh from the bout of colonization, to some Indian lawyer, 
comparative law seemed fairer and untainted source to rely upon than international 
law that had colonial origins. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 K Mbaye, The Complementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrators in Ensuring that International 
Commercial Arbitration is Effective, in, 60 Years of ICC Arbitration: A Look At The Future (Paris: 
ICC Publishing S.A., 1984) 293, 293-95. 
48 Virendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 447. 
49 State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, MANU/SC/0031/1964 (Mithibarwala). 
50 Ibid. para. 83. 





But self-determination is a concept and subject of public international law too. Thus 
far there has been no definitive study to ascertain if the Indian Supreme Court, while 
discussing matters involving public international law, exhibited a similar debate on 
subsidiary sources of international law, i.e. writings of the publicists and judicial 
decisions of international courts. Between 1950s and 1960s and even much later, the 
Court generously imported British and American authors and ICJ cases in rulings that 
had international law as an issue to be discussed. Trained in the common law 
tradition, Indian judges wrote with a sense of colonial continuity, even though the 
executive called for a postcolonial understanding of international law and institutions. 
Another reason for the judges to see a colonial continuity, as did Justice Mudholkar in 
Mithibarwala case, was the Indian Constitution’s Article 372, holding that all laws in 
place prior to the constitution’s passage were to remain in place unless repealed.52 
 
In the Eastern Newspaper case, for instance, the Court thought “writings of 
publicists” is a source of the law of nations as the ‘distinction between formal and 
material sources is difficult to maintain.’53 In fact the Court noted Gramophone case 
where it held that ‘even in the absence of municipal law, the treaties/conventions 
could not only be looked into, but could also be used to interpret municipal laws so as 
to bring them in consonance with international law.’54 But this position had begun to 
gradually change since 1960, the year the ICJ ruled in the Right of Passage case 
between Portugal and India.55  
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53 Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society, New Delhi v Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, 
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What led to this realization however? Notably, General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) came only 6 months after the ICJ had ruled in the Right of Passage case.56 In 
many ways the UN General Assembly endorsed the ICJ’s studied approach to newly 
decolonized nations in the Right to Passage case after becoming ‘[c]onvinced that all 
peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their 
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory’.57  
 
The idea of comparative international law points out that the academics, practitioners 
and international and national courts increasingly seek to identify and interpret 
international law by engaging in comparative analyses of various domestic court 
decisions. Indian Supreme Court since its inception in 1950 has engaged in 
comparative invoking, if not analysis, of American and British cases, as well as 
international law’s subsidiary sources. But soon with the actions taking place in the 
sphere of international law, Indian courts began displaying a nuanced rejection of 
international law’s subsidiary sources. 
 
B. Publicists of Decolonized States 
 
The publicists from decolonized States also display a different political economy that 
merits a mention here. The conflict as to the relevance of publicists from the newly 
independent states took place largely in the context of the efforts of the decolonized 
states to change the economic structure established during colonialism. These states 
believed that the structure of the existing order favoured the erstwhile imperial states. 
Consequently, a division arose between attitudes of developed and developing states. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid. 






Sornarajah maintains that in certain circumstances writings of Western scholars were 
used as the main source for reaching a decision.58 Doctrinally speaking, the ICJ article 
38(1)(d) does not factor in the differences between a developing and a developed 
nation. That this provision survived the World War II and existed before the United 
Nations began favoring major decolonization is very important. Therein lies the 
political economy of the subsidiary sources. There is gap of almost two decades 
between the establishment of the ICJ and the UN Declaration on the NIEO in the 
wake of the widening ‘gap between the developed and the developing countries.’59 
Admittedly, as the resolution puts it, the UN was ‘established at a time when most of 
the developing countries did not even exist as independent States.’60 
 
It is important to recount the use of these sources deemed subsidiary by the ICJ 
statute, between the day the ICJ Statute was adopted and the day the NIEO resolution 
was passed. This was the period in which many erstwhile colonies were graduating to 
a sovereign status. This process was politically charged and emotionally tied to the 
history of colonial rule and injustices. The new countries had to reconsider the older 
contracts made between colonizers and the colonies. Resource rich states had their 
economies dependent upon the exploitation of natural resources.61 In 2012, the 
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Supreme Court of India in the Centre for PIL case borrowed the international law on 
natural resource from subsidiary international law that has changed after the NIEO: 
 
The ownership regime relating to natural resources … In international law … rests 
upon the concept of sovereignty and seeks to respect the principle of permanent 
sovereignty (of peoples and nations) over (their) natural resources as asserted in the 
17th Session of the United Nations General Assemble [sic] and then affirmed as a 
customary international norm by the International Court of Justice in the case opposing 
the Democratic Republic of Congo to Uganda. Common Law recognizes States as 
having the authority to protect natural resources insofar as the resources are within the 
interests of the general public. The State is deemed to have a proprietary interest in 
natural resources and must act as guardian and trustee in relation to the same.62 
 
After decolonization, existing colonial contracts tied natural resources by contract to 
exploitation by foreign multinational corporations.63 Some of these contracts relating 
to oil became the subject of international litigation. Texaco v Libya arbitration, for 
example, as Raman and other scholars said then, was the first international decision 
purporting to examine the status of the NIEO as evidence of emerging customary 
international law.64 But unfortunately, Texaco award of a single arbitrator points to 
efforts at preventing the wishes of the developing countries being given weight within 
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customary international law. 65  The arbitrator, Professor Dupuy, dismissed the 
resolutions of the General Assembly on the NIEO as having only aspirational value. 
He effectively regarded General Assembly resolutions as not having law creating 
effect given the lack of consensus.66 Thus through interaction between arbitral awards 
and writings, a new law was created contrary to what was stated in the NIEO.  
 
An intriguing situation arises thus; while General Assembly resolutions do not create 
international law, writings of the publicists, a subsidiary source, does. No wonder, 
after the NIEO, ‘sovereign equality, that in theory offers a normative defence against 
unwelcomed commercial influence, has failed to embed any positive requirements to 
advance a comprehensive system of equitable benefit-sharing internationally.’67 In the 
first postcolonial phase Indian courts stood witness to the doctrinal disquiet between 
international investment law and decolonization.68 
 
Perhaps therefore, for instance, in the 1958 Dalmia Cement Co. case the Indian 
Supreme Court, while comparing the view of the ICJ and in reference to contracts, 
noted: ‘all rights to property, including those in real estate, are lost when a new 
sovereign takes over except in so far as the new sovereign chooses to recognize them 
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or confer new rights in them.’69 This position is in complete disagreement with what 
Beckett had to say in 1946 about the obligations of a future Indian government.70 
Again in State Trading Corporation, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that ‘[t]he fact 
corporations may be nationals of the country for purposes of international law will not 
make them citizens of this country for purposes of municipal law or the 
Constitution.’71 
  
III. Political Economy of the ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d) on Subsidiary 
Sources 
 
The past few years have seen a steady rise in the scholarship on subsidiary sources of 
international law.72 President of the 1920 drafting committee, Baron Descamps, 
maintained that in the absence of treaties or custom, the Court should rely on the 
works of publicists to avoid the blind alley of non-liquet.73 Clearly, teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists were included in the text of Article 38(1)(d) to purge 
non-liquet i.e. to avoid a situation where an international tribunal thinks it does not 
have any law to administer in the case at hand.74 The Indian Supreme Court in Gandhi 
v State of Gujarat nodded in support of this proposition saying, ‘The court is not 
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entitled to decline to determine the legal meaning of a statute on the principle “non-
liquet”.’75  
 
The Indian Supreme Court’s borrowing of the lower order and less consensual 
subsidary sources of international law when the executve rejected even main sources 
remains an unexplained enigma. While shifting through the jurisprudence of the 
Court, one comes across this nuance. Indeed, the Court has made a good use of 
subsidiary sources despite the fact that many scholars find strong evidence that 
‘judges favor the states that appoint them’ to ICJ thus making the use of decisions of 
international courts not the best sources of international law.76  
 
There is another way to look at writings of the publicists; through the lens of ICJ 
Statute article 17(2) which says ‘No member may participate in the decision of any 
case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of 
the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of 
enquiry, or in any other capacity.’77  
 
Thus participation in a particular case bars a judge from that case on the simple 
grounds of the conflict of interests. It is noteworthy to see what the ICJ actually sees 
as valid enough to consider it as an example of showing conflicting interest; if a 
member has participated ‘as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties’. These 
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are duties in which one provides “legal assistance” to one of the parties leading to an 
assumption that the person may want a particular party to win. Such “legal assistance” 
in the form of written arguments is a subject of private domain. But imagine a scholar 
who has published a piece in a journal and then gets elevated to the ICJ as a member. 
Will an author’s particular writing, naturally part of 38(1)(d), attract ICJ Article 17?78 
Well, it depends. As Reisman wrote in 1960: 
 
General legal articles, of course, are not framed as memoranda. There has been no 
study of the genealogy of articles. It seems certain, however, that many specific 
problems occur to scholars because of concrete cases that arise or appear to be 
developing. The article deals with the case or, at least, with the facts of the case, though 
the matter is generalized, perhaps cloaked. In a few instances, the relation to the case 
will be apparent on the face of the article. In most instances, however, the genealogy of 
the article will be known with certainty only by the writer. If there is a relation, it might 
constitute a disability under Article 17, assuming that a doctrinalist, by virtue of his 
status in Article 38 of the Statute, is considered an official for the purposes of Article 
17.79 
 
Lauterpacht and Jessup were two of the most vocal supporters of the views of 
publicists as sources.80 Lauterpacht sat uncomfortably with the gap in practice that he 	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thought is at odds with the plain language of the ICJ Statute.81 The ICJ has made 
reference to publicists only on two occasions: the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and 
Nottebohm cases.82 Notably, Lauterpacht had advised a party in the Nottebohm case 
and thus did not participate in that phase of the case, which arose during his 
incumbency.83 He specifically cited the ICJ Statute Article 17 in his letter of February 
7, 1955 to the Court.84  The more recent 2002 ICC Statute Article 41(2)(a) provides:  
 
A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might 
reasonably be doubted on any ground. A judge shall be disqualified from a case in 
accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in 
any capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national 
level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted. A judge shall also be 
disqualified on such other grounds as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. 
 
Invoking this ICC Article, on 29 June 2015, Lubanga moved the ICC to disqualify 
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi because of her previous involvement in the case before 
the same ‘Chamber in a situation which might reasonably cast doubt on her 
impartiality’ as ‘parts of the curriculum vitae, which do not appear’ in her ‘public 
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presentation on the website of the International Criminal Court, confirm that she 
performed high-level functions within the Office of the Prosecutor.’85 
 
IV. India And the Right of Passage Case 
 
The Right of Passage case is relevant to India in many ways. The case attracted the 
concern of Indian courts about the doctrine of territorial sovereignty. It is in this sense 
that the Right of Passage case was a watershed moment central to the coupling of 
India’s body politic with its judiciary, at least in the decade that followed.  
 
After Britain took control of India, the Portuguese continued the peaceful use of the 
passage to Goa till the Second World War. In the Right of Passage case, Portugal 
complained about the progressive restriction of its right of passage between October 
1953 and July 1954. The ICJ held that ‘Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over 
intervening Indian territory … to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese 
sovereignty’86 ‘in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general’.87 By 
nine votes to six, the ICJ found that ‘India has not acted contrary to its obligations 
resulting from Portugal’s right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials 
and goods in general’.88  
 
Historically speaking, with regard to the coupling of India’s body politic with its 
judiciary, the chapter contends that the role of the Right of Passage case is significant 	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as it reawakened the Indian judiciary to the importance of territorial sovereignty in 
postcolonial States. The Government of India had contended that the subject matter of 
the Portuguese claim was ‘too vague for the Court to be able to pass upon it by the 
application only of the legal rules enumerated in Article 38, paragraph 1, of the 
Statute’, as the ICJ Statute enumerates, the sources of international law.89 The 
arguments from the Indian Government before the ICJ had struck at the root of the 
traditional sources of international law, an argument that heralded a postcolonial 
perspective on the sources of international law. Quite notably, the ICJ while  
observing that the enclaves under contention were “of negligible political and 
economic importance to India”, propounded political ideas, which went beyond the 
ICJ’s legal mandate. 
 
[T]he Indian Government and people have doubtless never concealed their desire that 
the Goans should be allowed to join the Union of Independent India to which they are 
attached ethnically and culturally, whereas however the Indian Government has always 
said with equal force that that reunion must be achieved without violence; whereas it is 
difficult to see why any different attitude should have been adopted with regard to the 
enclaves which are of negligible political and economic importance to India.90 
 
Such views on the ‘political and economic importance to India’ serve as a smoking 
gun to the subsequent exposé registered in the diplomatic communiqué between 
London and Lisbon after the ruling. Sir Charles Sterling, the then ambassador of 
Britain to Lisbon recorded the Portuguese Foreign Minister’s conversation that 
Portugal did not get a completely favourable ruling from the ICJ ‘due only to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Right of Passage case, supra note 86, 12. 





illness of the British Judge and the death of one of the Latin American Judges 
committed to the Portuguese cause’.91 Notably, the ICJ contemplated upon India’s 
“annexationist designs”.92 In the past, Maratha kings ruled this part of India and from 
time to time ‘the Portuguese were granted authority to put down revolt or rebellion in 
the assigned villages’. Portugal cited this as ‘an indication that they were granted 
sovereignty over the villages’.93 The ICJ ruled: 
 
Whereas Portugal is equally unfounded in her reliance upon recognition of Portuguese 
sovereignty in the enclaves, either contained in a treaty of 1779 negotiated by Portugal 
with the Maratha Empire, or flowing from the attitude of the British or Indian 
Governments between 1818 and 1954; Whereas the negotiations of 1779 never resulted 
in an agreement and whereas the draft treaty in contemplation in any event involved no 
transfer of sovereignty.94 
 
Alexandrowicz and Anand, and more recently, Chimni have all argued that the 
recognition of a treaty of 1779 entered into between the Portuguese and the Marathas 
in the Right of Passage case established conclusive proof of the fact that, far from 
being in a legal vacuum, the confrontation between the “two worlds” took place on a 
footing of equality in the ensuing commercial and political transactions.95 The Right 
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of Passage case was India’s first case at the ICJ.96 It was India’s litmus test to stamp 
its newfound sovereignty. India was seeking to put its foot down on the last attempt 
from a European nation to claim parts of the disputed territory based on colonialist 
arguments. The ICJ verdict worked both ways; it gave a sense of satisfaction to 
Portugal by stating that it still had the right of civil passage, and to India by stating 
that Portugal could not conduct an armed intervention into the affairs, which India 
claimed was internal in nature.97  
 
A. The Political Economy of the Right of Passage case 
 
The Right of Passage ruling was delivered on 12 April 1960. Like any other 
nationalist upsurge, India won its freedom after a protracted struggle against the 
British Crown that involved civil disobedience as well as armed rebellion. 
Fortuitously, the Right of Passage case preceded most of the rulings that the Indian 
Supreme Court delivered where the Court had to rule on the reception of international 
law in the domestic legal order. The political economy of this case is rather important 
for understanding, to use Nehru’s phrase, India’s tryst with international law.  
 
The Security Council subsequently debated the issue of self-determination and the use 
of force in relation to Goa.98 In 1956, Portugal had refused to agree that it had any 
self-governing territories.99 However, due to the arguments from Soviet Union and 
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Goa was seen as a non-self-governing territory, which 	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refuted the Portuguese arguments.100 In the 987th meeting, C.S. Jha, the representative 
of India, stated that the Portuguese had invented a “legal fiction” by putting before the 
Council a question of a colonial nature.101 Therefore, a question of aggression did not 
arise. Though Keith thought that India’s arguments on Goa were motivated by self-
interest, which is hardly an irony given that erstwhile colonized countries had to pull 
together disparate territories to create a nation and claim sovereign status, India’s 
practice found support in the so-called “salt-water” theory of self-determination.102  
 
Indian sovereignty, a species of postcolonial sovereignty, stood hostage to British and 
Portuguese diplomacy for a long time after its independence. Naturally, India was 
quick to act politically and finally annexed Goa and other former Portuguese enclaves 
in 1961 into the Union of India.103 The archives of the British Foreign Office are 
replete with diplomatic exchanges about how even after the ICJ judgment, British 
ships did not seek diplomatic clearance, a sovereign matter, before entering India.104 
J.H. Fawcett from the Office of the British Deputy High Commissioner, Bombay, in 
his letter to London, wrote a brief note on Hindu-Catholic relations after the new 
Indian takeover in Goa. Portuguese, he said, ‘cannot for example have been pleased to 
see a large and ugly statue of Gandhi erected at one end of the main square of Old 
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Goa’, which is ‘surrounded by the great monuments of Catholic Portugal’.105 As Abi-
Saab notes, during the Goa debate ‘some newly independent states elaborated the 
theory that colonialism is a permanent aggression’ and therefore ‘reconquering 
colonized territory, far from being an aggression, is a legitimate act of self- 
defence.’106 Naturally, such views met with heavy resistance from Western powers.107 
 
B. Rulings in the Shadow of the Right of Passage 
 
In Monterio v. State of Goa, the Indian Supreme Court accepted that the Indian 
Armed Forces, following a short military action, did occupy Goa.108 Goa came under 
Indian administration from 20 December 1961 and was governed under the Goa, 
Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance 1962 promulgated by the President of 
India.109 The formation of the United Nations Charter was a watershed moment in the 
shift of jurisprudence in international law as the Charter declared illegal any 
acquisition of territory by war or aggression. This was a change of position as earlier 
the writers of international law had seen title by aggression as being good.110 In 
Monterio, to the dismay of many western commentators, Justice Hidayatullah ruled 
‘events after the Second World War have shown that transfer of title to territory by 
conquest is still recognised.’111 Justice M. Hidayatullah, the former Chief Justice and 
acting President of India in 1968, expressed a similar opinion while disagreeing with 
leading British publicists in 1969, the year the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 	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Treaties was adopted:112 
 
[Indian] representatives do not seem to be alive to the requirements of our Constitution. 
The suggestions of Brierly, Hersch Lauterpacht and Gerald Fitzmaurice do not serve to 
remove our difficulties but make them greater. The suggestion of Hersch Lauterpacht 
that there should be compulsory submission of the question of international Court of 
Justice cannot avail in India where Supreme Court will be moved to examine the 
legality of the consent.113 
 
Similarly while discussing the “Goa incident” Professor Quincy Wright wrote that the 
‘military take-over of Goa by India’ was of legal importance, primarily because it 
indicated ‘a major difference between the East and the West in the interpretation’ of 
the UN law.114 
 
V. An Account of the Indian Supreme Court’s Reception of the 
Subsidiary Sources 
 
The Supreme Court of India held its first sitting on 28 January 1950. It goes without 
saying that in order to know the use and application of international law one has to 
ground one’s study in national jurisdictions. While discussing the sources of 
international law it is important to consider the municipal effects of international 
norms, and the force of international treaties, upon non-signatories.115 While the 
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structures of Indian courts retained this colonial legacy, Hegde observes, ‘the 
response of the political establishment of the new India towards international law was 
anti-colonial.’ 116  Yet the judiciary first acknowledged the role of publicists in 
international law in Singhji v. Rajasthan considering “juristic opinion” as a source of 
law.117 Much later in Eastern Newspaper it said ‘submissions of professional lawyers 
and the seminal activities of legal academics enjoy no higher status’ but the ‘only 
exception is provided by the writings of publicists in, international law.’118 In the 
spirit of colonial continuity since 1950, the Indian Supreme Court believed that 
subsidiary sources complete international law. Even though early rulings of the Indian 
Court first pointed out to the anachronism of colonialism,119 the judges failed to point 
out the nuance that borrowing subsidiary sources of international law in domestic 
cases would induce.  
 
As the ‘death of colonialism and the end of World War II birthed new nations across 
the globe,’ the Court remarked in Coelho ‘these states embraced rights as foundations 
to their new constitutions.’ 120  Justice Mudholker when inking his opinion in 
Mithibarwala, tried to situate international law in a postcolonial frame but then he 
failed to proffer an effective postcolonial view.121 Justice Mudholker opined: 
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Now, a rule of international law on which the several Privy Council decisions as to the 
effect of conquest or cession on the private rights of the inhabitants of the conquered or 
ceded territory is founded has become a part of the common law of this country. This is 
‘law in force’ and is saved by Art. 372 of the Constitution. The courts in India are, 
therefore, bound to enforce that rule and not a rule of international law governing the 
same matter based upon the principle of state succession which had received the 
approval of Marshall C.J. and which has also received the approval of several text-book 
writers, including Hyd (sic). It is true that the International Court of Justice has also 
stated the law on the point to be the same but that does not alter the position so far as 
the municipal courts are concerned.122 
 
Mudholkar refused the lure of judicial activism in effect rejecting legal 
postcolonialism: ‘If in the light of this our law is regarded as inequitous or a survival 
of an imperialistic system the remedy lies not with us but with the legislature or with 
the appropriate Government by granting recognition to the private rights of the 
inhabitants of a newly acquired territory.’123 In such ways, the Court continued to 
borrow authors of international law who did not see colonialism as a problem of 
international law.124 This meant that while the Court’s heart was postcolonial, its mind 
remained colonial. It saw scholarship as colonial-neutral. 
 
All this would however change gradually but only after Portugal’s challenged India’s 
sovereignty in the Right of Passage case.125 It was soon visible as a year after the 	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Right of Passage decision, in Sahib v Chief Commissioner, a decision about a French 
colony, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that Pondicherry not being within the territory 
of India, a situation created by the French colonialism, is somewhat anomalous.126 
Judging the political tension patent to this subject, the Court was surely careful 
enough to point out that the Indian government has “enough power” even at the stage 
of the ‘de facto transfer to remedy the situation.’127 The Court thus saw the executive 
the makers of international law and cared less about what foreign international law 
scholars had to say about international law on this issue. In 1950, the Indian Supreme 
Court first spoke of ‘international law’ in Saksena v State in relation to extradition.128 
While quoting Wheaton later, the Court said that a ‘sovereign state, could not be sued 
against its will in the municipal courts of India’.129  
 
After 1960, we see a clear change in the Court’s approach to ICJ rulings. In the State 
Trading Case, the Indian Supreme Court held that a corporation may be national of 
India for purposes of international law but that this will not make it citizen for the 
municipal law.130 State Trading is notable because 13 years into its existence, the 
Indian Court displayed an impressive use and application of the teachings of the 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations. When the judgment is given a closer 
read, we see that of the nine judges sitting in the bench only three wrote their 
opinions. And among those 3 judges, Justice Hidayatullah takes the lion’s share in 
citing, quoting and analyzing the views of the publicists; English, French and 	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German.131 Some of the scholars discussed to arrive at a position are Weis, Moore, 
Starke, Young, McNair, Oppenheim and Hyde. 132  
 
Mithibarwala followed the State Trading case wherein the Indian Supreme Court 
conducted a lengthy discussion on international law.133 The Court had to discuss 
textbooks and the view of the ICJ asserting that the ICJ’s position does not alter the 
position in municipal courts.134 The Court talked about aligning Indian law with 
public international law only to the context expounded by the Privy Council in its 
decisions rendered on appeals from the Indian High Courts.135 Next, the Court made 
an explicit reference to jurists and the PCIJ marking a distinction between what might 
be termed the theory of the law and the enforceability of these rights in municipal 
courts citing Hyde, for example.136  
 
The Court defended India’s position by saying ‘[n]either the comity of nations, nor 
any rule of International Law can be invoked to prevent a sovereign State from 
safeguarding its national economy and taking steps to protect it from abuse.’137 
Previously, in Promod Deb case, the Court had said international law might 
recognizes the right to private property upon the incumbency of a new sovereign, but 
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municipal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce such international obligations.138 The 
Court chose to stress the role of dualism saying, ‘it is not necessary that all treaties 
must be made a part of municipal law.’ The Court drew support from 
Alexanderowicz, a professor at Madras University.139 The Court further said: “Our 
practice and Constitution shows that there are limitations upon the powers of Courts 
in matters of treaties and Courts cannot step in where only political departments can 
act. The power of the Courts is further limited when the right is claimed against the 
political exercise of the power of the State.”140 
 
A year later, in Commissioner of Income Tax, the Indian Supreme Court was asked 
whether ‘under International Law the assessee [sic] is immune from taxation.’141 The 
High Court whose decision went for appeal at the Supreme court held that under 
international law, the respondent ‘being a sovereign up to January 25, 1950, his 
income up to that date was immune from taxation’.142 The case generated a full-blown 
discussion of the privilege of the sovereign. Palkhiwala, counsel for the respondent, 
argued that as, during the accounting year, the respondent was a ruling chief, ‘he was 
exempt from taxation under the International Law.’143  
 
Admittedly, the Court was forced to look into the evolutionary nature of the 
international law vis-à-vis the liability of a sovereign to taxation in respect of private 
property.144 It is not hard to guess that there must not have existed any work on the 
subject by an Indian author then. Though a matter for a national court to decide, the 	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Supreme Court reached out for an international law textbook. It relied upon, inter 
alia, Oppenheim’s International Law, (8th edn., Vol. I).145 It next invoked the power 
of a scholarly journal: ‘Interesting and instructive discussion on the question of a 
foreign sovereign’s immunity from taxation is respect of his private properties is 
found in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 46, at p. 239, under the 
heading ‘Immunity from Taxation of Foreign State-owned property’ the Court said.146 
 
What is more, the Court admittedly decided whether the Nizam (king) of Hyderabad 
was a sovereign or not based on this journal article and Oppenheim’s view.147 Later, 
in 1969 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai, Chief Justice Hidayatullah noted Judge Huber’s 
observation in the Island of Palmas case about manifestations of territorial 
sovereignty.148 Recently while representing Italy before the Indian Supreme Court 
Harish Salve invoked Maganbhai case in which the Court had held that unless there 
be a law in conflict with the treaty, the treaty must stand.149 In Lahoria the Court 
while discussing the meaning of extradition invoked O’Connell, Cherif Bassiouni and 
Oppenheim.150 In Gramophone case, quoting Lauterpacht, the Court tried to answer 
two questions: first, whether international law is, of its own force, drawn into the law 
of the land without the aid of a municipal statute and, second, whether, so drawn, it 
overrides municipal law in case of conflict.151 But when international law runs into 
such conflict with municipal law, the Court was of the opinion that: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. para. 13. 
147 Ibid. para. 16, 17. The Court had similar issues at hand in Raja H Singh v. Commissioner of IT, 
MANU/SC/0242/1971. 
148 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel/Manikant Tiwari v Union of India, MANU/SC/0044/1969, para. 56. 
149 Republic of Italy thr Ambassador v Union of India, MANU/SC/0059/2013, para. 40. 
150 Daya Singh Lahoria v Union of India, MANU/SC/0260/2001, at para. 7. 





[T]he sovereignty and the integrity of the Republic and the supremacy of the 
constituted legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to external rules 
except to the extent legitimately accepted by the constituted legislatures themselves. 
The doctrine of incorporation also recognises the position that the rules of 
international law are incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the 
national law, unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament.152 
 
The Court quoted Fried, ‘[t]he test of a treaty are its exceptions. The proof of a treaty 
pudding is, when it cannot be eaten.’153 More recently, in Narmada Bachao Andolan 
the Indian Court mentioned the International Law Commission’s definition of 
precautionary principle.154 In Jolly Varghese case, Justice Krishna Iyer relied on 
Robertson to support India’s dualism.155 In Thakur the Court invoked Lauterpacht on 
the importance of the principle of equality.156 In the celebrated case of Indra Sawhney, 
the Supreme Court quoted Judge Tanaka’s opinion from South West Africa Cases 
(Second Phase). 157  The Indian Supreme Court in Vishaka held international 
conventions the norms of which are absent in domestic law are to be read into Indian 
constitutional rights.158 
 
International law is truly an externalization of European pacts, agreements and 
treaties through colonialism. Factually speaking, first the straitjacket of international 
law was created, and then as and when countries became free an attempt was made to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  Ibid. para. 5. The Court drew support from Tractoroexport, Moscow v Tarapore & Co., 
MANU/SC/0003/1969 quoting John HE Fried, The 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked 
States, 6 Indian J Intl L (1966) 9. 
153 Ibid., para. 10. 
154 Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India, MANU/SC/0640/2000, para. 119. 
155 Jolly George Varghese v Bank of Cochin, MANU/SC/0014/1980, para. 10. This case clarified that 
regarding international conventional or treaty law, India subscribes to the dualist position; such 
agreements have no binding effect unless implemented by legislation. See Smith, supra note 8, 243. 
156 Thakur v. Union of India, MANU/SC/1397/2008, para. 4. 
157 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0104/1993, paras. 407, 408. 





fit them into it. That ‘the history of international law’ as Jennings wrote, ‘is 
essentially the story of a struggle between the idea of a legally ordered society of 
States, on the one hand, and, on the other, the idea of a mere juxtaposition of 
sovereign States each one ultimately legally autonomous’159 became all the more clear 
after decolonization.  
 
There is no doubt that for many developing countries, India for example, international 
law is as much a matter of politics as it is of law. This is evidenced by the fact that out 
of the four ICJ judges from India, two were bureaucrats while the later two Supreme 
Court judges. Furthermore in the matters of human rights,160 women empowerment, 
prisoners’ rights, and most recently, rights to access to medicine,161 Indian domestic 
courts have been one of the biggest conductors and consumers of international law. In 
relation to bilateral investment treaties India has been open. As PS Rao notes, ‘the 
context in which these Agreements are being negotiated departs from the earlier phase 




Perhaps the single most important problem in advocating domestic courts as agents of 
international law is the collapse of the separation of powers in developing countries. 
International law is a matter of foreign office or the ministry of external affairs and it 
is political though conducted within the established legal boundaries. Thus to put faith 
in the mountain of cases from the British and the North American courts decided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 RY Jennings, The Progress of International Law, 34 British Yrbk Intl L (1958) 334. 
160 Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480. 
161 Novartis AG v Union of India, MANU/SC/0281/2013. 
162 PS Rao, Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements: A Legal Framework for the Protection of 





before 1920 (comparative) and the subsequent PCIJ and ICJ rulings using writers and 
publicists of international law (subsidiary) appeared crass to many third world 
scholars, lawyers, judges and even courts. 
 
The reception of international law in India presents a dichotomy. The two principal 
receptors, scholars and the courts, exhibit varied approaches also due to the classic 
divorce between teachers and courts in India. Many ask what form has the old 
structural borrowing of the Court has taken today. However, a more important 
observation is that while early Indian judges to the ICJ, Sir Benegal Rao and 
Nagendra Singh, were bureaucrats, more recently international judges from India 
have been domestic judges: judges Judge Pathak and Judge Bhandari both come from 
the Supreme Court while judge to the ITLOS judge PC Rao comes from the Indian 
foreign ministry.163 
 
Methodological weaknesses, Chimni says, compounded by ‘formalist and statist 
orientation’ characterises Indian scholarship preventing it from coming to grips with 
the character of international law and doctrinal import of dualism in developing 
countries.164 While there is still today a hard disjoint between Indian and western 
scholars, the Indian judges and bureaucrats of the Indian foreign ministry are, through 
legal soliloquy, more aligned with international courts and foreign bureaucrats. 
Notably, the division of opinions at the PCIJ in the Lotus case, gleaned from the 
dissenting opinions it generated, first pointed to ‘the unsatisfactory nature of 
international law concerning extension of national competence to crimes on the high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 However Knop thinks international lawyers are too quick to dismiss domestic judges. Karen Knop, 
Here and there: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 NYU J Intl L & Politics (2000) 501. 





seas and helped in the development of law in this regard.’165 In the Republic of Italy 
case before the Indian Supreme Court, India’s reference to the Lotus case and the 
distinction of facts made by the Indian Court allowed it to appreciate the authority of 
the UNCLOS, a law later in time.  
 
In such ways, the Indian Supreme Court has succeeded in opening new windows to 
welcome international legal norms through the generous use of the ICJ article 
38(1)(d). However, it does not see, as much as Lauterpacht would have wanted to, its 
rulings becoming sources of international law.166 At best Indian rulings are opinio 
juris. Yet international law’s appeal to India has gone up as it distinguished Republic 
of Italy case from Lotus case in the light of the UNCLOS. 
 
It is however also clear that when the Indian Supreme Court applies international law; 
it applies it because that international law has been incorporated into the municipal 
law of India.167 The Indian Supreme Court’s dislike of the colonial furniture within 
the postcolonial state building, of which the rule of law is a central part, has been 
pathological and nuanced.168 It continues to affect India’s understanding of the 
sources of international law where it uses both the components of the ICJ article 
38(1)(d) to settle domestic cases. The avoidance of non-liquet within international law 
is an assumption of the completeness of the sources of international law by the Indian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 RP Anand, Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in international adjudication, 14 ICLQ 
(1965) 803. 
166 Scindia case, supra note 119, para. 46. 
167 Citing Hukumchand Mills v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1329 and Mani v Sangeetha 
Theatre, (2004) 12 SCC 278, Mr. Banerji, representing India, urged that if the executive authority had 
the requisite power under the law, and if the action taken by the executive could be justified under 
some other power, mere reference to a wrong provision of law would not vitiate the exercise of power 
by the executive, so long as the said power exists. Republic of Italy case, supra note 149, para. 58. 





Supreme Court.169 It is thus argued that the completeness of the sources of the law 
within the meaning of ICJ Statute article 38(1) allows the Indian Supreme Court to 
plug gaps in the domestic law with the support of rulings of international and foreign 
courts and writings of publicists. 
 
Thus domestic courts are becoming an important agent of international law today. 
Monism or dualisms, commentators today expect the rulings of international courts to 
develop the law of state immunities by national courts. Some also maintain that the 
distinction between contract claims (domestic) and treaty claims (international) does 
not necessarily justifies the existence of two wholly separate layers of legal 
obligations. Furthermore, more recently, another notable issue is that of domestic 
courts often erring when they grant effects to foreign award judgments. 
 
India is its good example: The Indian Supreme Court in Bhatia International actively 
ruled that Indian courts have the power to order interim measures for arbitration 
conducted outside India only to overrule Bhatia in Bharat Aluminium Co case.170 Thus 
while apt in borrowing from foreign and international rulings, the Indian Supreme 
Court has shown a dim empathy in enforcing foreign awards. As Nariman says:  
 
[T]he peculiar feature of a domestic award in India is that its finality is not respected by 
the parties nor looked upon too seriously by courts: for over fifty years (from 1940 to 
1996) courts in India had become accustomed to supervising arbitral awards, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Enabulele, supra note 6, 651. 
170 Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading, 2002, 2 S.C.C. 105. The Court however overruled Bhatia in 





setting them aside for errors apparent on their face (a jurisdiction done away with only 
under the 1996 Act).171 
 
The President of India on 12th April, 2012 approached the Indian Supreme Court for 
an the opinion as ‘the Government of India has received various notices from 
companies based in other countries, invoking bilateral investment agreements and 
seeking damages against the Union of India by reason of the cancellation/threat of 
cancellation of the licenses.’172 India has entered into BITs with eighty-six countries; 
seventy-three of which have already come into force. Ranjan and Raju point out that 
despite these many BITs, only after the foreign investors used BITs to slap India with 
investment treaty arbitration notices did India woke up to this reality.173 This situation 
calls for a new prediction on how will the court and the executive balance 
international investment law with domestic law. Just as the 1960s allowed the Indian 
judiciary to couple with the executive, the new environment created by the BITs will 
perhaps generate the second phase of coupling of India’s executive and the judiciary. 
 
In all this the court will have to make sense of the abundant scholarly outpourings on 
international investment law since 1990s. Importing subsidiary sources today is as 
much a matter of the training of the judges as that of the structural constraints in 
unlearning the doctrines of law received through colonial intercourse.   
*** 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 FS Nariman, India And International Arbitration, 41 George Washington Intl L Rev (2009) 367, 378. 
172 In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, MANU/SC/0793/2012. 
173 Today foreign investors have challenged a host of state measures like cancellation of licenses by 
courts to legislations imposing retrospective taxes encroaching upon India’s judicial sovereignty. 
Prabhash Ranjan & Deepak Raju, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Indian Judiciary, 46 George 
Washington Intl L Rev (2014) 809-847. 
Chap V: Treaties, Contracts, and colonialism: The private life of 




Chapter 5 argues that the protection of private property undercuts both the law of contracts and 
international law in way that it ossifies colonialism’s impact on the doctrines of international law. I 
examine three tracts of time (a) the nineteenth century, (b) the interwar years (1920–1945), and, (c) 
the decades after decolonisation (1960 onwards) to argue that these three time periods are 
characterised respectively by three phenomena: (1) the unequal treaties regime (2) the 
contractualization of international law, and, (3) internationalisation of contracts and, as its subset, 
couching of the European-native legal relations within the vocabulary of international law. In order to 
accommodate the presence of the unequal-treaty regimes, the nineteenth century writers did not find 
consent central to treaty-making. At the time, the British courts accepted the unequal treaties entered 
into by the East India Company as an exercise of the Company’s “sovereign and political power”. 
After the obligation of understanding compliance with treaties in terms of their colonial context 
expired in the twentieth century, perfecting the analogy between treaties and contracts became 
fashionable. The purported commonality between, both, the private law and the public international 
law underpinned efforts by Lauterpacht and McNair to offer private law analogies of public 
international law. Its product, a contractual approach to international law, had the effect of ossifying 






“The Plurinational State of Bolivia as party to this arbitration cannot be considered without 
acknowledging the particularities of its people, model of State and recent history.” South 
American Silver Limited v. Bolivia1 
 
In those words in South American Silver case, Bolivia asserts that her vision of international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-15 (31 March 2015) 8, para 35. 
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law is mandated by “the particularities of its people, model of State and recent history” that 
even the investors need to take note of. Indeed the particularities of a given state’s people, the 
model of that State’s governance and history—postcolonial or colonial—are factors that 
international law cannot afford to ignore. In the case of many developing countries, the 
present is so impacted by the colonial past that international law simply appears to be the 
extension of a colonial power’s private law.  
 
For instance, in 1958, the Indian Law Commission was of the view that the codification of 
the Indian Contract Act by the British Parliament in 1872, in essence, was a codification of 
the British customs of the time on “real property law”.2 But underpinning a “system of 
property law”, Schwarzenberger noted in 1952, “lie, shrewdly hidden, the fundamental 
political, social and economic decisions on which these legal rules are based.”3 Thus when 
the British real property law became the Indian contract law,  “the fundamental political, 
social and economic decisions” of Britain struck roots in the Indian Subcontinent. Soon after, 
Indian native states and investors had to not only put up with the foreignness of commercial 
law, they had now upon them a duty to learn the law and practice it. The legal co-option, 
although inaugurated by the colonial companies, the British and the Portuguese, set the stage 
for a subsequent takeover by the British Crown. After decolonisation, the argument that the 
law of the protection of alien property abroad is part of a universal international law offered 
an example of the “shrewdly hidden” colonial ontologies of private property.4 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Law Comission of India, Thirteenth Report : Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Ministry of Law, Govt of India, 1958) 
1< http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/report13.pdf>. For a discussion in political theory over the meaning 
of property see, Onur Ulas Ince, Property, in, Michael Gibbons (ed) The Encyclopedia of Political Thought 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 3008–3018. 
3 G Schwarzenberger, The Protection of British Property Abroad, 2 Current Legal Problems (1952) 295.  
4 SN Guha Roy, Is the law of responsibility of states for injuries to aliens a part of universal international law? 
55 American J Int’l L (1961) 863-891. SP Sinha, Perspective of the newly independent states on the binding 
quality of international law, 14 ICLQ (1965) 121, 128. See, Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property, and 
Empire, 1500-2000 (CUP, NY, 2014). 
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This chapter examines three tracts of time (a) pre League of Nations years i.e. the nineteenth 
century, (b) the interwar years (1920–1945), and, (c) decades after decolonisation (1960–to 
this day).5 I argue that these tracts of time are characterised respectively by three phenomena:  
 
(1) unequal treaties; 
(2) the contractualization of international law, and; 
(3) internationalisation of contracts.6  
 
Within common law, the free consent of the parties has been fundamental to the validity of a 
contract, but as the twentieth century scholars argued, not for the unequal treaties.7 In order to 
accommodate the political context of the unequal treaties between the European powers and 
some East Asian states since the seventeenth century, European writers of the time chose to 
not consider coercion illegal. The twentieth-century common law writers tried to develop a 
natural law approach to the sources of international law.  
 
By contrast, states born of decolonisation, naturally dualist, since the start drew a fault line 
between a colonial treaty and new treaty. Countries born of decolonization viewed all its 
treaties with suspicion based on the time of its drafting. If a treaty is older than a sovereign, 
and drafted, signed and ratified by the previous colonial government, new nations could, 
then, theoretically speaking, make the distinction that was made in Europe between treaties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The interwar jurists wrote in favour of treaties being contractual to advance a regime, first, for the protection 
of semi-colonially obtained private property. Later, post-decolonization, a continuation of this approach 
amounted to the defence on colonially obtained property. This resulted in the denial of the legal value of the 
New International Economic Order Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
UN Doc A/RES/S-6/3201 (1 May 1974) para 7 that says the NIEO “shall be one of the most important bases of 
economic relations between all peoples and all nations.” See, Antony Anghie, Legal aspects of the New 
International Economic Order, 6 Humanity (2015) 145. 
6 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market, 8 Max Planck UN Yrarbook (2004) 
341, 342-48. A Fatouros, International Law and the Internationalized Contract, 74 Am J Intl L (1980) 134. 
7 Henry Wheaton, Elements of international law: with a sketch of the history of the science (Philadelphia: Carey, 
Lea & Blanchard, 1836). 
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signed by “the Kings above law” and those made by “States bound by law”. Developing 
countries could, theoretically speaking, treat treaties signed by colonial government as ones 
made by Kings above law; only the treaties that the new countries signed after re-birth could 
bind them. 
 
In 1920, the League of Nations generally established conventions and treaties as a source of 
law. Therefore, for the PCIJ Statute even unequal treaties would be covered under the arch of 
“convention” within the meaning of the PCIJ Statute Article 38(1)(d). Such treaties now 
could not be seen as repugnant even after the manifest lack of consent understood in the 
contractual or private law sense. Yet, not only would the early 20th century writers drew 
contractual analogies of international law, ironically, after decolonisation, the breach of such 
unequal treaties, for western writers, warranted contractual remedies.8  
 
A contractual approach to international law, doctrinally problematic in the interwar years, 
became politically incorrect after decolonisation. Therefore writers developed a new 
approach of the internationalisation of contracts that flipped the interwar approach. Using law 
as an antidote to power and politics, ad hoc judicial tribunals, aided by the writings of the 
publicists, championed both the approaches. 9  Since the beginning, this doctrinally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The ICJ Statute thus, textually, legitimized in international law the imposition of inequality, inter alia, on 
China, Siam and Japan. No wonder, at the first opportunity after the setting up of the PCIJ, nationalist China 
thought of the change in fundamental circumstances as an emerging doctrine of international law. Denunciation 
of the Treaty of 2nd November 1856 between China and Belgium case signified use of rebus sic stantibus, the 
clausula, and the political rather than a judicial settlement of the dispute. Denunciation of the Treaty of 2nd 
November 1856 Between China and Belgium PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 8 (1927) 4–5. China argued that its 
declaration was consistent with Article 19 of the Covenant of the League and, therefore, if any appeal against 
termination were to be made, it should go to the Assembly of the League rather than to a judicial tribunal. Matt 
Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire 74 Nordic J Intl L (2005) 
368. 
9 P Singh, The Rough and Tumble of International Courts and Tribunals, 55 Indian J Intl L (2015) 330 ff. 
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problematic approach would be condoned as the rise of innovation in postcolonial 
international dispute settlement.10 
 
A politics of contractual international law is palpably visible here: after the birth of the PCIJ, 
first a contractual approach was employed to ossify the political context of unequal treaties to 
make them sources of international law. Second, after decolonisation, I argue, this 
ossification of the context of the treaties were brushed under the carpet to retrieve from the 
contractual international law remedies of private law against new sovereigns. The investor-
state tribunals became the agents of private remedies for investors against the state. This 
chapter argues that irrespective of the currency used—colonialism or unequal treaties (semi-
colonialism)—private making of public international and the protection of private property 
remains the only purchase. The use of contractual precepts for the making of international 
law, effectively, brushed under the carpet both colonial and semi-colonial histories. The 
interwar contractual approaches to international law, after decolonisation, transformed into an 
argument for the internationalisation of contracts. The private law remedies for investors 
against developing countries, prevalent to this day, evidences this. 
 
II. The years before the League of Nations 
 
A. Colonialism, Semi-colonialism and Treaties before the League 
 
In 2005, Anghie wrote that “colonialism is somewhat pervasive, foundational in international 
law; and this is suggested in the way that the battle over state responsibility shifts to another 
area of international law, sources doctrine.”11 Later that year, Craven critiqued Anghie:  	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For all of the profound insights that Anghie’s analysis brings to the study of the relationship 
between international law and colonialism, … the experience of China, Siam and Japan appears 
to have been far more central to the colonising mission than might otherwise be supposed: they 
were subjected to the full weight of a culturally- loaded international regime whose disciplinary 
thrust – both to open economies to external trade on propitious terms, and to ‘civilise the 
natives’ by insisting upon legal and administrative reform – was largely indistinguishable from 
that associated with formal colonial rule.12 
 
An intellectual disputation aside, Anghie has today established the central role of colonialism 
in the growth of international legal doctrines. Craven however identifies semi-colonialism or 
the unequal treaty regimes as the vanguard of informal empires after decolonisation. One 
could summarize the Anghie-Craven debate as an attempt to identify, between colonialism 
and semi-colonialism, a unique key historical experience with which to further explain the 
continuities of informal empires.  
 
That said, free consent of parties is fundamental to the validity of a contract, however, as the 
nineteenth century writers argued, not to international law. In order to accommodate the 
political context of the unequal treaties between the European powers and some East Asian 
states since the seventeenth century, writers did not consider coercion illegal. The twentieth 
century jurists nevertheless attempted an analogy of international law with contract law. This 
interwar juristic imposition of the laws of the civilized nations, essentially private law, on 
capital importing countries was underpinned by a contractual approach to international law.13  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP, New York, 2005) 241, 
243. 
12 Craven, supra note 8, at 381, 382. 
13 Anghie, supra note 11, 241. 
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The nineteenth century writers awarded to Asians and Africans legal personality just enough 
to allow them to sign away their sovereignty. Anghie has critiqued this as “native consent”.14 
In turn, Craven has critiqued Anghie for reading colonialism in terms of sovereignty and 
territorial titles alone, charging Anghie with essentialising colonialism.15 Craven suggests 
that semi-colonialism—epitomised by the regime of unequal treaties—and not colonialism 
proper is central to the understanding of the postcolonial continuities of informal empires. 
Recently, Lorca, has argued that international law universalised when elites from “semi-
peripheral” polities borrowed European language and vocabulary.16 
 
Notably, Craven offers the polities of “China, Siam and Japan” as examples for the non-
Western parties to the unequal treaties regime of international law. To begin with, perhaps 
that might be one of the reasons for the difference of opinion between Anghie and Craven. 
Anghie, much like Judge Pal of the Tokyo tribunal, would see Japan as a colonizing power 
competing with Britain and other European power and not as semi-colonized, like China.17 
More recently, with his currency of semi-periphery, Arnuf Lorca seems to occupy a 
perceived space between Anghie and Craven arguing “international law became universal 
only when non-Western jurists internalized European legal thought, transforming nineteenth-
century international law along … doctrinal, professional, and normative dimensions.”18  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid 95. 
15 Craven, supra note 8, 382. 
16 AB Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 
Harv Intl L J (2010) 475. 
17 Japan’s understanding as a competing colonial power was central to Judge Pal’s dissent at the Tokyo Tribunal 
and Anghie would agree to Japan’s characterization as such. See, The International Tribunal of the Far East, 
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal (Tokyo: Kokushu-Kankokai, 1999) 323–344, 347–382. Pal discussed in detail 
the Japanese militarisation and preparation for colonialism. 
18 Lorca, supra note 16, 478. U Özsu, Agency, Universality, and the Politics of International Legal History, 52 
Harv Intl L J online (2010) 5. “Westernization was not a variable external to local economic conditions, shaped 
by such factors as the European legal system … Westernization was often an endogenous response to the failure 
of local custom to secure frictionless global transactions.” T Roy, Indigo and law in colonial India, 64 (S1) 
Economic History Rev (2011) 60, 73. 
 
 
	   178 
 
In other words, western law, a source of international law as defined by ICJ Article 38(1)(c), 
first set foot in Asia to ensure a “frictionless global transaction”. In that sense, international 
law competes with lex mercatoria, a set of private norms. This competition became all the 
more acute during the interwar period, particularly because of a new communist concept of 
property after the Russian revolution and the use of sovereignty principles by a non-Tsarist 
Russia.19 I do not see any contradiction between the arguments advanced by Anghie and 
Craven; in fact they appear complementary while building a complete picture of colonialism, 
private law and public international law. While Anghie’s approach, I argue, contributes to 
international legal theory, Craven’s is to international legal history. As such, these findings 
fall in line with my overall thesis that private actors, as norm entrepreneurs as well as private 
norms, make up the body of public international law.20  
 
B. British Courts and the East India Company’s Public and Private character  
 
Initially, the positivists of the nineteenth century could not readily reconcile treaties by way 
of analogy to contracts, as Lauterpacht and McNair were to do later.21 Why a change of guard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Gigory I Tunkin, The Contemporary Soviet Theory of International Law (1978) 31 Current Legal Problems 
177 –188. 
20 In 1910, Elihu Root, said “[A] standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental and of such general 
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the world ... If any country’s 
system of law and administration does not conform to that standard, although the people of the country may be 
content or compelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory 
measure of treatment to its citizens.” E Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 7 ASIL 
Proceedings (1910) 16, 22. Leading publicists Dolzer and Schreuer refer to Root’s aforementioned proposition 
to be the “dominant position” in international law. It is widely known that Carlos Calvo, the famous Argentine 
jurist, has stated that in the disputes between an alien and a government, the former has to resort to local 
remedies waiving diplomatic protection from her own government. M Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause In Latin 
American Constitutions And International Law, 33 Marquette L Rev (1950) 205. However Calvo’s competing 
formulation for Dolzer and Schreuer is “marginal” although historically Latin American states took this 
approach. R Dolzer & C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) 12, as dicussed in D 
Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to the Standards of Civilised Justice? 5 
Transnational Legal Theory (2015) 60, 61. G Kaufmann-Kohler, Soft Law in International Arbitration: 
Codification and Normativity, 1 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2010) 283-299. Cf A al Faruque, Creating Customary 
International Law Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 44 Indian J Intl L (2004) 292, 
296. 
21 Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire 74 Nordic J Intl 
L (2005) 335, 363. 
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then? In the nineteenth century, as Craven writes, European order “seemed to rest upon the 
terms of various peace treaties” where keeping the “distribution of power overshadowed any 
concern for formal consent.”22 For such writers, “any legal insistence upon a perfect exercise 
of voluntary will was to be understood as being conditioned by the context in which any 
particular agreement was to be found.”23 Craven quotes Wheaton thus: “The obligation of 
treaties, by whatever denomination they may be called, is founded, not merely upon the 
contract itself, but upon those mutual relations between the two States, which may have 
induced them to enter into certain engagements.”24 
 
The East India Company, a registered company in England, could, notably, make both, 
unequal treaties by war or sign contracts. It operated transnationally between the Law of the 
Nations and the private law of England. When Wheaton spoke of evaluating treaties “not 
merely upon the contract itself, but upon those mutual relations between the two States” he 
advanced a contextual legal explanation of the seventeenth century East-West power 
relations. A number of cases before the British courts between native rulers, native creditors 
and the Company testify to this reality. In Doss v Secretary of State, the private moneylender 
who loaned the King of Oudh—Oudh being taken over subsequently by the Government of 
the East India Company and later the Company by the British crown—argued: 
 
The East India Company took possession of Oudh as a sovereign power, and at the same time, 
according to the law of nations, became liable to pay the public debts and liabilities of the 
annexed province. Consequently the debt we now claim was transferred in 1856 to the East 
India Company, but it was a debt incapable of being enforced either against the King of Oudh 
or the Company by means of the ordinary tribunals. Then, in 1858 the Crown succeeded the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 361 
23 Ibid. 361. 
24 Wheaton,  quoted in, Craven, supra note 21, 348. 
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Company, and became the transferee of this debt, which can now be enforced against the 
Secretary of State for India, who by that Act is made the person to be sued.25  
 
The Vice-Chancellor enumerated the “principal difficulty” of the case at hand as “whether 
this is not an act of State, and therefore that you cannot sue. No doubt the East India 
Company in its trading capacity might have been sued, but the company had two rights—that 
of a trading company and of a political power.”26 The British court said: “[I]n this case the 
acts of the East India Company, in exercising public and political power, were acts which 
were afterwards recognised by our Government, and they became acts of State for which the 
Crown alone was responsible, and that they cannot be called in question by any Court of 
justice. Their only remedy, if they have any, is by petition of right to the Queen.”27 Such 
cases go further when it comes to exposing the normative discomfort in domesticating public 
and private nature of international law and colonialism. Doss recognised as distinct the 
existence of a mercantile and public function of the East India Company: “The East India 
Company filled two positions; on the one hand, it was a great trading corporation, having 
liabilities of vast importance. Then they had accorded to them a de facto dominion 
[sovereignty] over large tracts of country.”28 
 
Interestingly, the Indian creditor, among other things quoted Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law as authority in support of it’s position.29 Doss lost on the technical ground 
of forum non conveniens. The aggrieved Indian creditor noted the inconsistency of the British 
court in such matters. Although the court found no jurisdiction, Doss observed that British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Doss v Secretary of State for India in Council Equity (1874–75) LR 19 Eq. 509, 522 
26 Ibid,525. 
27 Ibid 516. 
28 The Kingdom of Oudh was one of the provinces of the empire of Delhi, but in 1819 the King of Oudh was 
recognised as an independent sovereign, and continued so until February 1856, when his territories were 
annexed to the British dominion. The legal position of the British Government and the East India Company is 
evidenced by many Acts of the British Parliament. Ibid 516. 
29 Ibid. 526. 
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courts had entertained “suits upon the subject of property in the colonies.”30 In Tulloch v 
Hartley, for example, where it was held that a Court of Equity in England would entertain a 
bill to settle the boundaries of real estate in Jamaica reveals a tendency of the nineteenth 
century British courts to ratify those acts of the British Company that brought land territory to 
the Crown, but not accept, on the logic of the public and private division of the acts of the 
British Companies, the encumbrances attached to the land captured.31 
  
In contrast, in Ex-Rajah of Coorg v EIC, the Indian King argued and “insisted that the two 
notes belonged to him personally and individually, and as his own private property, and not 
as Rajah of Coorg”.32 The British Court however “considered that they belonged to the 
Plaintiff in his character of Rajah of Coorg, and not in any private character.”33 In any case, 
the Plaintiff further “insisted that they had been considered and treated (upon principles … 
the law of nations) as exempt from seizure and confiscation, and had not been seized or 
confiscated, but had been retained by the Defendants as property held by them on deposit or 
trust”.34 
 
Sir John Romilly, went on to note the “principal difficulty … aris[ing] from the double 
character filled by the Defendants the East India Company. They were both a company of 
merchants trading to the East Indies”.35 The British court, while condoning the confiscation 
of the promissory notes belonging to the native king, a British court refused a remedy 
because the Company’s taking possession of the notes was not of “mercantile character …but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid 523. 
31 Tulloch v Hartley (1841) 62 ER 814. In this case the court gave judgment, without mentioning any doubt as to 
the jurisdiction. 
32 Ex-Rajah of Coorg v East India Company  (1860) 54 E.R. 642, 644 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 646. 
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… in the exercise of their sovereign and political power.”36  
 
Such cases establish the role of the Western companies in aiding the development of an 
artificial public-private divide that worked against the native sovereigns. By developing a 
doctrine of a private and a public function of the company in the colonies, the European 
courts were able to aid the export of wealth from colonies while adjudging the takeover of the 
colonies as legal within the Law of the Nations. Also, the courts tried to distinguish between 
the company’s liabilities arising from a contract (private) from that from a treaty (public). 
While a contract was a private law matter for the companies, a treaty after war constituted an 
“exercise of their sovereign and political power”. In fact, an early writers on the issue of the 
choice of law in colonial contracts, Brown, wrote that “[d]uring the colonial period … 
companies treated the selection of a proper law to govern the contract as a matter of 
convenience rather than substance.”37 No wonder, today, with an appetite for disagreements, 
the “[c]onflicts scholars … have helped to confuse courts and make a mess of choice-of-law 
analysis.”38 In the hands of the tribe of the common law scholars, those working between 
private law and public international law, this mess became only bigger in the case of the 
colonial concession contracts. 
 
III. The Interwar Years (1914–1945): The Contractualisation of International 
Law  
 
Collins has recently criticized the common law conception of “standardized contracts” for 
“mistaking contracts for law, thereby misrepresenting private rules as public norms, even 
though they lack the qualities of abstraction, system, and generality commonly associated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid.  
37 R Brown, Choice of law provisions in concession and related contracts, 39 Mod L Rev (1976) 625. 
38 Larry Kramer, Choice of law in complex litigation, 71 NYU Law Review (1996) 547. 
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with law.”39 One can read Collins’ critique as compatible with my thesis on the contractual 
approach to international law. The interwar British lawyers, it is argued, mistook contracts 
for international law, the lack of the qualities of abstraction, system, and generality 
commonly associate with international law notwithstanding.  A contractual approach to 
treaties served to take the focus away from the use of “duress” in the making of the unequal 
Peace treaties in Asia. 
 
In terms of jurisprudence, it brought naturalism back to the study of international law’s 
sources doctrine. In Britain, the law of contract itself emerges from the lex Mercatoria, a 
well-known example of natural law of private property. The jurisprudential natural law 
approach of contractual precepts for the making of international law, as Lauterpacht and 
McNair did, had the effect of brushing under the carpet both colonial and semi-colonial 
histories.40 
 
Equally notable is the impetus the birth of the permanent international courts; the PCIJ for 
example, gave to the contractual and private reading of public international law. British 
international lawyers, influenced in good measure by common law, first mistook “contracts 
for law”, misrepresenting subsequently private rules as public norms. Private law, or lex 
mercatoria, even though it lacked, to quote Collins, “the qualities of abstraction, system, and 
generality commonly associated with law” would now become the bricks of the house of 
international law. The contractual approach to international law, in that sense, is a product of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hugh Collins, Flipping Wreck: Lex Mercatoria on the Shoals of Ius Cogens, in, Stefan Grundmann, Florian 
Möslein & Karl Riesenhuber Contract Governance: Dimensions in Law and Interdisciplinary Research (OUP, 
Oxford, 2015) 383, 386. 
40 In Mighell v Sultan of Johore, the British Court of Appeal ruled that “the fact that a foreign sovereign has 
been residing in this country, and has entered into a contract here, under an assumed name, as if a private 
individual, does not amount to a submission to the jurisdiction, or render him liable to be sued for breach of 
such contract.” Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 Q.B. 149. 
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twentieth century natural law approach of Lauterpacht and McNair.41 Naturally, therefore, 
investigating such writers’ turn away from positivism, as does Craven, has a useful purchase. 
This approach aimed at enlarging the basket of sources doctrine to allow private laws to sit 
with classic sources of international law. Contracts could thus be compared with international 
treaties.  
 
For that to happen, consent had to be ruled out from the reading of international law. A 
century before, Peace Treaties, the dominant form of treaty-making characterized the global 
political scene. Craven’s study of such treaties together with their context and political 
environment of the time expose the essential role of power, duress and force in their making. 
In order to reconcile the use of duress in treaty-making as just and legal, writers distinguished 
between a just duress and a wrongful one in international law. At the turn of the 19th century, 
the PCIJ Statute, and later the ICJ, recognized treaties as sources of international law: 
“international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states”. It is notable that the Statute refers to “general” and 
“particular” conventions from which the PCIJ had to identify “rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states”. As such the PCIJ did not rule out the role of consent.  
 
By contrast, in 1927, Lauterpacht had tendered an analogy that ‘the legal nature of private 
law contracts and international law treaties is essentially the same’ to which McNair 
subscribed lock, stock and barrel.42 For them, a consensual or contractual international law 
was to ossify the “overriding considerations of political necessity” and political context of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 H Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longman, Green & Co, New 
York/Calcutta, 1927) 155-80. 
42 McNair, Introduction, ibid, v-vi. Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and 
the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 Yale  L J (2007) 823 “suggests instead that courts draw from modern contract 
theory in developing canons of treaty interpretation.” 
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unequal treaty regime.43  Referring to the East Asian unequal treaties, Craven notes, in the 
twentieth century “[s]ome way had to be found to allow some treaties to be changed without 
bringing the whole edifice of law crashing to the ground”.44 For Lauterpacht and NcNair, a 
way out of this impasse “was to separate their concern for peace and good order from their 
rationalization as to the binding force of treaties.”45  Once freed from the obligation of 
“understanding compliance with treaties in terms of their contextual or political significance, 
international lawyers were then able to talk about the perfection of the analogy between 
treaties and contracts.”46  
 
In other words, after the League of Nations began limiting recourse to force, unequal treaties 
could thereafter be understood as ‘agreements governed by international law, whose binding 
force depended upon the “autonomous will of the parties”.’47 For the sources doctrine, it 
meant that opinions of the twentieth century writers, those that took a contractual view of 
international law – brushing under the carpet histories of both colonialism and semi-
colonialism – would pass off as sources to determine the rules of law. 
 
The contractualization of international law has left footprints of its march. The Lena 
Goldfield arbitration in 1930 between the government of Soviet Russia and British investors 
is a case in point. While reporting Lena arbitration, Nussbaum noted that ‘unjust enrichment, 
bases of the Lena claims, have long been recognized as legitimate causes of action under the 
various systems of law, including international law’. Not only did he fail to cite a source or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Craven, supra note 21, 364, fn 107. 
44 “How could they explain to the Chinese that unilateral termination was not an option whilst allowing others to 
readily engage in precisely the same process?” Craven, supra note 21, 366. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 367. 
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authority for his argument, rather, he even grossly misquoted the actual taward.48 The actual 
words were: ‘On ordinary legal principles this constitutes a right of action for damages, but 
the Court prefers to base its award on the principle of “unjust enrichment”.’49 Unjust 
enrichment, a principle of private law, was never so established a principle of international 
law, let alone against a sovereign. 
 
A year before, in 1929, the PCIJ Serbian Loans case distinguished contracts that are subjects 
of international law and those that are subjects of domestic law: “Any contract which is not a 
contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the 
municipal law of some country.”50 Consequently, it is governed by “private international law 
or the doctrine of the conflict of laws”.51  In the civil law system too the conflation of public 
law and private law presented a problem that for Mann reflected a lack of “due regard” by 
“public international lawyers … to the character and teachings of private international law”: 
 
[T]he Swiss-French doctrine, as formulated by its authors, stems from a fundamental error 
which would not have arisen if public international lawyers had had due regard to the character 
and teachings of private international law: in the type of case where there is room for the 
problem at all under customary public international law, no breach of contract in fact occurs 
and, consequently, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not infringed.52 
 
Yet common law writers and arbitrators placed a great deal of reliance upon analogy between 
treaties and contracts. The Lena Goldfields award by an ad hoc tribunal, allowed an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields Ltd. And The Soviet Government, Award of Sept. 3, 1930, 36 
Cornell L Q (1950-1951) 31, 41. 
49 Ibid., 51 
50 Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12) 41 
51 Ibid. 
52 FA Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 American J Intl L (1960) 572, 578, 580-81. 
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opportunity for private investors to move away from the PCIJ’s approach.53 The Lena case 
occasioned the use by investors of British private law and a moral vocabulary of “unjust 
enrichment”. Lauterpacht’s text written three years before ‘With Special Reference to 
International Arbitration ’ was a significant influence.54  With Lauterpacht as the chief 
protagonist of this view, the interwar British jurists developed a natural law of private law 
principles to create public international law.55 Besides, Lauterpcaht and McNair often cross-
cited each other to argue that domestic decisions could be used as sources in international 
law.56 Taking the contractual approach to treaties further, McNair argued that concession 
contracts were treaties.57 For him, all contracts were treaties therefore general principles of 
law from civilized nations could be used to interpret them.  
 
Effectively, Lena allowed scholars to erroneously argue that the award equated “unjust 
enrichment” with “full damages”.58 Friedmann was the first to recognize the conflation of 
unjust enrichment and full damages saying unjust enrichment does not mean ‘an obligation to 
pay full, adequate and prompt compensation’.59 Later in 1974 Schreuer agreed saying such an 
advocacy is a ‘means to dress up policy consideration or ideological preference’ stemming 
from ‘the much more general and indeterminate concept of unjust enrichment’.60 This is just 
one of the many examples that preceded the wholesale creation of international law by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v USSR, Award of Sept 3, 1930, 36 Cornell L Q (1950) 42, 50. 
54 Lauterpacht, supra note 41, 155-80. EA Belgrad, General Principles of Law and the Use of Private Law 
Analogies in International Law: The Applicability of “General Principles”, 9 Indian J Intl L (1969) 483. 
55 H Lauterpacht, Decisions of Municipal Courts as a source of international Law, 10 Brit YB Intl L (1929) 65. 
56 Ibid, 
57 Arnol McNair, The General Principlesof Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 23 British YB Int’l  L (1957) 
1.  
58 Friedmann was first to recognize the conflation of unjust enrichment and full damages saying unjust 
enrichment does not mean ‘an obligation to pay full, adequate and prompt compensation’. W Friedmann, The 
Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 207-210. 
59 W Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) 
207-210. 
60 C Schreuer, Unjustified Enrichment in International Law, 22 American J Comp L (1974) 281, 285. 
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jurists.61 Before and after the World War II, it was not uncommon for scholars to anchor their 
arguments and buttress their legal opinion by an exclusive reference to other publicists.62  
 
Perhaps the deployment by the British investors of a moralist natural law vocabulary of 
“unjust enrichment” was in line with the rising natural law approach of Lauterpacht and 
McNair. This new natural law approach attacked non-European sovereignty or understanding 
of property not in conformity with capital exporting states. Later while discussing the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, Lord McNair noted the Lena award with far 
greater accuracy but with the same effect of depositing contract into the orbit of international 
law.63  
 
However, a question arises: why was colonial capture not “unjust enrichment”? About a 
century later, Anghie would answer this question. For the nineteenth century positivists, as 
for the twentieth century naturalists, “colonial problems constituted a separate and distinct set 
of issues which were principally of a political character”.64 As a number of British cases 
discussed above clarify, even for the British courts, colonialism espoused by the British 
corporations, particularly when ossifying native sovereignty, constituted an exercise of the 
corporation’s “sovereign and political power”. As a result, colonialism “did not impinge in 
any significant way on the core theoretical concerns” either of private law of England or of 
international law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Schwarzenberger, for example, explicitly ‘quote[d] German authors such as Professor Herbert Kraus, who 
was in close touch with the German Foreign Office during the Weimar Republic, and who was Professor of 
International Law at Göttingen University under the Nazi regime until 1937.’ G Schwarzenberger, The Bank 
For International Settlements and the Czech gold assets held by the Bank of England, 3 Modern L Rev (1939) 
151-152. 
62 Professor Sornarajah has made this point on many occasions. M Sornarajah, Power And Justice: Third World 
Resistance in International Law, 10 Singapore Yrnk Intl L (2006) 31. 
63 A McNair, The Applicability of General Principles of Law to Contracts between a State and a Foreign 
National, ABA Sec. Mineral & Natural Resource Law Proceedings (1957) iii, 168, 173.  
64 Anghie, supra note 11, 34–35. O Shoyele, State Succession And Debts in the African States, 22 Polish Yrbk 
Intl L (1995-96) 65, 79. 
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IV. Colonial Contracts after decolonisation 
 
The law of contracts in India emerged in the context of colonialism. The British Parliament 
enacted the Indian Contract Act 1872, that, as the Indian Law Commission put it in 1958, 
codified the British customs and usages of “real property law”.65 Soon after decolonization, 
writing in defence of private property, a contractual view of international law, and assailing 
newly acquired sovereignty occurred hand in hand. 66  After decolonisation, Western 
arbitrators were too eager to read a breach of private law, i.e. contracts, by a sovereign as a 
breach of public international law. It was in this context that the doctrine of 
internationalisation of contracts began.67 
 
A. The Internationalisation of Contracts 
 
There was no authority to turn to for [the] doctrine other than “academic dressing” (interview 
81, 2). The charismatic notables, therefore, found it … much easier to invoke the grand 
principles of law in support of their decisions, and the principles became embodied in those 
notables in the eyes of their colleague and their potential adversaries. Their colleagues … were 
as a general rule too respectful to these high judges or academic grand masters to dare contest 
their right to speak in the name of law.68 
 
The empirical evidences generated by interviews with the top arbitrators lead Dezalay and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The Indian Law Commission Report, supra note 2, 1. 
66 Anghie, supra note 11, 240-244. Gilles Cuniberti, The merchant who would not be king: Unreasoned Fears 
about Private Lawmaking, in, HM Watt & DP Arroyo (ed) Private International Law and Global Governance 
(OUP, NY, 1014) 141. 
67 Orrego Vicuña explains this with the use of French sources while Sornarajah’s exposition is based on 
literature in English. See, Orrego Vicuña, supra note 6, 342 ff; M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment 3rd edn. (CUP, NY, 2011) 289. 
68  Bryant G Garth & Yves Dezalay, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press, 1996) 89. 
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Garth to attest to the internationalisation of private law by “charismatic notables” at a time 
these notables shot down General Assembly resolution as non-law.69  Sornarajah points out 
that, against the will of weaker states, Western publicists have through the force of their 
writings internationalized contracts, particularly those about oil.70 The internationalisation of 
contracts was intended at neutralising political postcolonialism with legal colonialism. While 
attempting to internationalize private law against developing countries, the western 
companies not only wanted to exclude themselves from the local courts and judges, but they 
avoided “recourse to the laws of these countries”.71 
 
In terms of litigation strategy, after mass decolonization in Asia and Africa, investors made 
two arguments for the protection of private capital: (1) Replacing the law of the place of 
contracts by western law, and (2) Replacing local contracts by the language of international 
law of treaty.  Decolonization was accompanied by investor-state arbitrations that sprang out 
of efforts by the states of the Middle East to terminate or renegotiate long-term petroleum 
concession contracts.72 There possibly cannot be a better example of the influence of 
scholarly writings on arbitrators who in the name of transnational arbitration replaced the lex 
loci with British or French law. The ICJ Article 38(1) (c) on general principles of civilized 
nations supported this corporate strategy in no small part. The Abu Dhabi arbitration is an apt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Thus the sole arbitrator in Texaco v Libya said that although UN resolutions have a legal value, they are 
variable. The arbitrator then said that some of the resolutions referred to by the Libyan government “were 
supported by a majority of Member States but not by any of the developed countries with market economies 
which carry on the largest part of international trade.” It is the “developed countries with market economies 
which carry on the largest part of international trade” that make a UN declaration contra legem even though a 
larger number of developing countries with smaller part of international trade do think otherwise. Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 ILM 1 (1978).  
70 What is notable is that the internationalization of contacts theory is rooted in arbitral awards and writings of 
the publicist. Sornarajah, supra note 84, 289. AFM Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary 
International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EJIL (2001) 309-328. M Sornarajah, Resistance and 
Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment. (CUP, Cambridge, 2015). 
71 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 68, 86. 
72 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 ILR (1953) 534. Such arbitrations were all a result of, as 
Anghie says, a new transnational view of international law. Anghie, supra note 11, 226. 
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case in point.73 At the time the award came out, it was, quite literally, a classic case of the 
(Middle) East meets the West. It busted the hornet’s nest of norms as the new wine of 
transnational law was served in the bottle of comparative law. Friedmann, while serving this 
wine to the academia thirsty for answers, stood somewhere between apology and optimism: 
 
Lord Asquith in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration … use[s] comparative law as a guide to the 
principles that, in the circumstances of the ease, are most appropriate and equitable. This will, 
in most, though by no means in all, cases, involve a comparison of the relevant principles of the 
most representative systems of the common-law and the civil-law world. In certain cases it may 
be necessary to examine some of the non-Western legal systems, such as Muslim or Hindu law, 
now actively represented in the family of nations.74 
 
Lord Asquith himself in his Award made no bones about his borrowings from scholarly 
opinions. He notably introduced his footnote in the following words: ‘Perhaps I may make 
this footnote the vehicle for an expression of gratitude to those who addressed me, for 
bringing to my notice some of the voluminous literature, articles, addresses and other 
publications—by experts … Those from which I have derived the most instruction.’75 Lord 
Asquith’s words speak for itself. In relation to the Abu Dhabi arbitration some scholrs 
suggested that ‘a good deal of weight should be added to [the award’s] persuasiveness by 
reason of the appearance on behalf of the parties of such jurists of international repute as 
Professors Lauterpacht and Waldock and Sir Walter Moncton.’76  Moreover, judges have 
formulated the concept of expropriation unjustified not within the doctrine of law, but, rather 
patronizingly, as rooted in the need to develop poor countries with foreign capital. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 ILR (1951) 144. 
74 See for example, Wolfgang Friedmann, Uses of “General Principles” In the Development of International 
Law, 57 American J Intl L (1963) 279. 
75 Award of Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, 1 ICLQ (1952) 247, 258. 
76 EJ Cosford Jr., The Continental Shelf And The Abu Dhabi Award, 1 McGill L J (1953)109, 113. 
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example, Judge Carneiro in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co case said:  
 
[W]hen there are so many countries in need of foreign capital for the development of their 
economy, it would not only be unjust, it would be a grave mistake to expose such capital, 
without restriction or guarantee, to the hazards of the legislation of countries in which such 
capital has been invested.77  
 
The French text of the concessions agreement upon which this case was based had used the 
term “agreement” and “convention” interchangeably. In their Memorial, the British, 
displaying astute lawyering, referred to the concession agreement as “concessions 
convention” to read it as a treaty which the ICJ rejected.78  There cannot possibly be a better 
example of the influence of scholarly writings on arbitrators who in the name of transnational 
arbitration replaced the lex loci with British or French law supported, in no small part, by the 
ICJ Article 38(1)(c) on general principles of civilized nations. Such arbitrations came up due 
to the decision by some Middle Eastern states to terminate or renegotiate long-term 
petroleum concessions agreements.79  
 
Jennings, leading British publicist of the time, has recognized that from time to time the 
Powers did intervene in pursuance of pecuniary claims; perhaps the best-known instance was 
the blockade of the Venezuelan ports by Germany, Great Britain and Italy in 1902, to enforce 
a series of claims, several of which arose out of contracts.80 But then he says that ‘[t]hese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Anglo-Iranian Oil co. case (jurisdiction), Judgment [1952] ICJ Rep p. 93, 162. Sornarajah contextualizes this 
patronizing attitude by arguing that such a view ‘merely shows the paucity of justifications possessed by 
international lawyers, all of whom, of course, will claim a high degree of rectitude, scholarship and impartiality, 
in formulating theories to advance the cause of foreign investors from their states.’ Sornarajah, supra note 84, 
293; G Schwarzenberger, Decolonisation and the Protection of Foreign Investments, 20 Current Legal Problems 
(1967) 213-231. 
78 Anglo-Iranian Oil co. case, Ibid., 112. 
79 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 ILR 534 (1953). 
80 RY Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 British Yrbk Intl L (1961) 157. 
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early precedents, however, must be approached with caution, if only because the instances 
tend to be somewhat one-sided, in that a resort to self-help was necessarily a case of the 
strong enforcing a solution on the relatively weak.’ He further says they are not ‘for that 
reason necessarily bad law’!81  Against Jennings’ liberal uplifting of investor-state contracts 
to the level of treaty, Sornarajah advances a different legal opinion: 
 
Being domestic contracts, contracts of foreign investment create obligations only in domestic 
law. It is without doubt that, through the use of appropriate language, the rights so created can 
be lifted up and subjected to an international regime of protection. But, the extent of those 
rights must depend on domestic law. They cannot be expanded by an international 
mechanism.82  
 
Not only did Jennings make a very strong case for the internationalization of contracts 
through the force of scholarly opinion, he furthermore opined that a ‘case of the strong 
enforcing a solution on the relatively weak’ should not be seen as a bad law. Further, 
Jennings’ analogy equating contracts with treaties to avoid non liquet with the force of the 
ICJ Statute 38(1)(d) was contrary to the existing view at the time. Thus Jennings’ view 
fertilized the idea that contracts, understood in its classic sense, become a subject of 
international law.83 
 
By contrast, Professor Sornarajah has pointed out that soon after decolonization, the issues 
regarding the legality and force of contracts in international law arose.84 However, the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Ibid., 159. 
82 See, Legal Opinion of M. Sornarajah, in, El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, Case No. 
ARB/03/15, at para. 12, <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0970.pdf>. 
83 Jennings, supra note 80, 157. 
84 “It is an interesting aside to note that the United States in its formative years, as an importer of European 
capital, had experiences similar to those which developing countries presently have, and took stances not 
dissimilar to those developing countries now take. But after its emergence as a regional economic power, it 
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interpretation of contracts as an instrument of international law meant international law, a set 
of customs from “civilized states,” becomes the applicable law repudiating the locality of 
contracts.85 Later in the Sapphire case, the arbitrator ruled that concession contracts have a 
“quasi-international character” releasing it from the ‘sovereignty of a particular legal 
system.’86 Here although Iran was the lex loci, for various reasons the parties did not choose 
Iranian law. The general principles of law of civilized nations as mentioned in the ICJ Article 
38(1)(c) were held to be the governing law.87  
 
In Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co case, both Saudi Arabian law and general 
principles of law were held to govern the contract while limiting the concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.88  Similar results were reached in Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum arbitration.89  
 
Most recently, after the government of Venezuela decided to re-structure certain oil projects 
in 2007 so as to bring them in line with the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law, ExxonMobil and 
ConocoPhillips decided to exit Venezuela. These companies subsequently initiated a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
insisted that its Latin American neighbours should treat foreign investors in accordance with international 
standards.” referring the The Rose Mary case where it was said the settled practice of the international law 
trumping municipal law can be ascertained from ‘decided cases and from the writings of jurists.’ Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Co Ltd v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary) [1953] 1 WLR 246 (Supreme Ct Aden), at 253-57. The Barcelona 
Traction case testifies that operative part aside, even obiter dicta can add to the value of precedent. It was on 
“egra omnes” in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3, 32, 33–34. For if the publicists’ view do determine the sources of law, a larger group of publicist 
will, within the democratic understanding, determine sources more accurately than those in the minority. 
Perhaps therefore during the debates in the Assembly of the League of Nations, Argentina unsuccessfully 
proposed an amendment to prevent the PCIJ’s decisions from acquiring the authority of judicial precedent. G 
Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2011) 5, 
8. When the doctrinal ordering of sources doctrine is disturbed by pushing the “subsidiary means” within 
38(1)(d) to situate it with 38(1)(a)-(c), many issues of political economy crop up. See, M Peil, Scholarly 
writings as a source of law: a survey of the use of doctrine by the International Court of Justice, 1 Cambridge J 
Intl & Comp L (2012) 136–161, 139. 
85 See for an important discussion, Anastasios Gourgourinis, The Distinction between Interpretation and 
Application of Norms in International Adjudication, 2 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2011) 31-57. 
86 Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 ILR (1963) 136, 173. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 ILR (1958) 117. 
89 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 
ILM (1978) 1.  
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arbitrations involving some of the largest claims ever put before international tribunals. 
However, the bargains that the companies insist they are defending are not reflected in the 
agreements that they had actually signed. Generally speaking, these arbitrations amount to an 
attempt on the part of these companies to use international arbitral tribunals to re-draft on 
their behalf the contracts they had negotiated, so as to secure a windfall (which they had 
never bargained for) upon their exit from Venezuela.90 The multinational companies that 
exited Venezuela have argued for a breach of treaty and not of contract.91  
 
The sole arbitrator Lord Asquith in the Abu Dhabi award made no bones about his 
borrowings from scholarly opinions.92 Referring to Lauterpacht’s paper on Sovereignty over 
Submarine Areas, Asquith noted that Lauterpacht’s paper is ‘is likely to be published … 
almost simultaneously with this Award.’93 However, Jessup in his transnational law saw this 
award as the issue of ‘lex non conveniens, if such a rule existed, as it should.’94  Much later 
Amerasinghe however wrote apologetically for Lord Asquith while justifying the use of 
“general principle of law” in the Abu Dhabi arbitration95 although he did not explicitly 
support the internationalization of contract theory.96 The pro-investor bias of arbitrators in 
invest-state arbitratins remians moot to this day.  
 
More recently, in March 2015, before an investment dispute tribunal Bolivia applied a pre-
colonial reading of the Bolivian nation recognising the nations of tribal and aboriginal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Juan Carlos Boué, Enforcing Pacta Sunt Servanda? Conoco-Phillips and Exxon-Mobil Versus the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, 5 J Intl Dispute Settlement (2014) 438–474. 
91 Ibid. 451. 
92 Petroleum Dev Ltd. v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 ILR (1951) 144. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Jessup, supra note 10,  82. 
95 CF Amerasinghe, Some Legal Problems of State Trading in Southeast Asia, 20 Vanderbilt L Rev (1967) 257, 
270. 
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peoples within the state.97 It said ‘The Plurinational State of Bolivia as party to this 
arbitration cannot be considered without acknowledging the particularities of its people, 
model of State and recent history. Bolivia accused the investor of not coming with “clean 
hands” supporting its claims based on judicial decisions and writings of the publicists.98 In 
his dissenting note in Abaclat arbitration, Abi-Saab noted a clear ‘modification or revision of 
the existing rules,’ while defining what gap filling is:  
 
A gap or lacuna is a void, an empty legal space not covered by any rule. But here we have a 
complete legal regulation, covering almost every instance of the proceedings. What the 
majority award proposes is to replace most of it by another set of rules, which cannot be seen, 
by any stretch of imagination, as filling a void.99 
 
The practical value of prior arbitral award as a precedent in an on-going arbitration is, 
nevertheless, rather obvious. In January 2015, in Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Australia case, the 
claimant sought to introduce into the record two sources.100 Those two subsidiary sources are 
a recent award in the arbitration’ the Gremcitel SA v Peru,101 and ‘legal opinion by Justice Ian 
Callinan’.102 Overruling the respondent state’s objections, the tribunal accepted the admission 
of both the sources, and ‘the Tribunal notes that the Gremcitel Award is intended to be 
submitted as legal authority.’103 Despite the doctrinal import to the contrary, in actual 
arbitrations, gauging from the disagreement between the claimant and respondent, prior 
awards work like a primary source.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-15 (31 March 2015) 8, para 35. 
98 Ibid 84-85. Likewise, the Indian model BIT text of 2015 has invoked the Calvo clause The Model Text for the 
Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty < 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_division/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf>. 
99 Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab, Abaclat and Others v. Argentina (Decision on Jurisdiction and 
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B. A Suitable Semantics: Translating native legal relations into a treaty 
 
The Right of Passage case between India and Portugal is illustrative in more than one 
ways.104 During the arguments before the ICJ, Portugal translated local Indian legal terms 
sanad, jagir and sararanjam that actually refer to land grants in India, as the Marathas 
handing over sovereignty over certain areas to Portugal. The ICJ rightly disagreed on the 
handing over of territory thus rejecting the translation of Urdu local terms into treaty.105 
Although the ICJ kept “treaty” as a term of reference, the Court noted: 
 
From an examination of the various texts of that article placed before it, the Court is unable to 
conclude that the language employed therein was intended to transfer sovereignty over the 
villages to the Portuguese. There are several instances on the record of treaties concluded by 
the Marathas that show that, where a transfer of sovereignty was intended, appropriate and 
adequate expressions like cession “in perpetuity” or “in perpetual sovereignty” were used. The 
expressions used in the two sanads and connected relevant documents establish, on the other 
hand, that what was granted to the Portuguese was only a revenue tenure called a jagir or 
saranjam of the value of 12,000 rupees a year. This was a very common form of grant in India 
and not a single instance has been brought to the notice of the Court in which such a grant has 
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the matters of domestic law, ‘[a]s a matter of legal logic,’ Megaw LJ found “insuperable difficulty” in Armar 
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been construed as amounting to a cession of territory in sovereignty.106 
  
Judge Armand-Ugon’s dissent noted that these ‘term[s] had no single and legally precise 
meaning.’107 By translating sanad or decree into a treaty thus giving it a vocabulary of 
international law, the Portuguese tried to elevate contracts to the position of treaties. How 
could contract be used to hand over sovereignty to another state? More recent works in legal 
history of India argues that as the British East India Company established its territorial 
empire in India, “the British braided together notions of sovereignty that then existed in 
Europe with those that existed in South Asia.” 108  Sudipta Sen argues that “In British India, 
where Persian had long been recognized as the official language of correspondence with the 
Mughals and other native regimes, terms close or analogous to ‘sovereignty’ in contemporary 
Persian or Hindustani usage such as mulkgiri or iqtidar were never seriously considered as 
substantively equivalent concepts in contemporary debates on the legal validity of East India 
Company’s territorial acquisitions.”109  
 
After decolonisation, a margin of translation allowed the erstwhile colonial powers to use of a 
rigid colonial vocabulary of international law against the newly free peoples. It is argued that 
the Portuguese arguments though unsuccessful in the Right of Passage case became the 
springboard for innovative argument for putting down the sovereignty of states born of 
decolonisation. 
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V. From Systemic Integration to the Rejection of the NIEO 
 
International investment law is perhaps the best example of the analogy from private law 
being deployed by lawyers to de facto make law on foreign investment.110 The fall of the 
Berlin wall and break-up of the Soviet Russia further entrenched the view that any non-
capitalist doctrine of international law would ultimately bite dust. Private investors would 
invest in developing countries with the arguments that they are doing so for the development 
of the economy while their own profits are only a welcome spin-off. Only when sovereign 
states would try to curtail the freedom of the investors would the investors use private law 
concepts to defend their international investments. In the process they would even use 
concepts borrowed from human rights regime to defend their investments.111 
 
Recently, for instance, Paparinskis argues that international human rights can fill the 
temporal gap between classic and modern content of international minimum standards that 
fair and equitable treatment of investment demands.112 He therefore argues that the concept 
of the international minimum standard within investment law should focus on the 
arbitrariness of form and procedure rather than various policy choices of States and 
expectations of investors. Paparinskis links human rights to investment law. He seems to 
argue for a human right of investors. He is of the view that arguments from human rights 
treaties may be used to explain analogous investment protection rules using ‘relevant’ rules 
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44. 
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as described in the VCLT Article 31(3)(c).113 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT says that for 
interpreting treaties, together with the context, ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ can also be used. Even the strictest possible 
interpretation of the VCLT Article 31(3)(c) according to him allows parallel human rights 
obligations to become “relevant” in the interpretative process.114  
 
Paparinskis draws strength from the prior arguments made, as discussed before, by scholars 
and judges who view VCLT Artilcle 31(3)(c) as an article of “systemic” integration.115 
Besides, negotiation history, another tool for interpreting international law, of the VCLT 
reveals that Article 31(3)(c) had been included to avoid the risk of non liquet, namely, a 
situation when a tribunal decides that it has no rules available to apply to the case before it. 
All this allows Paparinskis to argue that in an investor-state dispute, investors can draw on 
“relevant rules” from human rights to protect their investment. In that sense he seeks to 
achieve a “systemic” integration of human rights and investment law.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, conflating human rights and investment law is problematic. 
First, bringing substantive human rights law to fill the gap of investment law through 
structural arguments is astute, and imaginative but also legally didactic. Substantively 
speaking, human rights and investment law address different subjects and an attempt to use 
human rights law for investor protection amount to legal pontification in need of a scrutiny. 
Such an approach therefore begs the question whether “any relevant rules” from human rights 
could be invoked in support of investment protection? Of course investors have a legal right 
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Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave (Brill/Nijhoff, The Hague, 2015). 
 
 
	   201 
 
to have their investment protected. To however put rich and powerful investors in the same 
class as, addressee of international human rights law needs more theory building. 
 
Such a systemic stitching of international law’s two regimes comes at the cost of ignoring the 
class reality of international society. That international law addresses the world that is 
divided in classes is a truism.116 Naturally, to Paparinskis the ‘historical narrative of the 
resistance’ by States that called for a New International Economic Order is not ‘particularly 
helpful’.117 The rejection of the NIEO today exposes that a transnational capitalist class, 
mostly comprising investors, shapes international law to its benefit.118  
 
Ironically within the doctrine of sources of International law,119 while international law finds 
writings of publicists as sources of international law, certain investment awards ruled out 
even United Nations declarations on the NIEO as sources of international law given the lack 
of consensus in the NIEO declaration.120 This means while writings of scholars can make 
international law, UN declarations, often a product of negotiations between states, can still be 
rejected as sources by arbitrators in investor state disputes. Thus a small class of writers, 
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recognized by the contesting states’.121 While ICJ Article 38(1)(a) talks about rules expressly 
recognized by the parties, the ICJ Article 38(1)(c) invites the World Court to apply “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. In some ways, the latter takes 
away what the former intended to give i.e. autonomy to the parties. The latter, expectedly, 
became the springboard of juristic activism to advance a contractual view of international 
law.122 
 
Intellectual property is the newest kind of property that capital exporting nations invest in and 
earn revenues from. And here too similar battle lines are visible. A policy based argument to 
remove intellectual property from the determined province of the law of contracts, for some 
lawyers, amounts to naiveté.123 The nature of international economic law, by baring the 
capitalist nature of public international law, only proves that the latter is a made of private 
norms. In the twenty-first century, the use of “systemic” integration of investment law and 
human rights law has uncanny resemblances to the interwar and post 1945 battle of norms.  
 
Blind to the vicissitudes of class reality, scholars argue that international minimum standards 
applicable to individual humans should now be extended to individual investors. To make the 
point differently, a new natural law approach to international investment law seeks to enrich 
it by lifting lock, stock, and barrel the protection of humans in human rights law. However, it 
is simply an extension of the old natural law approach of the interwar years. The role of 
publicists that cross-cite each other to make a suitable international law is rather visible here. 
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Concluding the Thesis 
Without belaboring what has already been said in the last five chapters, the thesis has 
tried to examine the nature of public international law. The thesis has argued that 
public international law is functionally private in nature. The private enterprise of 
international law has been facilitated by, both, (1) private norm entrepreneurs and the 
artificial public private distinction between the acts of the European colonial 
corporations (see chap 5).  
My thesis attempts to problematize international law’s sources; the subsidiary 
sources. To the extent, both, judicial decisions and writings of the publicists are seen 
as sources to determine the rules of international law, they come with a heavy 
European bias. These subsidiary sources operationalize the other sources.  
Therefore, in the twenty first century, we must read such sources critically. I have 
attempted that. In order to do so, I have run the readers through the various tracts of 
time; the nineteenth century (chapters 1 and 5), the interwar period (chapters 2 and 5), 
the time after decolonization (chapters 3, 4, and 5) to this day.  The tread that binds 
the whole thesis is the role of jurists and judicial decisions, although deemed 
subsidiary by the doctrine of sources, have been much more than subsidiary. The 
study of the “more than subsidiary” impact of these sources is qualitative than 
quantitative.  
The thesis argues that Western jurists with the power of their network, or with their 
invisible college of lawyers, have developed the doctrines of international law for the 
protection of private property. In that sense, public international law is a product of 
the private functions of colonial companies and of the arguments advanced to protect 









emerges from the concern for the protection of the property of the alien.  
Once initiated into such a world, countries born of decolonization were faced with the 
task of decolonizing international law. The biggest challenged they faced was the 
opinions of the established, or as the ICJ statute calls them, “the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations”.  Given that the centuries preceding the birth of the 
League of Nations witnessed colonialism and the regime of unequal treaties with the 
non-West, one cannot simply assume that the Western jurists would give within their 
doctrine a place to the concerns of the Other; those that were not “civilized nations”. 
A critical examination of the jurists and their work on the various aspects of 
international law animates my thesis. I discuss a range of issues and example to prove 
a omnipresent bias for private property in the writings of the jurists. Furthermore, 
when states began to deviate from the capitalist view of property, western jurists cited 
each other as a proof of existence of a law that was pro-capital. In that sense, the lock 
of the primary sources of international law (sated in ICJ Statute article 38(1) (a)-(c) 
were unlocked by 38(1)(d). The subsidiary sources had, metaphorically speaking, a 
key function in the making of international law. 
 
To the extent the non-Western jurists remain a small minority in the invisible college 
of lawyers, the concerns of developing countries remain unaddressed. That the elite of 
the developing countries now find their interest aligned to the Western bourgeoisie, 
put together, they form a transitional class that acts likes states. They are shaping law 
to their advantage to the expense of the subalterns in both the East and the West.  	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